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This collection of original essays has been 
assembled to honor Samuel Beckett on his 
seventy-fifth birthday — a celebration to 
which the writer himself has made his own 
contribution in the form of a play especially 
written for the occasion and entitled Ohio Im­
promptu. This special piece appears in an 
appendix to the volume, where it has been 
reproduced, through a combination of photo­
graphic facsimile and textual transcription, in 
various versions through which it evolved to 
its final form. 
Samuel Beckett — the Irishman who lives 
permanently in France and writes primarily 
in French (though he translates everything he 
writes into either English or French, depend­
ing on the original language of composition) 
— has achieved fame throughout the world 
for his work in fiction, drama, and film. A 
particularly multicultural writer, Beckett's in­
tellectual interests are so broad and so di­
verse that his writings in all media are best 
approached from a variety of disciplines; and 
this is the approach adopted by the editors of 
this collection. They have included, not only 
detailed treatments of literary matters, but 
also close examinations of such topics as, 
among others, Beckett's theater in perfor­
mance, the philosophical traditions against 
which he writes, his sense of history and 
politics, his close relation with the visual arts, 
the complex uses to which his language is 
put, and his effort to write "without style." 
The result is a series of critical essays that 
come close to being the measure of the man 
and the artist they honor—the writer found 
particularly congenial to the modern sensibil­
ity as one in whose work the illusions and 
deceptions of the outer world resist each sys­
tem that attempts a faithful, comprehensive, 
and coherent account, and that, in the end, 
must inevitably collapse under too great a 
weight of enigma and error. 
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This book grows out of a symposium, "Samuel Beckett: 
Humanistic Perspectives," sponsored by the College of Hu­
manities of the Ohio State University, 7-9 May 1981, as a tribute 
marking Beckett's seventy-fifth year. The volume is intended as 
an adjunct to that conference, not as a strict record of its "pro­
ceedings." It is primarily a collection of essays in its own right, 
yet we hope that it nevertheless suggests the multiplicity of 
perspectives and approaches offered at the symposium. Only a 
portion of the spirit and still less of the spontaneity generated 
during the three days of the conference can be captured in a 
book. Discussion sparked by a lively paper or rejoinder tends to 
spill into halls and elevators, to continue into hotel lobbies, over 
dinner, and often well into the night over drinks (we were after 
all heeding the etymology of "symposium"). With sometimes 
as many as four sessions occurring simultaneously, participants 
were often faced with difficult choices. Moreover, in addition to 
the one hundred and forty or so academic papers and discus­
sions, there were several theatrical performances and films, two 
of them premieres: the American premiere of David R. Clark's 
version of Beckett's Film, with Max Wall; and the world pre­
miere of the play Beckett wrote expressly for our gathering, 
Ohio Impromptu, directed by Alan Schneider and played by 
David Warrilow and Rand Mitchell. 
The performance of Ohio Impromptu was of course a highlight 
of the conference. We are deeply grateful to Samuel Beckett for 
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writing the play, and for generously providing to us for repro­
duction in this volume his manuscript (including a revealing 
faux depart) and three typescript versions. Although the excite­
ment of the original production obviously cannot be duplicated 
here, the various versions of Ohio Impromptu provide their own 
different but no less genuine fascination, as we see the play 
taking shape. 
Similarly, while the excitement of many of the other events 
also eludes the printed page, we believe that we have preserved 
many of those aspects of such a conference that can be pre­
served—and that even gain from being put into print. Much of 
what is valuable at such an event is, inevitably, passing; but 
some of it can be passed on. For a selected collection of essays 
can present arguments that merit close study and that make a 
substantial contribution to our understanding of Beckett's 
work. The following collection ranges from the sort of overview 
of Beckett's theater and trends in Beckett studies that perhaps 
only Ruby Cohn could provide, to essays on specific problems 
in particular texts. Several of the essays reflect the international 
character of the conference and offer perspectives that are con­
siderably different from those usually adopted by American 
and British scholars. Yasunari Takahashi's essay, for example, 
compares the spareness of Beckett's drama and its pervasive 
theme of absence to those features as they appear in Noh, the 
highly stylized drama of Japan. And Antoni Libera's allegorical 
reading of The Lost Ones may sit uneasily with some Western 
scholars but is characteristic of much work in his native Poland, 
where literature, Beckett's work in particular, has powerful 
political significance—and where a relationship between art 
and politics exists that is uncannily similar to that of Beckett's 
Ireland. 
The chief trait all the essays in this volume share is probably 
the conviction that Beckett's work matters. That is why people 
read it and go to the theater to see it. And that is why they read 
about it and go to conferences to hear and talk about it—and, in 









In the play within the play A Midsummer's Night Dream, an actor 
plays the set. As contemporary actors can play tree or serpent, 
Shakespeare's tinker plays a wall that separates young lovers. 
The tinker Snout even particularizes the wall: "And such a wall 
as I would have you think / That had in it a crannied hole, or 
chink." Less adept than contemporary actors in sheer physical 
skill, Snout summons properties to enhance his credibility: 
"This loam, this rough-cast, and this stone doth show / That I 
am that same wall; the truth is so." For all Snout's assurances, 
however, theatrical truth is never simply "so." The tinker's 
Wall is at once a speaking character and a dumb artifact of loam, 
stone, and roughcast. Both character and artifact are concrete 
stage entities or signifiers or sign-vehicles, according to your 
ideolect. However you may designate this person-object amal­
gam, he/it functions as a barrier between lovers, who can com­
municate only through an aperture that happy Freudians will 
hasten to penetrate. 
Samuel Beckett's dramatic characters—he calls them "my 
people"—never play artifacts, and one can never dogmatize: 
"The truth is so" about his resonant plays. I propose to examine 
a few harmonics of that resonance, especially for plays we ex­
perienced together at the symposium. But to show how far 
Beckett has traveled, I begin with his first extant complete play, 
the unproduced, unpublished "Eleutheria" of 1947. Eleutheria 
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is Greek for freedom, which is the goal of the play's oxymoroni­
cally named hero, Victor Krap. In a well-worn dramatic path to 
freedom, Victor Krap has left his comfortable Passy home for an 
uncomfortable Left Bank hotel room. Beckett confronts his 
putative audience with both dwellings simultaneously—for two 
of his three acts. No wall separates the stage rooms, but no 
character crosses the invisible border from one area to the 
other. The Krap living room is stuffed with bourgeois furnish­
ings, but Victor's hotel room is bare of everything but a folding 
bed; and yet that nearly empty room fills three-quarters of the 
stage space in act one, while the remaining quarter is stuffed 
with the Krap salon. These two stage rooms are of course sym­
bolic of two different ways of life, and the dramatic action of the 
play is predicted by the change of setting. The opulent Krap 
living room hosts the act one action on its quarter-stage, and 
Victor's dingy space accommodates act two. By act three the 
Krap living room vanishes; it would fall into the orchestra if the 
stage were round. When Victor's wretched room usurps all the 
space, he has achieved his victorious freedom—to do nothing 
in indigence. And this will surprise no one familiar with 
Beckett's other works. 
In "Eleutheria" Beckett himself is not free from traditional 
symbolism of the realistic play, despite his simultaneous sets. 
Each partial set bespeaks its way of life, like Ibsen's Doll House 
or Chekhov's Cherry Orchard. Victor Krap has turned his back 
on the Krap way of life, as lived on a quarter of the stage. 
Peeping beyond realism, however, Victor finally stretches out 
on his unfolded folding bed; he stretches out and literally turns 
his back on the theater audience, who have absorbed the Krap 
living room, bourgeois as they probably are. 
Written less than two years after "Eleutheria," Waiting for 
Godot spurns realism, since it is set in a no-man's-land at twi­
light. The nearly bare stage, as everyone knows, symbolizes not 
a way of life but the human condition, where momentary activ­
ities are wrested from the surrounding void. The printed text of 
Godot designates only two items of the set: "A country road. A 
tree." Both road and tree are traditional symbols of human life, 
and Beckett relies on our familiarity with this convention, in 
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order to subvert it. His life-road does not lead to Godot, and his 
life-tree is linked to death wishes by hanging. 
In Godot Beckett's scenic directions are minimal for set, but 
they are virtually absent for costume (except for footnoted 
bowlers). From the first Paris production on, however, 
Vladimir and Estragon have worn the tuxedos and derbies of 
vaudeville comedians, which prepare us for their vaudeville 
turns even before we hear a word. No such convention governs 
the costumes of Pozzo and Lucky, but when Beckett directed 
Godot in Berlin in 1975—the only time he has directed his most 
famous play—he designed his costumes symbolically. In act 
one Beckett's Vladimir wears black coat and striped trousers 
whereas Estragon wears striped coat and black trousers, and 
the reverse is true in act two. The two friends belong together, 
matched through mismatch. Pozzo and Lucky also belong to­
gether in Beckett's production; the tan-brown check of Pozzo's 
trousers is picked up in Lucky's vest, and Pozzo's gray vest is 
cut from the same cloth as Lucky's gray trousers. Different as 
the four men are, they belong in the same play through their 
bowler hats, at once correct city attire in Britain and interna­
tional comedian attire in show business of the Western world. 
Perched on heads, these bowlers are related to human minds, 
but in no allegorical fashion that could not survive a juggling 
act. 
Godot's bowlers may serve as transition to the resonances 
Beckett obtains from numbers, as few other playwrights do. 
Worn though the hats may be, the bowlers retain circularity— 
roughcast zeroes, like the setting sun or rising moon. The sun 
was invisible in Beckett's production, but the moon was a full 
round zero. In the printed scenic directions, Vladimir and 
Estragon circle around Lucky, and in directing, Beckett often 
had the two friends walk in small circles during the verbal 
canters of act two. A tradition of divinity in a perfect circle is 
subverted by Beckett to the zero that is never uttered in Godot, 
as it is repeatedly in Endgame. But zeroic circularity is neverthe­
less confirmed in Godot by thirty odd repetitions of the word 
"nothing"—the nothing that is both "done" and resisted. 
Set, costumes, and circularity depict this version of the 
6 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
human condition, or life unlike a dome of many-colored glass 
staining an wnradiant eternity, or void. Godot also plays against 
the void, since the drama of waiting absorbs us for over two 
hours, and it does so by inventive if repetitive word and ges­
ture, sometimes geared to larger numbers than zero. The Chris­
tian number three threads through the play, which we view 
through three changes of light in each act. The two friends 
move through several triads. Vladimir probes the interior of his 
hat and Estragon the interior of his boot in three distinct move­
ments—looking, feeling, shaking the prop. Vladimir shifts 
mood in three phases, as in the sequence: "There you are again, 
there we are again, there I am again." Pozzo's name is de­
formed to Bozzo and Gozzo, Godot's to Godin, Godet— 
phonetic triads. The two friends juggle three hats. When 
Estragon is wounded in his leg, the two friends hop together on 
three legs. Most striking in Beckett's direction is his segmenta­
tion of Lucky's monologue into three movements, the theme of 
the first an apathetic God, the second dwindling man, and the 
third indifferent nature. In three increasingly desperate de­
grees, Pozzo registers dismay at Lucky's logorrheal triad. In act 
one the two friends prop up Lucky, and in act two Pozzo, each 
human trio recalling the iconography of Christ crucified be­
tween two thieves. 
Every critic has commented on this last trio, which troubles 
Vladimir in the actual dialogue of Godot. Three crucifixions and 
two thieves. The number two lacks the sacramental associations 
of three, and Beckett deploys two as a Janus-symbol in Godot. 
On the one face, the number two can indicate repetition, and 
on the other, opposition.1 Repetitions in Godot—two acts, two 
pair of couples, two men in each couple, two entrances and 
exits of Pozzo and Lucky, two entrances and exits of the Boy, 
two brothers serving Godot, and many, many gestural and 
verbal doublets. For Beckett as for Ecclesiastes, there is nothing 
new under the sun, and these pairs hint by one repetition at an 
infinity of repetitions during the course of life on this muck-
heap. 
The Gospel according to Saint Matthew presents the two 
thieves reviling Christ, but Saint Luke contrasts the two, the 
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one thief rebuking Christ and the other defending Him and 
receiving His mercy. It is Luke's version that informs the op­
positions of Godot. One couple is bound by serfdom, but the 
other by fraternity. Within each couple are contrasts: master 
Pozzo and menial Lucky, pensive Vladimir and physical 
Estragon. Even props contrast: phallic carrots and vaginal 
radishes, hats and shoes at opposite ends of the human body. 
In the resonance of numbers, I leap from two—contrast or 
redundancy—to Vladimir's "million years ago" and Estragon's 
"billions" whom he claims Vladimir has killed, as well as "bil­
lions" who have kept their appointment. Patent exaggerations, 
these numbers reach out toward infinity—of years in time, of 
human mites in cosmic time. 
In Godot Beckett is no traveler in an undiscovered country of 
symbols. Set, props, shapes, numbers, costumes, and even the 
bones that span prop, word, and intertextuality have all ap­
peared in Tpre-Godot plays; but through their convergent reso­
nance, Beckett has shaped a theater classic of our time. 
Rather than rest on his laurels, Beckett ventures ever deeper 
into an unbaudelairian forest of symbols. Some fifteen years 
after Godot Beckett wrote Play and invented a new kind of 
theater sign with its own generative capacity—an invention 
that he has refined in his plays of the last decade. Play of 1963 
requires three actors to play a man and two women confined to 
an eternal triangle inscribed in a vicious circle of repetitions. 
Each of the three characters believes himself or herself to be 
alone, although their urns touch. We glean their supposed 
solitude from their speech, which is triggered by a spotlight 
that Beckett in his scenic directions designates as an "inquisi­
tor." Unlike Shakespeare's Wall, the spotlight does not speak, 
but all three characters speak to it. Provoked by the spotlight, 
the three characters first deliver a Narration of their earthly 
imbroglio and then a Meditation on their present situation, 
both frankly physical and fictionally metaphysical. 
In Play Beckett subverts an old symbolic tradition of life as 
light. The spotlight of Play acts like an alarm, awakening the 
characters to their living death. This light is an instrument of a 
theater technician, which enables us to see Beckett's play. It is 
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also a fictional inquisitor eliciting confession and inspiring 
interrogation from a man and two women in supposed isolation 
from one another. This light—a reality in the theater and a 
fiction in the drama—is what I call theatereality. Of it the man 
asks anxiously: "Am I as much as . .  . being seen?" Since we 
see him, the answer is affirmative. It is small wonder that in 
rehearsal director Alan Schneider baptized so effulgent a 
light—with the name Sam.2 
Advancing to Beckett's most recent plays, I quote Albee's 
George in praise of their "quiet intensity"—a spotlit quivering 
mouth in the darkness (Not I), a spotlit head with its halo of 
white hair (That Time). Paradoxically and perilously for the 
theater, Beckett limits stage movement in these plays. In even 
later plays Beckett again blends the reality of the theater into 
the fiction of the drama. Brecht uncovered the theater machin­
ery, and his disciple Richard Foreman bares more sophisticated 
technology, but only Beckett makes a play (pun intended) of 
physical fact against dramatic fiction. 
Brief as it is, Footfalls of 1975 contains four movements, punc­
tuated by blackouts followed by chimes, but that is a structure 
we appreciate only in retrospect. Through the four movements 
we behold a long wooden board, a meter wide. The high spot­
light of Play, Not I, and That Time falls in Footfalls to the floor­
board. The footfalls are not, however, visible, for the single 
visible character is a woman with a "worn gray wrap hiding 
[her] feet." In the first three of the four movements, the gray 
ragged figure paces back and forth on the wooden board—nine 
steps and turn, nine steps and turn, the number of steps de­
creasing from movement to movement, the light dimming from 
movement to movement, until, in the fourth and final move­
ment, the stage board is barren of human trace. 
The first three movements of Footfalls dramatize mother-
daughter relationships, a drama conveyed by two voices, al­
though we see only the one gray woman. Each of the first three 
movements alludes to a daughter pacing back and forth—at 
once our visible fact and audible fiction. During the course of 
the first three movements, mother, daughter, and pacing 
woman garner details, for even as the footfalls decrease, the 
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words about them increase. The first movement presents the 
pacing woman as a daughter named May, offering various 
ministrations to her invalid but invisible mother. Despite her 
own illness, the mother worries about her daughter's restless­
ness, revolving a mysterious "it all" in her mind. The second 
movement, a monologue by the invisible mother, seems to be a 
flashback to her daughter May's compulsion to pace back and 
forth on a wooden floor and to hear her own steps. The third 
movement, a monologue by the woman we see, begins what 
she explicitly labels a sequel, and thus implicitly continues the 
mother's account. Both women speak obliquely of the daugh­
ter's anguish at "it all," the gonglike syllable that closes each of 
the first three movements. 
I see theatereality in an actress pacing nine steps, counted off 
on the board as she shudders through ghostly roles. The words 
of the first movement situate an aged woman perhaps in a 
hospital, her middle-aged daughter tending her, and revolving 
some matter in her mind. The words of the second movement 
situate a mother and her young daughter in a family home 
where the daughter spurned games in order to pace back and 
forth, even tearing up the carpet so that she could hear her own 
steps. The words of the third movement situate a nameless 
walker in a locked church where she broods about Christ's poor 
arm as she paces. Hospital, home, and church coalesce into a 
sounding-board for footfalls, visual analogue of a mind revolv­
ing the unnamed pain of "it all." 
This brief but complex play fuses several harmonics of the­
atereality. The titular footfalls are at once actual and fictional; 
we hear them and we hear about them. We see a wooden board 
as we hear about a transept, and churches are built in the shape 
of a cross. The invisible woman directs our attention to the 
visible woman; in scene one she counts her steps, and in scene 
two she solicits our regard: "See how still she stands." "But let 
us watch her move." "Watch how feat she wheels." The third 
and longest movement is segmented into three: the woman we 
see announces "The sequel" about a ghostly woman walking in 
a locked church; the second part, entitled "The semblance," 
gradually builds a verbal self-portrait of the woman we see, 
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culminating in the vivid phrase "A faint tangle of pale gray 
tatters." Without title, the third part offers to a reader descrip­
tion and dialogue of old Mrs. Winter and her daughter Amy at 
Sunday night supper. 
Not only does Beckett fictionalize the theater facts—the sight 
of the woman pacing on a wooden board and the sound of her 
footfalls (a sound Beckett changed in successive productions 
from a hard knock to a grating rasp), Beckett also literalizes the 
old genre of mystery play through playing against what is 
literally hidden. One character, the fictional mother, is always 
hidden from our sight. In scene two her bodiless voice narrates 
how the fictional daughter was absent from the childhood game 
of lacrosse, how the adult daughter speaks only "when she 
fancies none can hear," implying our absence from scene three 
when it is apparently a daughter who speaks. She tells of a 
fictional daughter Amy who claims to be absent from a church 
service where her mother Mrs. Winter nevertheless heard her 
respond "Amen." The Winter segment is addressed to a 
reader, and yet book and reader are absent from the stage (in 
marked contrast to Ohio Impromptu). As the nothings of Godot 
become almost palpable through the several circularities, the 
absences of Footfalls haunt us through these verbal traces, but 
by scene four even they are absent. 
Words and music of Footfalls harmonize in an exquisite 
"cascando" of steps, chimes, and light. A Piece of Monologue, in 
contrast, is a still life unveiled by the parting of a curtain (un­
fortunately lacking in the Columbus performance). On audi­
ence left is a figure in white—white nightgown and socks. To 
his left is a lamp as tall as he is, topped with a skull-sized white 
globe faintly lit. Just visible on audience right is the white foot 
of a pallet bed. After ten seconds the figure utters the word 
"Birth." Some fifty minutes later he closes this piece of mono­
logue with the word "gone." Between start and stop of speech, 
the white-clad figure on stage describes a white-clad figure in a 
room that contains a lamp the height of a man, and the corner 
of a pallet bed. The monologuist barely moves, but he tells of 
the movements of his subject in the room—westward toward a 
window from which he looks out into darkness, eastward 
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toward a wall on which photographs once hung. Between west 
window and east wall, continues the monologue, the white-
haired figure in white gown and white socks stops at a man-
sized oil-lamp whose wick he lights, sometimes with a match, 
sometimes with a spill. Gazing before him at wall or window, 
the narrated man sees below him in his mind's eye a rainy 
burial. My account is more coherent, more sequential than the 
actual monologue composed of terse phrases in semi-sen­
tences—repeated, accreted, qualified, denied, with the delicate 
tonal variations of David Warrilow, for whom the play was 
written. 
Unlike Footfalls, where we have a slow eclipse of theater fact 
by dramatic fiction, Monologue very soon presents an apparent 
coalescence. After the curtain parts but before a word is 
spoken, we have ten seconds to absorb the still, invariant 
image—two uprights and a corner; the two uprights—man and 
lamp—are visual reflections of one another. Through them 
Beckett subverts the old symbol of life as light. During the 
course of the monologue, we sense a man moving toward death 
while the lifeless lamp glows unmoving on. (At the Stanford 
University performance, where the audience was distant from 
the stage, after-images produced a symbiotic exchange between 
man and lamp.) 
Once words are heard, counter-images are conjured against 
the hypnotic still life. Footfalls plays with an identity between 
the pacing woman of fact and fiction, but Monologue plays on 
the divergence between a narrative of frequent displacement 
and a white-clad figure "still as the lamp by his side." We count 
the titular footfalls—nine and wheel—but the bleached figure of 
Monologue is still3 as he recounts how another totters, gropes, 
stands, turns, backs. A single gesture is mimetic; the speaker 
wryly describes "Making do with his mouth," as he makes do 
with his mouth. 
This stage figure in his setting is both coalescence and con­
tradiction, through theatereality. There are, moreover, degrees 
of contradiction; most blatant is the repeated and accreted 
choreograpy of lighting an oiMamp while the electric lamp on-
stage is untouched by human hands. Further, we see a white 
12 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
pallet, but we hear of a brass bedrail. Although the stage set is 
bare of wall and window, the narrated figure moves between 
them. And a rainy burial—three times described—in the mind's 
eye of the narrated man is summoned by words to our minds' 
eyes. 
Man, lamp, corner pallet are a sounding board for words 
between the opening "Birth" and the closing "gone." Through 
words Beckett draws a faint thread of theatrum mundi. About 
halfway through the piece, we hear these phrases: "Gown and 
socks white to take faint light. Once white. Hair white to take 
faint light. Foot of pallet just visible edge of frame." What 
began as narration appears here to be performance. Then, a 
shadow review describes how, in the light of a spill, a pair of 
hands light the lamp with a spill. In the actual theater the light 
is constant to the end of the play, but periodically the narrator 
punctuates a narrated scene with: "Fade." Less often, "Thirty 
seconds" sounds to delay the funeral scene—the anonymous 
funeral framed to exclude the coffin. Toward the end of the 
monologue, we are fixed in a theater by "White foot of pallet 
edge of frame stage left"—where we see the actual corner of a 
pallet bed. 
While the white-clad figure absorbs the invariant light, while 
the skull-sized globe glows with its invariant light, we listen to 
a piece of monologue, beginning with "Birth," ending with 
"gone," and oscillating between two kinds of light. One kind 
clings to the old light/life metaphor through an old man made 
of words—thirty thousand nights or two and a half billion 
seconds old, with both numbers belittled as "so few." His loved 
ones are long gone, along with their photographs in a thousand 
shreds. The stubborn durability of human life is hinted by those 
large numbers for 79 and 82 years, avatars of the biblical three 
score and ten.4 Yet those huge numbers are mere specks in 
infinity, variously rendered in Monologue as "black vast," 
"empty dark," "dark whole," "black beyond," "black veil," 
whence emanates the second kind of light of a lifeless cosmos. 
As we in the theater "take" the steady light from the stage, 
death seeps through the words of the monologue: the sun is 
long sunk, the light is fading, and the white figure moves west­
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ward; birth collapses into a funeral scene and loved ones into 
ghosts. Death even plays through a pun: "Never but the one 
matter. The dead and gone." When all beings and their 
memories are dead and gone, it does not matter about mere 
matter. Light is finally not life, for man is finally not the meas­
ure. An unaccountable light "whence unknown" drizzles 
through the cosmos, but there is no one to perceive it, once the 
globe darkens. 
A Piece of Monologue and Footfalls, like the thirty-second 
Breath, announce in their very titles Beckett's view of life the­
atrically imaged. Footfalls are what we hear and what we hear 
about as a metaphor for the mind revolving life's pain. A piece 
of monologue shimmers through the many meanings of 
piece—fragment, entity, example, play, game-counter—all 
synecdoches for life. In both plays moving figure or still figure 
sketches a verbal self-portrait that is then animated into im­
aginary actions. As Beckett's recent fiction Company proves so 
dramatic that he has accorded Frederick Neumann permission 
to perform it, so these two late Beckett plays precipitate fiction 
and drama as a new concentrate. Paradoxically, A Piece of 
Monologue abjures narrated dialogue in favor of pure descrip­
tion of a life spent between birth and death, groping toward 
western window from eastern wall. 
Which leads me to deliberate circling back to Shakespeare's 
Wall, character and artifact. In Beckett's late plays character is 
etched into artifact. Feet fall on a wooden board that is hospital, 
home, and church; a lighted globe is man's conquerable mind 
and his vulnerable world. Beckett's late plays, like the early 
ones, theatricalize his vision of the human situation, but the 
late plays fuse the actual audience experience into the dramatic 
fiction. It is as theater experience that I cherish these plays— 
that weary old word experience—and if you see the plays as 
codes of signifiers that conform to a theoretical model, then you 
and I view the plays from opposite sides of a wall, "[But] such a 
wall as I would have you think / That had in it a crannied hole, 
or chink" through which dialogue may still be possible, within 
humanistic perspectives. 
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Addendum on "Ohio Impromptu" 
Ohio Impromptu was written in English (in 1980), but in keep­
ing with its "Latin Quarter hat," it sports a French angle to 
"Impromptu." I quote from a recent theater dictionary: "Piece 
theoriquement improvisee et jouee sans preparation. . . . 
Souvent, le dramaturge y expose les difficultes de l'activite 
d'auteur et d'acteur."5 Beckett again subverts, for the diffi­
culties he asks his actors to expose are those of the creative and 
critical aspects of fiction-writing—in his most convoluted ex­
ample of theatereality. 
The stage is strictly black and white, lacking the glowing 
globe of Monologue. As in a Magritte painting, we see two im­
ages of the same figure, a black-coated, white-haired man—the 
one nearer us in profile, the farther one full-face, although both 
heads are bowed, obscuring the faces. Both actors sit in "arm­
less white deal chairs" at a white deal table, on which a single 
black, broad-brimmed hat reposes. The man facing us is 
silent—and motionless except when he raps with left hand on 
the table; the profiled man reads aloud from the last pages of a 
large book. He reads about a man in long black coat and wide-
brimmed hat who, having moved to a lonely abode overlooking 
the Isle of Swans, is visited by a man who reads to him 
throughout the night, quieting his malaise. Night after night, 
the man visits him "to read the sad tale through again." Of that 
second-degree "sad tale" we learn nothing, except that through 
it the reader and listener "grew to be as one." 
Not only does Ohio Impromptu condense genres even further 
than Footfalls—a tale within a tale within a play—but the coales­
cence and divergence of theatereality is more involved than can 
be absorbed in performance. On stage the refracted images of 
old men resonate toward reflection within the tale that is read 
from the book—hinted through the fictional place to a swan 
song. Within the book-tale, however, the two men "grew to be 
as one" as the tale is repeatedly read, while on stage the two 
men diverge before our eyes. The single hat, starkly black on 
the long white table, may be a symbol for a single mind, for a 
single creating mind, one aspect reading the noted words and 
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the other aspect pacing or judging the reading. Toward the end 
of our play, we hear that once the sad tale is read a last time, the 
two men sit "as though turned to stone." On stage, in contrast, 
once the book is closed, the two men raise their heads to "look 
at each other. Unblinking. Expressionless," and only then as 
still as stone. Unlike Proust's transcendent book admired by 
Beckett in his youth, unlike Moliere's impromptu about pro­
ducing a play for a king, Ohio Impromptu almost drains a story 
of experience in order to theatricalize the reading/writing itself 
as experience. To adapt the end of Watt to this occasion: "No 
resonance where none intended." 
1. Cf. Lawrence E. Harvey, "Art and the Existential in En attendant Godot" 
PMLA (March 1960), 143-44. 
2. "Working with Beckett," in Samuel Beckett: The Art of Rhetoric, ed. 
Edouard Morot-Sir, Howard Harper, and Dougald McMillan III (Chapel Hill, 
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), p. 273. 
3. Warrilow turns twice to his right: east or west? 
4. I am grateful to Linda Ben-Zvi for calculating the ages. 




Beckett's "Bits of Pipe'

In a letter of 11 April 1972, replying to questions more detailed, 
and indeed more audacious, than any that I should now pre­
sume to put to him, Samuel Beckett wrote as follows: "I simply 
know next to nothing about my work in this way, as little as a 
plumber of the history of hydraulics. There is nothing/nobody 
with me when I'm writing, only the hellish job in hand. The 
'eye of the mind' in Happy Days does not refer to Yeats any more 
than the 'revels' in Endgame (refer) to The Tempest. They are just 
bits of pipe I happen to have with me. I suppose all is reminis­
cence from womb to tomb. All I can say is I have scant informa­
tion concerning mine—alas."1 
In this essay, I want to examine the status of some of 
Beckett's "bits of pipe," limiting myself, since the subject is a 
rather large one, to the quotations that are found in the English 
and French versions of Happy Days, but also seeing how this 
issue can be related to certain wider aspects of Beckett's dra­
matic technique and considering not only the play in the light of 
his remarks but also his remarks in the light of the play. In the 
letter just quoted, was Samuel Beckett, to put it a trifle baldly, 
merely adopting a favorite defensive stance, namely that of 
ignorance, whether feigned or real, or was he assuming the 
perspective of the worm in the core of the apple, unable to 
perceive the outside of the apple in the way that others can? Or 
does Beckett's comment (as I believe it does) say something 
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perfectly valid about the status of quotation in Happy Days in 
particular, but also in his plays in general, that is worth examin­
ing much more fully? 
The identification of Winnie's quotations now belongs to past 
critical history. They were identified for us in any case by 
Beckett himself in the fourth typescript of the English play, 
preserved in the Ohio State University Library.2 Ever since, the 
authorship and location of Winnie's "wonderful lines" have 
been scrupulously recorded by Beckett in preliminary notes 
that he sent to Alan Schneider and in notebooks prepared for 
his own productions of the play in Berlin and London, some­
times situating the sources with words such as "end of speech 
beginning 'oh what a noble mind'" (for the "oh woe is me" 
quotation) and "Marcellus disappearance of ghost" (for the 
"bird of dawning" quotation), adding only in 1979, "sorrow 
keeps breaking in" as a deliberate distortion of Oliver 
Edwards's remark to Dr. Johnson, "cheerfulness was always 
breaking in."3 Since Ruby Cohn's first book on Beckett in 1962, 
it has been known, therefore, that Winnie is familiar with "such 
good old poets as Shakespeare, Milton, Herrick, Gray, Keats 
and Browning"4 and also quotes from Edward Fitzgerald, W. B. 
Yeats, and Charles Wolfe. The sources of the French quotations 
in Oh les beaux jours have also been clearly identified, ranging 
from Beckett's own translations of Shakespeare, Milton, Gray, 
and Keats to Ronsard's Stances (for "bouchette ble'mie") and 
Racine's "Qu'ils pleurent, oh mon Dieu, qu'ils fremissent de 
crainte," which becomes in Beckett's play "Qu'ils fre'missent de 
honte."5 And, of course, the different tone and associations of 
the French title, provided by the quotation from Paul Verlaine's 
poem Collocjue sentimental ("ah les beaux jours de bonheur in­
dicible / Ou nous joignions nos bouches—C'est possible") 
have also been noted and explored.6 All of this, like the pres­
ence of death in Ionesco's play, Tueur sans gages (The Killer), is 
already "known, assimilated, catalogued."7 
On the evidence of the manuscripts in the Ohio State Uni­
versity Library, the choice of these quotations was made by 
Beckett with considerable care and with great concern for their 
relationship with important themes of the play. Several schol­
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ars have examined the echoes that are set up by Winnie's allu­
sions to some of the "classics" of English and French literature. 
It seems, in fact, irrefutable, as Ruby Cohn wrote in Back to 
Beckett, that Winnie's quotations comment ironically on the 
cruel landscape, speak of woe, and invoke the proximity of 
death.8 And S. E. Gontarski has extended these ironies to dis­
cover in Winnie's use of quotations important Beckettian 
themes and wider mythic patterns. He writes that "the themes 
of the failure of love, the misery of the human condition, the 
transitoriness of all things, the disjunction between the real and 
the ideal, the misery of awareness, have been carefully rein­
forced in Winnie's literary allusions and reverberate through 
the play like a constant drumbeat."9 
Yet there is a world of difference between noting and explor­
ing the subtle ironies set up by the presence of these quotations 
and, as other critics have done, stressing the co-presence of both 
texts, that of Beckett and of the work quoted by Winnie, to the 
extent of reading Beckett's play as if it were a development, an 
ironic reflection, or, in some cases, even a parody of the original 
source work. One scholar, for example, has considered Winnie 
and Willie as echoes of Verlaine's ghosts from Colloque senti­
mental.10 Another has written that "only if we take the whole 
passage [the Shakespearean "O what a noble mind is here 
o'erthrown" speech] and substitute Winnie and Willie [for 
Ophelia and Hamlet] can we appreciate the grotesque parody 
implied," or again, "Winnie persists as a parody Prometheus 
because there is nothing else to do."11 A critical approach that 
may seem to be justified by the apparent openness of Beckett's 
technique of verbal and visual allusiveness has tended to be­
come quite the opposite: unduly explicit, over-referential, 
imaginatively restrictive, and inappropriate to Beckett's han­
dling of the theatrical medium. 
There are, in fact, several good reasons why we should con­
sider the quotations in Happy Days a good deal less referentially 
than this and acknowledge that, by focusing too hard on 
reference, we might only too easily be missing the much more 
important function. First, of course, is the obvious fact that 
Winnie's "wonderful lines" register in the theater only within 
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certain specific constraints. There is no time during a perform­
ance to formulate or to dwell on extended parallels between 
Winnie and Hamlet, no time to consider the analogies between 
Romeo's discovery of Juliet, lying seemingly dead, and 
Winnie's studied contemplation of her own face in the mirror, 
"ensign crimson . . . pale flag." Secondly, two of Winnie's 
quotations at least lay unidentified for several years: the quota­
tion from Browning's Paracelcus12 and the Oliver Edwards dis­
tortion. Winnie identifies these different phrases as actual 
quotations by means of her characteristically reassuring "What 
are those wonderful / exquisite lines" in only four of the fifteen 
quotations that are now commonly noted. The other eleven 
arise far more naturally and could pass almost unnoticed in the 
context, except by the scholar, probably forewarned and hence 
on the lookout for such allusions. Further, there are also many 
other, only half-hidden, literary or religious allusions or actual 
quotations made in the course of the play: to Hamlet, to the 
Bible, to the Christian marriage ceremony, to Dante, to 
Schopenhauer, perhaps even to Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, 
which, along with the Inferno, seems to have been a major in­
spiration for the play.w Winnie makes no distinction at all of 
level between her various "classics." Charles Wolfe is admired 
and cherished as much as are Shakespeare and Milton. All have 
become, one might say, "Winnieisms," bearing on occasions 
Winnie's characteristic imprimatur, the "something. . . 
something" of a learner of lines who is more enamoured of 
rhythm than she is of sense. But Winnie's questions still retain 
the relevance as well as the slightly foreign flavor of the bor­
rowings. 
Even without imputing to an audience the knowledge of the 
literary scholar, however, the spectator will register immedi­
ately some of the bitter truths found in the quotations that 
Winnie puts forward in the guise of phrases of reassurance: 
"Laughing wild amid severest woe" needs no scholarly com­
mentary at all to echo the earlier "oh fleeting joys oh something 
lasting woe" and to provide an ironic commentary on Winnie's 
plight and a wider statement on the sad, transitory nature of 
human existence. The opening words of the second act, "Hail, 
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holy light" ("Salut, sainte lumiere" in Beckett's own French 
translation) almost provoke a shudder in the listener, so sharp 
is the irony between Winnie's Miltonic greeting and her newly 
revealed state of more radical deprivation. It is not that ironies 
will not be reinforced or even that further layers of irony will 
not be revealed, if one should happen to recognize the words 
and the context of the original quotations. It is, I suggest, that 
to regard them primarily in terms of reference is to diminish 
their important role within the play and to misunderstand cer­
tain crucial elements of Beckett's dramatic technique. 
In another, and more important, sense, Happy Days is almost 
all quotation. For Beckett has Winnie confront the "hellish sun" 
and endure a life of growing immobility with a vocabulary of 
secondhand, rose-colored platitudes, cliches of middle-class 
piety and complacent optimism. Her speech is a kind of mod­
ernized, suburbanized Robinsonadesprache. Beckett's first manu­
script draft was called "Female Solo,"14 and, as a point of com­
parison with Happy Days, one may choose the dramatic mono­
logue that Beckett most likely saw at the Comedie Francaise in 
February 1930, Jean Cocteau's La Voix humaine, which he con­
demned in Proust as "not merely a banality, but an unnecessary 
banality."15 When, thirty years later, Beckett came to write his 
own female virtual monologue, he was very careful to avoid the 
trap that Cocteau had fallen into, namely, that of creating a 
banality out of banalities. For, instead of merely using cliche in 
Happy Days, Beckett makes it work for him dramatically, as part 
of a dense linguistic structure, which is characterized by many 
variations in the levels of meaning, register, and tone. The 
numerous borrowed cliches are, then, not only registered as 
such by the spectator. They are made to reverberate with a 
subtle blend of irony, understated human feelings, and deeper 
philosopical concerns. The technique is complex, but stated in 
the broadest of terms, this effect is achieved by contrasting 
Winnie's cliches and bland phrases of reassurance with the 
stark visual imagery of imprisonment in a barren earth and 
exposure to a hostile sun, and by the juxtaposition, repetition, 
and association of the component phrases themselves. So flat, 
commonplace, apparently neutral words and phrases signify at 
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the obvious surface level, but also prompt their own wide-
ranging, and often momentous, echoes: "world without end," 
"cannot be cured," "sleep for ever," "blind next," "running 
out" are just a few examples chosen from the opening moments 
of the play. 
Yet, as I have developed more fully elsewhere,16 common­
place, worn-out words, which Winnie uses to tame and do­
mesticate a mysterious, elusive reality, also lead her to the very 
edge of the abyss, when sorrow, regret and loss intrude re­
peatedly into her busy chatter. And so the horror of her im­
mediate predicament, a sense of the mystery of being, and a 
fear of the silent, solitary wilderness that may await her cannot 
be wholly kept at bay by her familiar, borrowed words. Liter­
ally, "sorrow keeps breaking in," in the shape of her literary 
quotations (the creations of others) and her fictions (her own 
creations), but also in the tiny qualifications of a remark, a break 
in, or faltering of, the voice or the swift erasure of a smile. 
When Winnie draws Willie's attention to the heights that she 
has scaled, most often she has ironically been plumbing un­
common depths of perceptiveness into the nature of her true 
condition: "and wait for the day to come—the happy day to 
come when flesh melts at so many degrees and the night of the 
moon has so many hundred hours";17 "and should one day the 
earth cover my breasts, then I shall never have seen my breasts, 
no one ever seen my breasts."18 This alternation, even inter­
play, of keen insight and self-deception adds substantially, of 
course, to the dramatic interest and the poignancy of the play, 
as Winnie spins her own web of words, of which she becomes 
the victim as well as the creator. 
Winnie's quotations come, however, in different registers 
and occur even in several different voices, as she indulges in a 
highly sophisticated form of ventriloquism. She quotes, for ex­
ample, the blandly ironic words of wisdom from the toothbrush 
handle and the medicine bottle label—in a special tone, as Ruby 
Cohn pointed out, in Beckett's Berlin production.19 The range 
of her voices, moreover, echoes the range of her repeated ges­
tures and habits. She talks regularly to herself in many different 
tones: sharply, "as to one not paying attention"; cautionarily, 
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"do not overdo the bag, Winnie"; anxiously, "and now?", and 
so on. The range of her inquiry and address to Willie is even 
more diversified still. And, at the end of the play, her voice 
offers a chilling impersonation of her "soul-mate," as his pre­
nuptial pleas take the form of a piece of sardonic self-address: 
"Life a mockery without Win";20 "I worship you Winnie be 
mine and then nothing from that day forth only titbits from 
Reynolds' News."21 In the Shower/Cooker story, Winnie alter­
nates between three different voices and provides a complex 
interweaving of accents and linguistic registers: "Stuck up to 
her diddies in the bleeding ground" [first male voice] "coarse 
creature, fit mate" [her own voice] "Dig her out, he says, dig 
her out, no sense in her like that [first male voice]—Dig her out 
with what? [second female voice] she says [her own voice]—I'd 
dig her out with my bare hands [first male voice] he says—Must 
have been man and wife [her own voice]"22 In the French trans­
lation, the shifts from assumed vulgarity to natural censorious­
ness are even more marked, providing an impressive tribute to 
Beckett's bilingual sensitivity. Finally, the "Milly and the 
mouse" narrative introduces sharp pain into a fictional world 
that is reminiscent not only of the child's fairy tale but of the 
setting of a Katherine Mansfield story (The Dove's Nest, for ex­
ample). The vocabulary is again borrowed, this time from the 
literature of the nursery, with its stock epithets, and its child's 
perspective on the world: "big, waxen dolly," "complete out­
fit," "frilly frock," "legends in real print," "steep wooden 
stairs," and "silent passage."23 But the real screams contrast 
sharply with this borrowed, rehearsed, even stilted terminol­
ogy. To regard this as parody of the style of the nursery tale— 
even less of Katherine Mansfield—is to miss the point entirely. 
For it is with these delicate, stylistic borrowings, recited in a 
tiny child's voice, that Winnie expresses obliquely a sense of 
the violence of sex, procreation, and birth, and the mystery of 
pain and being. Primarily, these elements are used then func­
tionally, combining important tonal variety with the oblique, 
thematic significance of this fiction and the Shower/Cooker 
encounter. 
In conclusion, it is worth stressing how much this creation of 
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a multiplicity of voices, levels, tones, and registers demands by 
way of active involvement on the part of the spectator. By a 
technique that clearly owes far more to suggestion and ambi­
guity than it does to reference, the spectator is able to move 
freely between these different levels, questioning, judging, and 
often supplying what is hinted at rather than stated. Reference 
is, then, anathema for Samuel Beckett, as it was for Stephane 
Mallarme, for whom "nommer un objet, c'est supprimer les 
trois quarts de la jouissance du poeme, qui est faite du bonheur 
de deviner peu a peu; le suggerer, voila le reve."24 If Mallarme 
is here a potent source for inspiration for Beckett, it may be the 
example of John Millington Synge, whose own dramatic allu­
siveness followed no "sustained referential scheme,"25 that 
helped Beckett avoid some of the dangers inherent in the sym­
bolist legacy. Beckett, unlike those dramatic heirs of symbolism 
commonly referred to under the label of the "Theater of the 
Unspoken" (e.g., Maeterlinck, Bernard, Vildrac),26 is not at­
tempting to evoke a world of mystery or of the spirit; nor is he 
trying to convey obliquely or by means of silence the inner life 
of his characters; nor again is there any Pinteresque "weasel 
under the cocktail cabinet" in Beckett's theater. The silences 
that figure prominently in Beckett's plays are filled more by the 
spectator measuring what is being seen against what has just 
been said or following, within specific constraints, the multiple 
associations aroused by preceding statements or patterns of 
statements. For, in a very real sense, Beckett's verbal and visual 
imagery echoes not on the boards alone but in the mind of the 
spectator. 
Winnie's "classics" differ hardly at all, then, from the remain­
der of the text. It may be said, of course, that part of their 
function is to add further levels of meaning. But the variations 
in voice, level, tone, and register that they introduce tend to 
predominate over the actual "references" themselves. The "bits 
of pipe" of which Beckett speaks do not "refer," as he suggests, 
therefore in this sense. To extend the plumber analogy a little 
further, however, they are of exactly the right shape, length, 
thickness, bore, even ring, for the job in hand. And inasmuch 
as they do point outside the play, it is as part of a dramatic 
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technique that aims, above all, to involve the active imagination 
of the spectator, liberating it rather than imprisoning it with the 
shackles of reference. 
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Edith Kern

Beckett's Modernity and 
Medieval Affinities 
Because of a circularity that defies customary logic and linear­
ity, critics have often seen in Samuel Beckett's work an absurd­
ity they believe to be modern and expressive of the world we 
live in. It is true, of course, that the author has given manifold 
and striking expression to alogical circularity, so that the un­
assuming ditty (originally a German children's song) hummed 
by Didi in Waiting for Godot may well be considered emblematic 
of the author's entire work as it teasingly begins again when­
ever one expects it to end and, indeed, cannot be brought to 
any logical ending.1 In Molloy the protagonist's assertion that 
the first lines of his report were its beginning but are now 
nearly its end conjures up a similar mood of unending circular­
ity bordering on the absurd.2 In the year of the celebration of 
Beckett's seventy-fifth birthday, we might do well, however, to 
ask whether this mood is exclusively modern and meant to 
reflect merely the chaos known to us. It would seem to me 
rather that it is informed by a conception of man that Beckett's 
works and those of other contemporary authors share with the 
literature preceding both the rediscovery of Aristotle's Poetics 
and the neoclassical emphasis on rationality and individuality. 
Not unlike authors of the Middle Ages, Beckett conceives of the 
individual sub specie aeternitatis, and in Waiting for Godot this 
vision is brilliantly dramatized when blind old Pozzo, having 
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fallen over decrepit Lucky, is unable to get up. His cries for help 
are reluctantly answered by Didi and Gogo, whose efforts end 
in their own loss of balance, though they reply to Pozzo's in­
quiry as to who they are: "We are men." Nameless and faceless, 
mankind is groping to get on its feet, and the same medieval 
notion of the insignificance of the individual is later epitomized 
by Pozzo when he proclaims: "One day we were born, one day 
we shall die, the same day, the same second. . . . They give 
birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's 
night once more" (57). Such a conception of man does not call 
for clearly outlined literary protagonists or psychological ex­
planations. Nor is it concerned with personal confrontations or 
social problems. The focus is rather on mankind and its un­
changing structures and needs within the universe. The indi­
vidual is but the transitory and ephemeral link in Nature's un­
ending chain of birth, life, and death. 
Quite obviously, such a vision of man and the universe af­
fects the function and form of literary dialogue. When it is not 
employed to develop plot or reveal individual character, dia­
logue becomes ludic. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
verbal exchanges of Beckett's characters often seem absurd to 
those who approach them with attitudes that conform to neo­
classical expectations. But when Didi and Gogo wonder, for 
instance, whether they should leave, end it all, go on, or come 
back tomorrow, they engage in conversational patterns of the 
kind we might encounter in any medieval French farce: 
E: Where shall we go? 
V: Not far. 
E: Oh yes. Let's go far away from here. 
V: We can't. 
E: Why not? 
V: We have to come back tomorrow. 
E: What for? 
V: To wait for Godot. (59) 
In his study of French farce, Robert Garapon has referred to 
such dialogue, which reveals no facts and follows no logical 
pattern, as "un jeu de paume,"3 and the verbal exchanges of 
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Beckett's characters resemble, indeed, quite frequently verbal 
ballgames—although the effect may be, on occasion, highly 
lyrical and poetic.4 Beckett's own consciousness of this ball-
game effect of dialogue is quite apparent. "In the meantime," 
Gogo suggests on one occasion, "let us try and converse 
calmly, since we are incapable of keeping silent" (40). 
Vladimir—musing why it is that of the four Evangelists "only 
one speaks of a thief being saved"—prods Estragon, who had 
remained silent: "Come on, Didi, return the ball." (9) In 
Endgame, of course, Clov's question "What is there to keep me 
here?" is answered by Ham with "The dialogue" (58) .5 But in 
Beckett's work such ludic dialogue may also assume the form of 
medieval fly ting, that is, of half-playful, half-serious insults. On 
one occasion when Didi and Gogo have nothing to do and 
nowhere to go, as they wait for Godot, they begin to quarrel 
just to pass the time away. They are close to getting into a fist 
fight, when Gogo suggests: "That's the idea, let's abuse each 
other." Stage directions indicate that they turn, move away 
from each other, and begin to insult each other, one outdoing 
the other until Didi is utterly vanquished and Gogo calls him 
"Crritic!" so that Gogo concedes: "Now let's make it up!" (48). 
In all likelihood, such flyting had its origin in more ancient 
"slanging matches" that, in the view of Johan Huizinga, may 
well represent the very origin of theater.6 The exaggerated in­
sults that rival tribes engaged in would have led to violent war, 
had there not been in existence a tacit understanding that they 
were meant to be an impersonal game of one-up-manship—a 
liberation of pent-up emotions in a spirit of make-believe, not 
unlike that of "playing the dozens" known to black communi­
ties. It is interesting in this respect that the iambos, the meter of 
Greek tragedy, is thought by some to have meant derision, sug­
gesting that theater and the exchange of insults have been 
linked from time immemorial.7 In the commedia dell'arte such 
slanging matches were standard in the lover's pursuit of his 
beloved and her playful or serious rejection of him. Eugene 
Ionesco recently used them with great skill in his play Macbett 
(based on Shakespeare's Macbeth) to give expression to the 
snowballing effect of murder, as he has his conspirators reach 
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the tragicomic frenzy of hatred in the course of their verbal 
exchanges.8 Beckett availed himself of such tragicomic playful­
ness mainly in order to be able to discuss questions as serious as 
those of man's place in the world and his relationship to God, 
without sounding pompous or transgressing the limits of 
theater as entertainment and stage business. 
In his early works, ludic dialogue and flyting permitted 
Beckett, above all, to juxtapose the sacred and the profane in a 
mood of the seeming absurdity known to the Middle Ages. 
Thus Vladimir and Estragon, wondering whether man is tied to 
God (or is it Godot?), have an answer suggested to them that is 
as ambivalent as it is ironically farcical when Pozzo appears 
upon the stage led by Lucky, to whom he is tied (or who is tied 
to him?) by a rope. In The Absolute Comic, I have discussed at 
some length the significance of medieval parodies that, in simi­
lar manner, juxtapose the sacred with the profane and whose 
popularity is attested to by the large number of Latin manu­
scripts still extant. Their spirit was caught remarkably well by 
Nietzsche in Thus Spake Zarathustra, which contains a travesty 
of a Mass, not unlike those celebrated during the medieval 
Festival of the Ass. A brief sampling of it will convey the flavor 
of such parody in all its carnivalesque irreverence that laugh­
ingly turns the world upside down: 
And the litany sounded thus; 
Amen! And glory and honour and wisdom and thanks and 
praise and strength be to our God, from everlasting to everlasting! 
—The ass, however, here brayed Ye-A. 
He carrieth our burdens, he hath taken upon him the form of a 
servant, he is patient of heart and never saith Nay; and he who 
loveth his God chastiseth him. 
—The ass, however, here brayed Ye-A. 
He speaketh not: except that he ever saith Yea to the world 
which he created: thus doth he extol his world. It is his artfulness 
that speaketh not: thus is he rarely found wrong. 
—The ass, however, here brayed Ye-A. 
Uncomely goeth he through the world. Grey is the favourite 
colour in which he wrappeth his virtue. Hath he spirit, then doth 
he conceal it; every one, however, believeth in his long ears.9 
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Nietzsche's travesty, though used by him in the spirit of satire, 
would seem to be sacrilegious, unless we recognize that it be­
longs to that—usually more lighthearted—medieval tradition. 
It is in this same tradition that James Joyce parodied the litany, 
the liturgy, and the Lord's Prayer and that his work abounds in 
ludic travesties such as the following: "Haloed be her eve, her 
singtime sung, her rill be run, unhemmed as it is uneven." Or: 
"Oura Vatars that arred in Himmal," with its exuberant fusion 
of different languages, real as well as invented. Or: "Ouhr 
Former who erred," a sheer play on sound.10 Rabelais had 
indulged in such exuberant and irreverent playfulness in his 
Gargantua and Pantagruel, and in his seminal study Rabelais and 
His World, Mikhail Bakhtin points out that one of the book's 
protagonists, Panurge, seeking advice from Friar John as to 
whether he should marry or not, couches his words in praise of 
the male sexual parts in the form of a litany repeated 153 
times.11 Rabelais used Christ's last words on the cross "sitio" (I 
thirst) and "consummatum est" (it is finished) in a literal sense 
as if they referred to food and drink, and such mingling of the 
sacred and the profane was so readily accepted and enjoyed in 
the author's time that he did not expunge it from his 1524 
edition, which had to pass severe censorship.12 It would be 
difficult but also idle to ascertain whether Beckett consciously 
adopted the spirit of this tradition, or whether it was simply 
germane to his own concerns. We know, of course, that, like 
Joyce, he had been a student of Romance literatures and that 
his early poetry was cast in the Provencal and medieval French 
forms of the troubadours tradition: the enueg, the planh, and the 
alba. This "modern minstrel," Harvey wrote, "chooses titles for 
seven of his thirteen poems directly out of the troubadour tradi­
tion. . . ."13 There can be no doubt, at any rate, that in his 
theater and fiction Beckett perpetuates or reinvents medieval 
juxtapositions of the sacred and the profane—both in a sense of 
playfulness and of profound seriousness. 
There is, for instance, the narrator of Beckett's Watt, identi­
fied as Sam somewhere toward the middle of the novel, who 
conveys to us that, one day, in the garden of his pavilion (it 
seems to be part of a mental institution), he espied Watt, whom 
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he had previously and intimately known at another place. Watt 
was walking toward him but was walking backward. As Watt 
grotesquely advances—perpetually falling into the thorny 
shrubbery and painfully extricating himself from it—he turns 
his face toward Sam, who perceives him both as an image of 
Christ bearing a crown of thorns and as his own mirror image. 
The identity thus evoked between a religious image of Christ as 
painted by Bosch and hanging in London's Trafalgar Square, 
on the one hand, and the half-crazed representative of mankind 
Watt, who is the grotesque mirror of Sam himself, on the other, 
would border on the sacrilegious, were we not conscious of the 
fact that Watt advancing backward and perpetually falling is 
also a figure of medieval farce, of carnival, and of what I have 
designated with the Baudelairean term "the absolute comic."14 
Beckett maintains the ambivalence of that absolute comic so 
that, through laughter and tears, he can seriously probe the 
meaning of human existence without assuming the part of the 
philosopher. Beckett's ability and determination to pursue such 
serious questions under the guise of farce make themselves felt 
everywhere in his work and prove themselves perhaps most 
strikingly in a scene of the second novel of his trilogy, Malone 
Dies. There Macmann (Son of Man) is grotesquely caught in the 
rain, far from shelter, in an open field. Dressed like a scare­
crow, he lies down on the ground in the posture of one cruci­
fied as the "rain pelted down on his back with the 
sound . .  . of a drum. . . . The idea of punishment came to his 
mind, addicted, it is true, to that chimera and probably im­
pressed by the posture of the body and the fingers clenched as 
though in torment. And without knowing exactly what his sin 
was he felt . . . that living was not a sufficient atonement for 
it. . . ."is 
But it is above all in Lucky's speech, that torrent of seeming 
madness, that Beckett's mingling of the sacred and the profane 
and even the scatological assumes truly medieval aspects. In 
the manner of participants in medieval farce, Lucky turns tradi­
tional patterns of reasoned discourse and theological debate 
into farce. Yet the seriousness of his concerns becomes ap­
parent when we strip his speech of its carnivalesque elements. 
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He then seems to suggest something like "given the ex­
istence . .  . of a personal God . . . with white beard . . . out­
side time . . . who from the heights of divine . . . aphasia loves 
us dearly with some exceptions for reasons unknown . . . and 
suffers with those who . . . are plunged in torment . .  . it is 
established beyond all doubt . . . that man . . . fades away" 
(28-29). A number of critics more or less agree on such a read­
ing. Yet nothing could better illustrate the half-serious, half-
playful travesties of medieval carnival and their ridicule of 
theological and scholarly pomposity that takes itself too seri­
ously than Lucky's speech. It is clearly patterned after a medie­
val French sermon joyeux, a burlesque sermon of the kind 
preached in churches during carnivalesque celebrations and 
that later became part of the threesome that made up French 
traditional theatrical performances: the sermon, the sottie, and the 
mystere or farce. Rhetorically, the sermon joyeux was a coq-d-l'dne, 
a discourse defined as disjointedly passing from one subject to 
another without logical transition of any sort. "Sauter du coq a 
l'ane" meant literally "to leap from the rooster to the donkey," 
and the expression may well have its origin in animal debates. 
Although the sixteenth-century French poet Marot is credited 
with the invention of a poetic genre by that name, the concept 
is clearly much older. In the form of a coq-d-l'dne, sermons joyeux 
often travestied sacred texts by speaking of food, drink, and sex 
as if they were discussing theology or vice versa. The aim of the 
sermon joyeux was, on occasion, satire, but the genre was usu­
ally expressive of a sheer joy in verbal fantasy, often starting 
with Latin invocations, such as "in nomine Patris, et Filii et 
Spiritus Sancty. Amen."16 It jumbled together disparate no­
tions and languages and did not hesitate to address itself in the 
same phrase to Bacchus, Venus, and the Christian God. In its 
grotesque references and its play on sound rather than mean­
ing, the genre represented a triumph of carnivalesque fantasy, 
both in exuberance and in irreverence toward all that was 
taboo. Unfortunately, the examples extant of such sermons 
joyeux are not easily accessible to the modern reader because of 
their generous mixture of medieval French with an oddly galli­
cized Latin, so that the genre is, perhaps, most easily illustrated 
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by a sampling from Moliere's Don Juan. This is how Don Juan is 
lectured to by his servant Sganarelle: 
. .  . I can keep quiet no longer . . . , but I must open my heart to 
you and tell you that I think as a faithful servant should. You 
know, master, the pitcher can go to the well once too often, 
and . . . men in the world are like the bird on the bough, the 
bough is part of the tree and whoever holds on to the tree is 
following sound precepts; sound precepts are better than fine 
words; the court is the place for fine words; at the court you find 
courtiers, and courtiers do whatever's the fashion. . .  . A good 
pilot needs prudence; young men have no prudence . . . ; old men 
love riches; riches make men rich; the rich aren't poor; poor men 
know necessity and necessity knows no law. Without law men live 
like animals, which all goes to prove that you'll be damned to all 
eternity. 17 
Lucky's mock sermon abounds, from its start, in scholarly 
references to authorities that bear names as grotesque and even 
obscene as Puncher and Wattman, Testew and Cunard, Fartov 
and Belcher, Peckham Fulham Clapham, Steinweg and Peter­
man, and Essy-in-Possy. Lucky's elaborate proof of the ex­
istence of God is put in question because it is based on the 
findings of these authorities. Nor do we derive assurance from 
the childish picture he evokes of a God with white beard, or 
from the animal-like sounds—quaquaquaqua—with which he 
accompanies the word God and which in French pronunciation 
become obscene references to the body and its elimination. A 
similarly irreverent effect is achieved by Lucky's stuttering 
profering of "Acacacacademy" and "Anthropopopometry." 
Such phrases as "labors left unfinished," "for reasons un­
known," together with heaven, hell, flames, and fire conjure 
up a world presided over by a god as inscrutable as he is un­
predictable, while the phrase "it is established beyond all 
doubt" ridicules the foolish and arrogant certainties of certain 
scholars. Like a medieval fool, Lucky truly leaps from topic to 
topic, as he turns the world mockingly upside down. But while 
he engages in fatrasies, the farcical play with words known to 
the French Middle Ages, he raises serious questions concerning 
man and his place in the universe—the same questions, in fact, 
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that were raised by Didi and Gogo at the beginning of the play, 
namely, whether there is a God who loves man dearly and 
knows why he saved only one of the two sinners, or whether 
man's notion that "time will tell" is as absurd as the certainty of 
some that knowledge can be "established beyond all doubt." 
Such questions can be dealt with, after all, only in the ludic 
mode of the coq-d-l'dne. For whosoever raises them—be he 
medieval or modern man—will be listened to only if he plays 
the role of the fool. 
Seen in this light, the play's title cannot but be recognized as 
one of the half-serious, half-playful bilingual combinations so 
often encountered in medieval French literature—regardless of 
what immediate experience might have suggested to Beckett 
the name Godot. It represents clearly a juxtaposition of the 
sacred with the profane as it links the Anglo-Saxon word God 
with the French suffix -ot that abases and makes laughable any 
name it is attached to, such as Pierre/Pierrot, Jacques/Jacquot, 
Charles/Chariot. Such "absurdity" is not an inadvertent reflec­
tion in Beckett's work of the chaotic universe we live in but 
rather a conscious tool in the hand of an author who sees man 
sub specie aeternitatis, who ridicules the desire of most of us, 
expressed for centuries in literature, to envision himself—not 
unlike Hamm in Endgame—as the center of the universe, of an 
author realizing that he can speak of what is most serious only 
in the manner of farce and the absolute comic. I am tempted to 
impute to Beckett a passage from Plato quoted by Huizinga: 
"Though human affairs are not worthy of great seriousness it is 
yet necessary to be serious. . . . God alone is worthy of su­
preme seriousness, but man is made God's plaything. . . . 
What then is the right way of living? Life must be lived as play, 
playing certain games, making sacrifices, singing and dancing, 
and then a man will be able to propitiate the gods, and defend 
himself against his enemies, and win in the contest."18 
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Oh I am ashamed

of all clumsy artistry

I am ashamed of presuming

to arrange words. . . . 1

Few aspects of Samuel Beckett's work are more exasperating to 
the cautious critical mind than the style of his early writings in 
English—before, in a fit of exasperation all his own, he turned 
to writing in French. 
This is partly because, like Mr. Knott's wardrobe, this style is 
"very, very various." It is not one style, but many—"now 
heavy, now light; now smart, now dowdy; now sober, now 
gaudy; now decent, now daring"2—making it seemingly im­
possible to pin it down for long enough to analyze it. It is also 
partly because, with all its obvious faults and failings, which 
should, according to most of the canons of taste, render it virtu­
ally intolerable, it nonetheless holds its own. It remains memo­
rable and quotable; and at times it achieves a quite haunting 
beauty. It is, on the face of it, a perverse style. And yet, looking 
back now from the distance of nearly half a century, it is pos­
sible to discern a methodical process at work behind the facade 
of this apparently disorganized exuberance. 
Two comments by early critics may offer a clue to the under­
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standing of the Beckettian enigma. In the first-ever-published 
full-length study of Beckett, Die Unzuldnglichkeit der Sprache of 
1957, Niklaus Gessner observes that he once asked the writer 
why he had abandoned English for French. The reply—which, 
characteristically, was given in French rather than in English— 
was "parce qu'en francais, c'est plus facile d'ecrire sans style."3 
And a second remark from the same period, which was roughly 
that of the first English production of Waiting for Godot at the 
Arts Theatre Club in London in 1956, was made to me by that 
well-known historian of the English novel Dr. Arnold Kettle: "it 
sounds like a bad translation from his own French." 
Now, it is generally assumed that Beckett is a superlative 
translator from the French, whether his own or anyone else's. It 
is true that he can be. Robert Pinget's play La Manivelle, for 
instance, is more effective from every point of view—poetically, 
dramatically, atmospherically—in Beckett's version, The Old 
Tune, than it is in the original. On the other hand, there are 
some efforts that had best been left unpublished. Rimbaud's 
Bateau ivre is one of these. There are some passable lines in 
Drunken Boat; but there are far too many that are clumsy, 
amateurish, and frankly in bad taste—neither good Rimbaud, 
nor good Beckett: 
Et, des lors, je me suis baigne dans le poeme 
De la mer infuse d'astres et lactescent, 
Devorant les azurs verts ou, flottaison bleme 
Et ravie, un noye pensif, parfois, descend; 
Ou, teignant tout a coup les bleuites, delires 
Et rythmes lents sous les rutilements du jour, 
Plus fortes que 1'alcool, plus vastes que vos lyres, 
Fermentent les rousseurs ameres de l'amour. (Lines 21-28) 
Thenceforward, fused in the poem, milk of stars, 
Of the sea, I coiled through deeps of cloudless green, 
Where, dimly, they come swaying down, 
Rapt and sad, singly, the drowned; 
Where, under sky's haemorrhage, slowly tossing 
In thuds of fever, arch-alcohol of song, 
Pumping over the blues in sudden stains, 
The bitter redness of love ferment.4 
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The first two lines of Beckett's translation are admirable; but 
thereafter the reader is torn between a kind of startled amaze­
ment at the slick skill with which the translator, like a virtuoso 
of the jigsaw puzzle, has taken each separate piece from 
Rimbaud's pattern, juggled with it, and then fitted it neatly into 
his own, the irritation at the ineptitudes of the vocabulary 
("dimly" and "singly" jingling away in consecutive lines), the 
modish, post-dadaist, antipoetic imagery, and the rough and 
jerky rhythms taking the place of the smooth and subtle con­
volutions of the Rimbaldian prosody. 
The unevennesses of Drunken Boat are revealing, if only for 
the fact that they are almost certainly (in a way) deliberate. For all 
that the Rimbaud translation was done frankly for money, 
Beckett betrays few of the characteristics of the polished profes­
sional translator. He is at once something less and, obscurely as 
yet, something more. He is less for the reasons outlined above; 
he is more in that quite clearly his use of English is designed to 
serve purposes of his own that are very different from those 
which Rimbaud was serving with his French. The distinction, 
in briefest possible form, is that Rimbaud was using language 
positively and creatively; Beckett is using it—in part at least— 
negatively and destructively. And it is this negative, destruc­
tive, or self-destructive element in Beckett's English style that 
we shall attempt to follow in this essay. 
For Beckett the problem of a literary language presented itself 
in the form of an insoluble contradiction. As a metaphysician— 
that is, as a plain but compulsive writer with something to say 
about the condition of man sub specie aetemitatis—his concern 
was to get beyond language: to transmit not ideas but (in his 
own phrase) the more elemental "shapes of ideas"; not con­
cepts but the logic of the failure of conceptualization; not 
"cogito, ergo sum" but rather some elusive echo of the Sartrian 
rejoinder: "non sum, ergo cogito." But to deal in language with 
the "shapes of ideas" without getting bogged down in the ideas 
themselves would mean reducing language itself to a form so 
automatic and primitive that it conveys no concepts whatso­
ever, but merely its own inherent patterns: computerized 
"shapes" (as in Ping), which may, by awakening some respon­
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sive echo through the sheer intricacy of their permutations and 
combinations, serve to suggest the "shape" of the idea without 
evoking the idea itself. 
It is a problem that perhaps can be illustrated from the art of 
painting—the problem, say, of painting a fish. A traditionalist 
painter paints a fish in its context of water, reeds, and move­
ment: the fish plus its essential "fishness." A modern Japanese 
painter will paint a swirl of reeds and water without the fish: 
"fishness," as it were, without the fish itself. But a modern 
Canadian painter will paint the fish in a bleak and disquieting 
void, as a Ding-an-sich, an arbitrary and meaningless phenom­
enon in a nonexistence of space and time: fish, in fact, without 
"fishness."5 Beckett's ambitions would seem to be most nearly 
akin to the latter category: the "shapes" of ideas, stripped of 
any hint of the omnipresent associations and significances of 
the ideas themselves. 
In this situation, the problem of language looms threaten­
ingly large. Setting aside for the moment the inevitable role of 
language in providing a context of conceptualization, the more 
immediate obstacle is that of "style"; for "style" in any ad­
vanced literary language, but more especially in English, pro­
vides a reverberating "context" of echoes, images, and associa­
tions^—precisely the elements that Beckett wishes to avoid. 
"Style"—the "clumsy artistry," the "presuming to arrange 
words"—is the ultimate enemy, the trap, the devil's most dan­
gerous, most insidious temptation, the sin for which there is no 
forgiveness: that of inauthenticity. All language distorts; stylis­
tic language distorts absolutely. "A thought expressed is a lie," 
wrote the Russian poet Tyutchev over a century ago. If only it 
were possible to write without language at all—or, if not with­
out language, at least without style! The problem is not new. 
Stendhal, in the 1820s, was already struggling with it, and came 
to the conclusion that the only valid model for his writing 
should be the impersonal officialese of the Napoleonic Code 
civil, the nearest that the language of literature could approach 
to the nondescriptive language of mathematics. The Code civil: 
as close as the nineteenth century could get to the styleless 
language of the computer. 
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But—and herein lies the dilemma—Beckett is not only a 
metaphysician, he is also a poet. And for the poet, the over­
whelming and compulsive need is to convey his experience of 
the depth and richness of the world, its ecstasies and its des­
pairs, through language. Probably this has always been so; but 
in the contemporary "Death-of-God" context, it is truer than 
ever. In a universe from which the traditional God-the-Father 
figure has been abstracted, the supreme experience is that of 
existential "is-ness" ("etre-avec," in the phrase coined by 
Gabriel Marcel): the intuitive sense, in certain instances almost 
verging on the mystic, of being uniquely and absolutely at one, 
both with one's own self, and with all else that simultaneously 
exists, randomly and inexplicably, in a given instantaneous-
external accident of space and time. This "communion with 
It-ness"6 is the ultimate experience of the poem and the justifi­
cation of poetry, and it can be expressed only through lan­
guage. The poet's "style"—his linguistic alter ego, the embodi­
ment in conceptual form of the miracle of his being-in-the­
world—has about it nothing that is haphazard. It is the signifi­
cance of his existence; it is the reason why he is a poet rather 
than a building contractor or a motorcycle salesman. 
The outcome, in Beckett, has been from the outset a duality 
and a contradiction: a tug-of-war between poetry and non-
poetry, between "style" and "nonstyle," which, in the early 
writings in English, emerges as a series of self-parodies, almost 
in the manner of an introspective Raymond Queneau directing 
his exercices de style against himself. Each successive style, by 
dint of its deliberate and baroque exaggerations, becomes a 
"nonstyle," or perhaps, better, an "antistyle," destroying its 
authenticity by the assertive self-consciousness of its own arti­
ficiality. In Beckett's case "le style," quite categorically, "n'est 
pas l'homme meme." 
In the long run, however, for a serious writer, anything so 
artificial and negative as an "antistyle" can scarcely offer a final 
solution—any more than the "antitheatre" and the"antinovels" 
of the 1950s could be perpetuated indefinitely. An "antistyle" is 
at best the means to an end, and the end itself is a "nonlan­
guage," a vehicle of expression in which the concepts to be 
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signified are neither colored nor distorted by the words used to 
signify them.7 In the last analysis, this could be the reason 
Beckett eventually turned to French. Not necessarily because 
French is less rich in poetic overtones and nuanced imagery 
than is English (although to some extent this is in fact the case); 
nor even because for any writer to write in a language not his 
own involves a degree of structured artifice that renders the 
self-conscious and auto-destructive artificialities of "style" 
superfluous; but ultimately because in the gap between one 
language and another there may reside that nonlanguage which 
it is Beckett's final aim to realize. Belacqua once claimed to live 
"a Beethoven pause"8—to have his existence in those gaps of 
silence more real (for "Nothing is more real than nothing")9 
and more significant than the great musical phrases surround­
ing them; and it is worth recalling that, in 1962, the somewhat 
eccentric College de Pataphysique, apparently following up a 
similar train of thought, devoted an issue of its Dossiers to an 
exploration of literature born "dans les interstices du Ian-
gage."10 Beckett's French linguistic self is not identical with 
his English-structured linguistic self; nor, even more signifi­
cantly, are his English translations from his own French identi­
cal renderings from one idiom into another. In both cases, there 
is a gap; and somewhere in the gap between the abolutes of any 
given language—be it English or French, German or Italian, 
Latin or Computerese—lies that nonlanguage which is at once 
existential poetry, and yet "styleless" in any recognizable con­
text except that of Beckett himself. 
Returning, however, to Beckett's use of English in the earlier 
writings, before the transition to French, what we discover is a 
series of experiments in artificiality; a multiplicity, in fact, of 
"antistyles," each one of which contains within itself the seeds 
of its own negation. One of the initial problems, on Beckett's 
own admission, was the "poetic" quality of English—the 
wealth of unwanted imagery, color, allusion, and reminiscence 
conjured up by the simplest sentence. And Beckett's earliest 
attempt at a solution was to intensify the richness of this color 
and allusiveness, of this "poetry," to the point where the 
42 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
"poem" itself becomes virtually incomprehensible to anyone 
but the poet himself, and thus stylistically defeats its own ob­
ject. To the poem Whoroscope (1930), Beckett, in a moment of 
weakness, provided some explanatory footnotes of his own; 
but the subsequent Alba (1931), Home Olga (1932), and Echo's 
Bones (1935) are stripped of any such primitive aids to exegesis, 
and in fact it took trained academic critics the better part of forty 
years to begin to penetrate the obscurities and to grasp dimly at 
the meaning11—and then not all of it since, as it chanced, none 
had happened to be living in London and Dublin and Paris and 
Dortmund during those precise years. 
To illustrate this hermetic-solipsistic style—a "style" so inac­
cessible that it becomes in effect a "nonstyle"—we may take the 
two poems from Echo's Bones, entitled respectively Enueg I and 
Enueg II. 
When these were reprinted in 1961, in the collected Poems in 
English, enlightened critics could do no better than to suggest 
that the mysterious word Enueg could be nothing more subtle 
or significant than an approximative anagram of the French 
word jeune. Beckett, who had studied the literature of twelfth-
century Provence, knew of course that Enueg derived from the 
late-Latin word inodium meaning "vexation," and was a form of 
poetic complainte familiar to troubadour poets such as the Monk 
of Montaudon; but the majority of accredited critics, and cer­
tainly the average reader, did not possess this knowledge. 
Once the Provencal context is detected, then other allusions fit 
into place like (once again) the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle: the 
"Isolde Stores,"12 for instance, with the "great perturbation of 
sweaty heroes" who may equally well be Arthurian knights 
after a battle or simply hurling players after an exhausting 
game. But unquestionably the elucidation of the mystery does 
require the services of a skilled literary detective who is pre­
pared to devote several years of his life to the job.13 And in the 
end, perhaps, the final significance of the intrusion of this an­
tique Mediterranean element into an English poem lies pre­
cisely in the fact of its non-Englishness: a first step in the under­
mining of the monolithic self-sufficiency of a linguistic struc­
tural absolute. 
Richard N. Coe 43 
Other equally exotic and esoteric allusions are drawn from 
the Bible and from classical mythology. Nothing straightfor­
ward, of course. To start with, just houses and trees: "Above 
the mansions, the algum-trees." There are no algum trees in 
Dublin, more's the pity; but they did grow once, in the high­
lands of Lebanon, and Solomon commanded that their wood 
should be transported by sea to Jerusalem for the building of his 
temple (2 Chron. 2:8-11)—the house or "mansion" of the Lord. 
So much for the Old Testament; from the New, that recurrent 
Beckettian obsession, the Crucifixion. But, again, one has to 
pick up the initial clue for the rest of the hermetic allusion to fit 
into place: 
at Parnell Bridge a dying barge 
carrying a cargo of nails and timber . . . 
on the far bank a gang of down and outs would seem to be mending a 
beam. . . . 
and the weals creeping alongside on the water . . . 
de morituris nihil nisi . . . 
veronica mundi 
veronica munda 
gave us a wipe for the love of Jesus 
sweating like Judas 
tired of dying. . . .14 
and, through the intermediary of Dante ("God's Quisling on 
earth"), a brief vision of the River Liffey transformed into "the 
Pit" of Hell, with the Damned, Dore-fashion, or like the 
climbers of the ladders in The Lost Ones (Le Depeupleur), attempt­
ing to crawl out: 
Blotches of doomed yellow in the pit of the Liffey; 
the fingers of the ladders hooked over the parapet, 
soliciting. . . . 
The classical allusions are similary unmethodical and (appar­
ently) scattered at random. If the "algum-trees" suggest the 
house of Solomon and the mansion of the Lord, they could 
equally evoke (for the classical scholar) the Greek word akyos, 
meaning "pain," which makes much sense in the context of the 
44 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
woman dying of tuberculosis in the "Portobello Private Nursing 
Home." And then, on the road to Kilmainham, 
I splashed past a little a little wearish old man, 
Democritus . . . 
introducing thus for the first time in the Beckettian canon the 
figure of the "Abderite" with his memorable "guffaw." And 
back in the Isolde Stores, he observes the hurling-players 
come hastening down for a pint of nepenthe or moly or half and half 
and though the most illiterate of his readers (if any) would have 
been familiar with "half and half" (a mixture of two brews of 
beer, half mild, half bitter), again only the scholar like himself 
would have identified nepenthe, "the drug producing forget­
fulness of grief," or moly, the "fabulous herb with white flower 
and black root, endowed with magic properties." The picture 
formed by the jigsaw puzzle is easy enough to interpret once 
the pieces are in place, but utterly baffling so long as the key to 
the structure as a whole is missing. 
Or, to take another element in the "nonstyle" of these 
poems: the use of rare, exotic, and unfamiliar words. Latin 
words: "Exeo," with which Enueg I begins, thus invoking the 
Cartesian "Cogito" and, like Descartes, avoiding the too-
dominant subjectivity of the pronoun "I," with which two of 
the following sections of the poem begin. French words: gaffe; 
or "feet in marmelade"—not the familiar bitter-orange jam of the 
English, but rather any kind of Gallic or Slavonic jelly-like 
squishy mess. "Wearish" = OE "Werig" - OHG "wuarag," 
meaning "drunk." Irish: "pucking," from "puckaun," meaning 
a billy goat: 
a small malevolent goat, exiled on the road, 
remotely pucking the gate of his field. . . . 
German: "doch doch I assure thee." Or plain English rarities 
such as "cang" (reference to a Chinese torture) or "Rafflesia"— 
the latter, named after Sir Thomas Raffles, lieutenant-governor 
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of Sumatra 1818-23, later founder of the Regent's Park Zoo in 
London, being the largest flower in the world, and one of the 
most evil-smelling. All this constitutes not so much a language, 
in the normal sense of the word, as a code, just as the "lan­
guage" of the computer is a code. And a code, at least in any 
literary sense, is a nonstyle. 
It might be added that the formal style of the poems them­
selves (written ca. 1930-35) was, in its time, "exotic"; that is, it 
belonged to a French rather than to an English tradition. Its 
origins may lie remotely in the Provencal Enuegs themselves;15 
but more immediately, these origins are to be found in the 
French tradition as it had developed over the decades between 
Rimbaud and Laforgue on the one hand and Beckett's con­
temporaries Max Jacob, Pierre Reverdy, and Benjamin Peret on 
the other. This manner of conceiving poetic structure was abso­
lutely foreign to English-language poets of the period, with the 
significant exception of those who were closely in contact with 
France: T. S. Eliot, for instance, or Ezra Pound, or e. e. 
cummings.16 For the rest, English poetry seems to have been so 
dazzled by the revelation of Gerard Manley Hopkins in 1918 
that for the better part of a generation it was immunized, as it 
were, against the whole Rimbaldian aesthetic; and even James 
Joyce (so often referred to as Beckett's "mentor") would seem, 
in Pomes Penyeach (1927), to have been taking an anachronistic 
"last ramble through Palgrave,"17 rather than to have kept even 
remotely in touch with the truly original poetic idiom of his 
own time. Thus Beckett, in the Enuegs as in the other poems of 
Echo's Bones, was in fact writing English poetry in an almost 
entirely French poetic idiom: yet another descent into that 
"gap" of silence that lies secreted in the interstices of language. 
If the hermetic "code" of the Poems in English constitutes one 
"nonstyle," Beckett's use of realism, paradoxically, constitutes 
another. This is essentially because, though never cheating, he 
goes to immense pains to conceal the fact that he is a realist. 
Not the jigsaw puzzle now, but hide-and-seek is the game: "I 
hid and you sook," as he observes in a not wholly irrelevant 
line of Whoroscope. So efficacious have been these efforts at 
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concealment that few if any critics seem to have concerned 
themselves seriously with the immediate—as opposed to the 
ultimate—metaphysical reality underlying Beckett's writing;18 
yet it has been apparent for a long time that his "absurdism" 
(like that of his disciple Armand Gatti) is arrived at by driving 
the "realities" of reason, observation, logic, and mathematics to 
their necessary but unacceptable conclusions, and that his "sur­
reality" never for an instant severs its relationship with the 
real—frequently in its grossest and most unpalatable form. 
Where a literal reality takes on the shape of a fantasy, a night­
mare, or a plain impossibility, then "real" and "unreal" cancel 
each other out, and the result is another "nonstyle." 
Admittedly, this technique of contradiction and cancellation 
is not exclusive to the writings in English; but it is more notice­
able, say, in All That Fall, Happy Days, Play, Film, or even in Ohio 
Impromptu, than it is in Godot, in the Trilogy or in Comment c'est; 
and certainly all the fundamental techniques of Beckettian 
realism are well and truly laid in the early writings. It is as 
though the switch to French induced an additional stratum of 
abstraction—culminating in texts such as Le Depeupleur—thus to 
some extent upsetting the carefully calculated balance of the 
"nonstyle," and allowing the artificially acquired language (just 
because it is artificially acquired) more autonomy than the 
natural, maternal idiom. 
Once one starts to look for plain reality in Beckett's writing, 
the more evident it becomes. There is geographical reality—the 
basic guidebook promenades through central Dublin and 
through its remoter suburbs—in Enueg I, for instance ("Over 
the Liffey with its steep perilous bridge");19 in "Fingal" and in 
"A Wet Night," and of course in Watt. Murphy similarly follows 
an accurate street plan of small but very real sections of Lon­
don—of Edith Grove, Cremorne Road, Lot's Road, and Sta­
dium Street, for instance, all of which, within less than a hun­
dred yards of each other, can be located on the North Bank of 
Chelsea Reach in any edition of the familiar A-Z Atlas and Street 
Guide of that city. But undoubtedly what Beckett loves best to 
light upon is the existence of a real place whose name conceals 
an accidental but resplendent symbolism—it could well have 
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been his acquaintance with a very real suburb of Dublin named 
Chapelizod (= "The Chapel of Isolde") that sparked off the 
whole "troubadour" structure of Enueg I. And the very summit 
of this amalgam of realism and symbolism is attained when 
(given the Beckettian vision of decaying humanity astride dis­
integrating bicycles) the already symbolic place-name, to those 
who actually know the place, is associated with a hospital: 
Kilmainham (Enueg I), where the hurling-players have been 
locked in mortal combat, was, first, the building in which the 
"crucified" Parnell had once been imprisoned, and second, one 
which had later become a hospital; and what better syllable for 
the name of a hospital to begin with (and Beckett is supremely 
alert to the significance of the opening syllables of names) than 
"Kil"? The Chelsea Reach of Murphy leads directly to the 
famous Chelsea Royal Hospital. And Murphy himself, mewed 
up in life if not in death in his "Mew in West Brompton," 
overlooked the Western Hospital, which has as its garden the 
immense West Brompton Cemetery. When, in the course of 
translation, Beckett moved Murphy to Paris, West Brompton 
could not go with him; but—marvel of marvels—close by the 
cemetery of Montparnasse, Beckett discovered a (real) 
"Impasse de 1'Enfant-Jesus"; and it was overshadowed by the 
grim walls of the Hopital Necker! 
Thus symbol and reality interfuse; and the same is true as he 
walks the streets and observes the life around him. In such a 
manner, the "surrealist" admonition to "smoke more fruit" 
(Enueg II) combines the essence of two all-too-prevalent pub­
licity campaigns in the London of the 1930s: the Imperial 
Tobacco Company's "Smoke Capstans" (on huge hoardings), 
and the South African Trade Bureau's "Eat More Fruit" (in 
delicious cardboard cutouts of oranges, lemons, pineapples, 
and so on, available at every greengrocer and fruiterer). Or— 
another example of observed reality apprehended for its acci­
dental symbolism—the Great Ice-Cream Rivalry. In Murphy's 
London, two firms vied for the juvenile ice-cream market: 
Wall's and Eldorado. Both employed disabled former service­
men to pedal around the streets on delivery-tricycles fitted with 
refrigerated containers. Wall's (blue-and-white, with the slogan 
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"Stop Me And Buy One") was reputed to have the better qual­
ity; but it was also more expensive. Eldorado (red-and-white) 
was the cheaper, inferior product; and cheap ice cream was 
then known as "hokey-pokey." "Hokey-pokey-penny-a­
lump," chanted the nannies to their charges—conjuring up 
visions of unsanitary Italian vendors, their product concocted 
in the bathtub. A laborious explanation; but it is necessary, 
perhaps, for the modern reader to understand the typically 
elaborate mixture of the real and the symbolic that underlies 
one of Beckett's apparently more ingenuous sentences: 
Celia [contemplating suicide by drowning herself in the Thames] 
walked to a point about half-way between the Battersea and Albert 
Bridges and sat down on a bench between a Chelsea pensioner and 
an Eldorado hokey-pokey man, who had dismounted from his 
cruel machine and was enjoying a short interlude of paradise.20 
Observed reality—decrepitude, hospitalization, and death— 
Inferno, Purgatorio, Eldorado. Social realism also: Wall's "Stop 
Me And Buy One" would probably not have bothered with 
Lot's Road or Chelsea Reach during the days of the Great De­
pression. Nor is the "cruel machine" wholly to be dissociated 
from the later Beckettian bicycle image, which had already 
made its first appearance in the "Fingal" of More Pricks Than 
Kicks (pp. 33-36). 
But if Beckett's eye is accurate, so also is his ear. Like Proust, 
he is truly a human tape recorder. The role of the tape recorder 
itself in Krapp's Last Tape is not accidental; the then newly in­
vented machine simply vulgarizes the processes of his own 
mind. The rhythms, intonations, and inflections of Murphy and 
Watt, of the English version of Godot, and even of some of the 
later sketches such as Footfalls or Theatre I and Theatre II, are not 
the product of Mind working in the quintessential Abstract; 
they are the rhythms of the Dublin street and public house—as 
accurate as those of Stanley Holloway's Wigan and Runcorn, or 
of Barry Humphries' Moonee Ponds. The utterances of the 
Winnie of "Fingal," sparse as they are, nonetheless suffice to 
reverberate with the limitless vulgarities of her tiny-minded 
conventionality. "The Smeraldina's Billet Doux," as the 
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pastiche of a letter written in her own brand of English by a 
Germanic woman-in-love, is so devastatingly accurate that it 
hurts. The very accent of Kassel—or is it not rather that of 
Wiener-Neustadt?—echoes through the written words: 
Bel! Bel! how could you ever doubt me? Meine Ruh ist hin mein 
Herz ist schwer ich finde Sie rummer und nimmer mehr. (Goethes 
Faust.) Lord Lord Lord for god sake tell me strate away what 
agsactly I have done. Is everything indiffrent to you? Evedintly you 
cant be bothered with a goat like me. If I don't stop writing you 
wont be able to read this letter because it will be all ofer tears. Bel! 
Bel! . . . 
Do you remember last summer (of course he dose) and how lovely 
it was lieing hearing the bees summing and the birds singing, and 
the big butterfly that cam past, it looked grand, it was dark brown 
with yellow spots and looked so beautiful in the sun, and my body 
was quite brown all ofer and I dident feel the cold any more. (P. 
166) 
On the other hand, the purely parodic speech-realism of La 
Smeraldina, or for that matter of the Miss Coonihan of Murphy, 
or of Maddy in All That Fall, is superficial compared with the 
profound psychological reality of verbal patterns in some of the 
later works. What Beckett's significant personal experiences 
may have been is unknown to us, and will probably remain 
so.21 But that he has passed through (and mentally tape-
recorded) some of the most traumatic moments of a human 
existence is unquestionable. Psychoanalytical interpretation of 
great works of literature are normally futile because they are 
directed at the writer, who is usually far more intelligent than 
the would-be psychoanalyst. But in Beckett's case the result 
might be more fruitful, since these interpretations could only be 
directed at the characters. The Winnie of Happy Days, for in­
stance: an uncannily accurate recording of the voice of a woman 
whose marriage has broken down, during the last days before 
she resorts to the tranquilizing pills, the psychiatrist, and the 
mental-home; Play: the word-for-word nastiness of marriage 
and adultery—the bestial melodrama that no modern dramatist 
without the genius of a Beckett would dare touch, and yet 
which is true nonetheless: 
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W2. One morning as I was sitting stitching by the open win­
dow she burst in and flew at me. Give him up, she 
screamed, he's mine. Her photographs were kind to 
her. Seeing her now for the first time full length in the 
flesh I understood why he preferred me. 
N.	 We were not long together when she smelled the rat. 
Give up that whore, she said, or I'll cut my throat— 
(hiccup) pardon—so help me God. I knew she could 
have no proof. So I told her I did not know what she 
was talking about, 
W2.	 What are you talking about? I said, stitching away. Some­
one yours? Give up whom? I smell you off him, she 
screamed, he stinks of bitch.22 
Or, of course, Lucky's great monologue in Godot that, from the 
psychiatrist's point of view, is the almost untreated, unex­
purgated version of the outpourings of any contemporary in­
tellectual adolescent in the first crisis of drug addiction or of 
plain schizophrenia. 
Another nonlanguage. In almost everything that he has writ­
ten (but particularly in English), Beckett is presenting a total 
reality: a more-than-Zolaesque, absolute naturalism, which, 
within its context, refuses to behave as naturalism, or even as 
realism. It is the language of literal truth (to those who can 
recognize it) masquerading as the language of the metaphysi­
cal, the mythological, and the absurd. Truth pretending to be a 
nontruth. Truth and nontruth canceling each other out. Again a 
void. 
Perhaps Beckett's supreme attempt to write both in superla­
tive literary English and, at the same time, "without style" was 
achieved in Watt. Watt represents the nearest ever that a great 
poet has managed to transform himself into a computer; yet 
(because he is a poet) it remains a computer-with-a-bad-con­
science. 
The objective of Watt is to use language as though there were 
no positive or necessary relationship between word and con­
cept—between signifier and signified. For Watt himself this is' 
both a puzzling and (since he had not then read the later struc­
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turalists) a painful procedure: "Watt's need of semantic succor 
was at times so great that he would set to trying names on 
things, almost as a woman hats . . .  " (Watt, p. 90). 
For Watt's creator, on the other hand, it was a supreme, a 
desperate exercice de style; or rather (once again) de non-style. But 
the basic principle of using words in a completely random rela­
tionship with concepts—saying of a pot, for instance, "It is a 
shield, or, growing bolder, It is a raven, and so on" (p. 90)—is 
only one part of the general pattern of linguistic disintegration. 
By a skilled and virtually unique use of the comma, Beckett 
breaks up his sentences into a series of semiautonomous sense-
units, isolating hunks of raw language in such a way that, al­
though the continuity of the thought is not destroyed alto­
gether, each section of the argument that constitutes that con­
tinuity stands apart and comes as a surprise, seemingly arbi­
trary and unexpected, assumable or discardable upon the whim 
of the moment. Consider the description of Mr. Knott's style of 
dressing, for instance, in which the comma—the "Beethoven­
pause" between blocks of significance—appears more momen­
tous than the phrases that it separates: 
But whatever he put on, in the beginning, for by midnight he 
was always in his nightshirt, whatever he put on then, on his 
head, on his body, on his feet, he did not touch again, but kept on 
all that day, in his room, in his house, in his grounds, until the 
time came to put on his nightshirt, once again. (P. 222) 
There is something vaguely archaic about the ring of these sen­
tences, something tantalizingly reminiscent of the Areopagitica 
or of the Anatomy of Melancholy; but once again, if there is a 
suggestion of pastiche, it is not in order to bring about a rap­
prochement with a more ancient style but rather to achieve a 
further alienation effect: English, not as it once was written but 
as it is not written. Echoes of John Donne or of Izaac Walton 
invoked deliberately to undermine the authenticity of twen­
tieth-century narrative prose. 
Other devices likewise serve to emphasize the all-prevalence 
of nonstyle—including that of negativity itself. Time and time 
again, in Watt, faced with the choice of making a statement in 
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positive or in double-negative form, Beckett chooses the latter. 
Indeed, the challenge of the double-negative waves like the 
black flag of the anarchists above the doomed linguistic tradi­
tionalism of the narrative: "This is not to say that Watt never 
saw Mr Knott, at this period, for he did, to be sure" (p. 75); 
"Not that he was always unsuccessful either, for he was not" 
(p. 84). Or else complex triple, quadruple, or quintuple implied 
negatives, such as the following: 
For the only way one can speak of nothing is to speak of it as 
though it were something, just as the only way one can speak of 
God is to speak of him as though he were a man, which to be sure 
he was, in a sense, for a time, and as the only way one can speak of 
man, even our anthropologists have realized that, is to speak of 
him as though he were a termite. (P. 84). 
"Something" here is a pis-aller for the ultimate reality of 
"nothing," which language, even in the ultimate extremes of its 
negativity, is unable to grasp or to handle. 
The variations on an "antistyle" in Watt are innumerable, 
among them the familiar antics of the "Academic Clown."23 
There is, for instance, the borrowing of stylistic tricks and man­
nerisms from other writers and other situations wholly inap­
propriate and irrelevant to the thematic material of the argu­
ment. Arsene's formal pomposity and reiterated interjections of 
"Haw!" are borrowed straight from P. G. Wodehouse's Jeeves, 
with some addition, perhaps, from Dorothy L. Sayers's Bunter 
and from innumerable other comic or semicomic gentlemens' 
gentlemen of the period. The naively repeated "said Mr. 
Hackett," "said Goff," "said Tetty" of the opening sequences 
suggest the deadpan formula of Ivy Compton-Burnett, with 
something thrown in from the sophisticated ingenuousness of 
The House at Pooh Corner. There are the computerized permuta­
tions and combinations of Mary eating onions-and-pepper­
mints, of the Lynch family background to the dog who did or 
(as the case might be) did not consume the remains of Mr. 
Knott's supper, or of Mr. Ernest Louit's appearance before the 
committee responsible for determining his worthiness to re­
ceive an award for research. In all of these, step by step, the 
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computer begins, almost literally, to take over from the poet; 
and the ultimate nonlanguage is that code which electronics can 
contrive out of oblong holes punched in slips of pasteboard: 
"Ot bro, lap rulb, krad klub. Ot murd, wol fup, wol fup. Ot 
niks, sorg sam, sorg sam. Ot lems, lats lems, lats lems. Ot gnut, 
trat stews, trat stews" (Watt, p. 181). 
With the computerized automation of Watt's linguistic ex­
periments in part three of the novel, Beckett's search for a non-
style reaches its climax and its logical conclusion. The "inter­
stices" between languages have become gigantic chasms be­
tween language-as-such and the thoughts or concepts that lan­
guage traditionally is expected to convey. Thought, words, 
style: the three have become absolutely and irremediably sepa­
rated from each other; and, because of this separation, we are 
left with a style in vacuo—a style that functions as a nonstyle by 
having severed all connections with that which it is supposed to 
represent, while at the same time retaining its unique indi­
viduality. "Le pour-soi," wrote Sartre, "est ce qu'il n'est pas." 
Beckett's English style, in the last stage of its evolution before 
he turned to French, similarly "is what it is not." It is a style; but 
it is not, in that the signifier no longer bears any immediate or 
positive relationship to the thing signified. A style reveals; a 
code conceals. In Watt Beckett has given a style to a code, and 
thus has realized the ultimate self-contradition of which litera­
ture is capable. 
If, as we have argued, the problem that Beckett set himself 
from the outset was to discover a manner of writing "in the 
interstices of language"—in the linguistic equivalent of the 
"Beethoven-pause"—the transition to French would seem in 
retrospect to have been almost inevitable. Under different cir­
cumstances, it might have been Latin, or Esperanto. A foreign 
language is a code; to learn a foreign language is one of the 
most computer-like functions of the human mind. By working 
in French, Beckett avoids the traps he feels to be implicit in 
establishing a direct or "organic" relationship between the 
thing signified and the phrase signifying. Instead, the com­
puter first translates the concept into the "code" of a foreign 
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language—that is, into a medium that is not "natural" but arti­
ficial—and then, by a second and wholly distinct operation, 
works back to the "real" or "natural" language, by translating 
from, or deciphering, the code. In other words, from Molloy 
onward Beckett's prose-poetry in English is, in Watt's phrase, 
"language commenting language," and is thus positive and 
affirmative within the strict limits that constitute its domain, 
rather than language trying, and forever failing, to embrace 
reality. The artificiality of the whole procedure is of the essence. 
And to remind us of this, here and there Beckett translates with 
carefully calculated inadequacy, sometimes even to the point of 
clumsiness. 
To take one example only. In the exchange between Vladimir 
and Estragon, when they attempt to recall the landscapes of the 
past, the French runs as follows: 
Vladimir. Tout de meme, tu ne vas pas me dire que ca \geste] 
ressemble au Vaucluse! II y a quand meme une 
grosse difference. 
Estragon. Le Vaucluse! Qui te parle du Vaucluse? 
Vladimir. Mais tu as bien e'te dans le Vaucluse? 
Estragon. Mais non, je n'ai jamais ete dans le Vaucluse! J'ai 
coule toute ma chaudepisse d'existence ici, je te 
dis! Ici! Dans la Merdecluse!24 
This becomes in English: 
Vladimir. All the same, you can't tell me that this [gesture] 
bears any resemblance to . .  . [he hesitates] . .  . to 
the Macon country, for example. You can't deny 
there's a big difference. 
Estragon. The Macon country! Who's talking to you about the 
Macon country? 
Vladimir. But you were there yourself, in the Macon country. 
Estragon. No, I was never in the Macon country. I've puked 
my puke of a life away here, I tell you! Here! In the 
Cackon country!25 
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It grates! "Macon" and "Cackon" neither translate the French 
wordplay, nor replace it by an English equivalent. As a semi-
pun ("Vaucluse'V'Merdecluse" is not exactly subtle, it is mean­
ingless. Surely, one feels, Beckett can do better than that:26 "It 
sounds like a bad translation from his own French!" Which is 
exactly (this is the essence of our argument) what it is meant to 
sound like. 
Thus Beckett's sense of the failure of language is (provision­
ally) exorcised, and in translating these works of the middle 
period, he can write some of the greatest prose-poetry in Eng­
lish literature: 
I listen and the voice is of a world collapsing endlessly, a frozen 
world, under a faint untroubled sky, enough to see by, yes, and 
frozen too. And I hear it murmur that all wilts and yields, as if 
loaded down, but here there are no loads, and the ground too, 
unfit for loads, and the light too, down towards an end it seems 
can never come. (Molloy, P. 40) 
To deny that this passage has "style" would be absurd; yet, 
on analysis, it is a style that nonetheless makes use of those 
elements of "antistyle" that we have been examining. In their 
final form, however, and thanks to the procedure by which 
they have first been required to pass through the "computer­
code" of a foreign language, these elements have, as it were, 
become naturalized. They are no longer negative but positive. 
They function as words should function, that is, as a "comment" 
on other words; only indirectly and accidentally do they relate 
to concepts. Only accidentally are they poetry. But for all that, 
they are stamped with the unique and unforgettable identity of 
their maker. 
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Rubin Rabinovitz

Unreliable Narrative in Murphy

In some of Samuel Beckett's early works, the narrator's com­
mentary is occasionally untrustworthy; in Murphy the unreli­
able narrative becomes an important structural device. Many of 
the narrator's seemingly plausible statements are in some way 
misleading or inconsistent. For example, he twice says that 
Murphy is a "strict non-reader"; but he also reveals that 
Murphy is familiar with works by Fletcher, Swift, Wordsworth, 
Dante, Campanella, and Bishop Bouvier, among others.1 A 
possible way of resolving this problem is given in a passage 
where the narrator describes how Murphy was forced to sell 
some of his possessions: 
He thought of the rocking-chair left behind in Brewery Road, 
that aid to life in his mind from which he had never before been 
parted. His books, his pictures, his postcards, his musical scores 
and instruments, all had been gradually disposed of in that order 
rather than the chair. (P. 189) 
It may be, then, that Murphy gave up reading when he was 
forced to sell his books; but calling him a strict nonreader is 
nevertheless somewhat misleading. Moreover, if this explana­
tion resolves one contradiction, it introduces another. Earlier 
the narrator has assured the reader that Murphy's rocking chair 
"never left him"; here the narrator includes a reminder that it 
has been "left behind in Brewery Road."2 
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Another problem involving the rocking chair arises in the 
opening pages of the novel. The narrator says that Murphy 
uses seven scarves to bind himself to the chair and then, enu­
merating them, mentions only six (p. 2). According to some 
critics (A. Alvarez, for example), this is an inadvertent error.3 
But Beckett is careful about small details. If the error had been 
an oversight, it would probably have been eliminated when 
Beckett translated his novel into French. However, the incon­
sistent enumeration of scarves, the assurances that Murphy is a 
nonreader, and other misleading statements are retained in the 
French version. Moreover, many of Beckett's novels have in­
consistencies of this sort; John Mood has discovered twenty-
eight of them in a single work, WattA 
One of the ways Beckett uses unreliable material is illustrated 
in an exchange between Bim Clinch, the head male nurse at the 
Magdalen Mental Mercyseat, and Ticklepenny. Bim hires 
Ticklepenny as an attendant and promises him a salary of five 
pounds per month. After ten days among the lunatics, Tickle-
penny has had enough; he persuades Murphy to take over his 
job, and asks Bim to pay him for the time he has worked. Bim, 
who has "a fancy for Ticklepenny not far short of love," agrees 
to this arrangement (pp. 156-57). But he adds a stipulation: 
"you will get your one-six-eight," he says, "as soon as your 
Murphy has given a month's satisfaction and no sooner."5 
Ticklepenny accepts this offer without realizing that after work­
ing ten days he is owed a third of five pounds, or one-thirteen­
four (one-six-eight is a third of four pounds). The exact value of 
"Bim's fancy . . . not far short of love" may be difficult to com­
pute, but it is clearly less than six shillings eightpence. 
There is another bit of legerdemain in this episode. When 
Ticklepenny offers Murphy the job, he says nothing about his 
relationship with Bim. Yet Murphy predicts that he will not be 
hired if Ticklepenny is involved in "a liaison with some high 
official, the head male nurse for example."6 How does Murphy 
manage to guess the truth so accurately? Either he has become 
uncharacteristically perceptive or—more likely—the narrator is 
sharing a joke with the reader. For, despite the premonition 
about the head male nurse, Murphy (who thinks that the liai­
60 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
son will hurt his chances for employment) still has managed to 
get things backward. 
Many of the inconsistencies in the novel become apparent 
when one compares related details in widely separated pas­
sages. One example involves two appearances of the word 
"whinge" (to whine or whimper). According to the narrator, 
"All the puppets in this book whinge sooner or later, except 
Murphy, who is not a puppet" (p. 122). This suggests—or 
seems to—that whatever forms of expression will be elicited 
from Murphy, the whinge is not among them. But some pages 
earlier the narrator had described how Murphy "threw his 
voice into an infant's whinge" (p. 37). Nor can the narrator's 
statement be taken to mean that all the minor characters in the 
book whinge and are puppet-like, but that Murphy (who also 
whinges) is not puppet-like. There are other characters, notably 
Mr. Endon, who never whinge.7 
Murphy's horoscope introduces a number of other incon­
sistencies. Some of Suk's predictions, like those about fits and 
quadrupeds, are accurate; many others are not.8 Suk indicates 
that Murphy possesses "great Magical Ability of the Eye, to 
which the lunatic would easy succumb" (p. 32). When Celia 
threatens to leave him unless he looks for work, Murphy fixes 
his gaze on her "with great magical ability"; the result is that 
Murphy is forced to seek employment (p. 39). Later on, the 
narrator notes that the M.M.M. is ideally suited for Murphy to 
take advantage of the "great magical ability of the eye to which 
the lunatic would easy succumb" (p. 183). Attempting to 
achieve rapport with Mr. Endon, he stares into his eyes; and 
again, Murphy is the one who is defeated.9 Murphy loves to 
talk, but Suk claims that silence is one of his highest attributes. 
Like the narrator, Suk has his playful moments: shortly after 
praising Murphy's silence, he says, "Avoid exhaustion by 
speech" (p. 32). Celia twice quotes this admonition back to 
Murphy after he engages in one of his long-winded mono­
logues.10 
According to the narrator, Suk was told the day and year of 
Murphy's birth, but not the time (p. 23). Yet the opening words 
of the horoscope are, "At time of Birth of this Native four de­
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grees of the GOAT was rising . . .  " (p. 32). Suk could not have 
given the position of a zodiacal constellation this accurately 
without knowing the time of birth to within a few minutes.11 
Again, a repeated word is used to call attention to the incon­
sistency. The narrator says that Suk would be able to prepare 
Murphy's horoscope without being told "the precise moment 
of vagitus" (birth cry); later, the word "vagitus" appears twice 
in a passage about Murphy's birth (pp. 23, 71). The narrator 
seems to know when Murphy was born—he describes what 
occurred in the delivery room; but this knowledge is never 
shared with the reader. Hence it is impossible to determine 
whether some of the details in the horoscope are reliable. 
There is a way, however, of estimating roughly when 
Murphy was born, and this points to another inconsistency. 
The action of the novel takes place in 1935, and Murphy is 
called young (twice) and a young man (twice on the same 
page).12 Assuming that Murphy is at least sixteen but no more 
than fifty (to take the extreme cases), the year of his birth is 
between 1885 and 1919. Suk says that when Murphy was born, 
Neptune was in Taurus and Uranus was in Aquarius.13 Nep­
tune was in Taurus from 1874 until 1889; Uranus was in Aquar­
ius from 1912 to 1920. Hence one of Suk's statements could be 
true if Murphy were forty-six or over; the other one, if he were 
twenty-three or under; but both of the statements cannot be 
true. In fact there is no time in the nineteenth or twentieth 
centuries when Neptune and Uranus are in the designated po­
sitions simultaneously.14 
With characteristic evenhandedness, Beckett makes certain 
that the astronomy in Murphy is as unreliable as the astrology. 
If the comment about the moon promoting magical ability is 
misleading, so is the statement that is its counterpart, "The 
moon, by a striking coincidence full and at perigee, was 29,000 
miles nearer the earth than it had been for four years" (p. 26). 
On the night in question (11 September 1935—the date can be 
calculated from details given in the novel), the moon was in fact 
full.15 Perigee, however, was not reached until the next even­
ing; and since the moon is full and at perigee about once a year, 
the coincidence is not so very striking.16 On 12 September the 
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moon was well over 29,000 miles nearer to the earth than it had 
been only thirteen days earlier, when it was at apogee. Nor was 
it closer to the earth than it had been for four years: when it was 
at perigee on 20 April 1932, the lunar distance was less by ten 
miles. Indeed, unless someone tampers with its orbit, the moon 
never can be "29,000 miles nearer the earth than it had been for 
four years"; the difference between the average and minimum 
perigee distances is less than 5,000 miles.17 It is remarkable how 
much error the narrator has packed into a single sentence; yet 
his information is so plausible, his tone so self-assured, that it 
seems almost rude to check on the data. 
Another error in astronomy is introduced when the narrator 
explains why Murphy can see no stars from the window of his 
garret: 
When it was not too cold to open the skylight in the garret, the 
stars seemed always veiled by cloud or fog or mist. The sad truth 
was that the skylight commanded only that most dismal patch of 
night sky, the galactic coal-sack, which would naturally look like a 
dirty night to any observer in Murphy's condition, cold, tired, 
angry, impatient and out of conceit with a system that seemed the 
superfluous cartoon of his own. (Pp. 188-89) 
But if Murphy had wanted to see more than the coal-sack, he 
only needed to wait a bit and the area framed by the skylight 
would have changed: this is one of the many salutory effects of 
the earth's diurnal motion. Moreover, if the coal-sack seems 
dark in contrast to nearby regions of the Milky Way, it can 
hardly be called dismal; and it does contain visible stars.18 A 
more likely explanation for Murphy's inability to see the stars is 
given at the end of the quoted passage: he is "out of conceit" 
with the celestial system. 
According to the narrator, Murphy starts out believing in two 
systems: that of the heavenly bodies (astrology) and that of his 
own mental processes (pp. 22-23, 75-76). But the narrator notes 
"a certain disharmony between the only two canons in which 
Murphy can feel the least confidence."19 Murphy begins to 
think of his own system as the superior one: "The more his own 
system closed round him, the less he could tolerate its being 
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subordinated to any other" (pp. 182-83). He becomes more and 
more convinced that his mind is "a closed system, subject to no 
principle of change but its own . . .  " (p. 109). The stars he had 
believed in as an influence on his life become the "stars he 
commanded" and "his stars"; finally Murphy thinks of astrol­
ogy as "a system that seemed the superfluous cartoon of his 
own."20 
Ironically, Murphy's repudiation of astrology is predicted in 
the epigraph of his horoscope, which is a passage taken from 
Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet: "Then I defy you, Stars."11 
Murphy, like Romeo, can defy the stars; but neither hero can 
escape his destiny, which is to die a short time afterward. There 
is another quotation from Romeo and Juliet—again about stars— 
in Murphy: "Take him and cut him out in little stars" (p. 86). 
This passage is from a speech of Juliet's in which the imminent 
death of Romeo is foreshadowed: 
Come, gentle night, come, loving, black-brow'd night, 
Give me my Romeo; and, when he shall die, 
Take him and cut him out in little stars, 
And he will make the face of heaven so fine 
That all the world will be in love with night. . . . 22 
The remains of Romeo will be transformed into stars: this idea 
nicely offsets Murphy's notion that the astral system can be 
subsumed into his own. 
Murphy's separation from the outside world is symbolized 
by his diminishing ability to see the stars. A related theme 
occurs in two works that were important influences on Murphy: 
The Divine Comedy and The World as Will and Idea. In The Divine 
Comedy, Dante loses sight of the stars when he descends into 
the underworld. Only when he emerges does he see them 
again; this is described in the last verse of the Inferno.23 There is 
also a reference to the stars in the last sentence of The World as 
Will and Idea. Describing the insubstantiality of the physical 
world, Schopenhauer says, "To those in whom the will has 
turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, 
with all its suns and milky ways—is nothing."24 The universe 
that we believe exists outside ourselves is actually projected 
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from within. In Proust Beckett refers to this idea: he says that 
the outer world is "a projection of the individual's conscious­
ness (an objectivation of the individual's will, Schopenhauer 
would say). . . ,"25 A similar concept is introduced when 
Murphy decides that his own system has taken precedence 
over the celestial system: 
They were his stars, he was the prior system. He had been pro­
jected, larval and dark, on the sky of that regrettable hour as on a 
screen, magnified and clarified into his own meaning. But it was 
his meaning.26 
The struggle for priority between the two systems leads to a 
new way of understanding the errors and inconsistencies in the 
novel. If Murphy's is the prior system, there is no need for the 
narrator's descriptions of celestial phenomena to be in accord 
with those of the almanac. Indeed, strict conformity to astron­
omical data would suggest that the system of the novel is sub­
ordinate to the system of the outer world. The narrator, how­
ever, indicates that the world of the novel is a closed system, 
and one with priority over other systems. 
A related idea emerges in still another passage about the 
moon. According to the almanac, the moon was visible before 
dawn on 21 October 1935; and it set long after sunrise.27 But the 
narrator, using a balanced sentence, disagrees: "An hour previ­
ously the moon had been obliged to set, and the sun could not 
rise for an hour to come" (pp. 250-51). Symmetry is the con­
trolling factor here, and not the almanac. Once Murphy has 
repudiated the other system, the narrator no longer feels com­
pelled to follow it. He himself is perhaps the one who "obliged" 
the moon to set. Soon after this passage he describes the "star­
less" and "abandoned" sky; presumably it is starless because 
Murphy has abandoned it. 
Other events in the novel do conform to the laws of the 
external world, but this is part of the narrator's strategy for 
credible mendacity. Most of the time, fallacious material is in­
troduced sparingly, and is surrounded by easily verified facts. 
To gain the reader's confidence, the narrator even calls atten­
tion to possible errors: "The next day," he says at one point, 
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"was Saturday (if our reckoning is correct) . . .  " (p. 149). As 
might be expected, in this instance the date has been calculated 
accurately. 
When Ticklepenny claims that he once saw Murphy drunk, 
the narrator finds it necessary to set the record straight: "Now 
the sad truth was that Murphy never touched it" (p. 86). This, 
so far as one can tell, is in fact "the sad truth." But this phrase 
later resurfaces in a less reliable context: "The sad truth was that 
the skylight commanded only that most dismal patch of night 
sky, the galactic coal-sack . . .  " (p. 188). 
One factor that makes the errors hard to discover is that 
many of them are based on obscure facts. Not too many readers 
will know that Hippasos was drowned at sea and not (as Neary 
claims) in a puddle.28 Another subtle error is introduced in a 
passage about "Barbara, Baccardi . . . Baroko . . . Bramantip" 
(p. 16). These are medieval mnemonic terms that represent dif­
ferent types of syllogisms—all of them, that is, except for 
Baccardi, which has been substituted for a legitimate term, 
Bocardo.29 The device resembles an intelligence-test problem 
where one must discover the item that does not belong in a 
series. Baccardi also appears in the French version of Murphy.30 
Beckett wittily uses the spurious term to allude to a beverage 
that might provide some respite from the rigors of medieval 
logic. 
A similar sense of playfulness emerges in other unreliable 
passages where author and reader are involved in a battle of 
wits. The chess game hints at this idea: Murphy, naturally 
enough, takes it for granted that the game will be played in the 
conventional way; but Mr. Endon has introduced new rules. 
Beckett's readers will probably also begin by assuming that 
Beckett is following the conventional rules of novel-writing. 
Discovering that the rules have changed is part of the challenge; 
but it would be unsporting to introduce the new rules without 
any warning. Hence Beckett includes errors that are relatively 
easy to detect, like the faulty enumeration of scarves; these 
make it easier for readers to discover other unreliable passages. 
Many of the recurring passages are similarly used to hint at 
the pattern of unreliability. The narrator reveals that he has 
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been taking liberties with the dialogue by saying three times 
that a character's remarks have been "expurgated, accelerated, 
improved and reduced" (pp. 12, 48, 119). Cleverly, Beckett re­
veals that the dialogue has not been transcribed verbatim by 
repeating the disclosure verbatim. 
Repetition is often used to underscore ironical passages. 
Neary's letters to Wylie and Miss Counihan both begin with the 
same sentence: "I can never forget your loyalty" (p. 199). Neary 
means, of course, that he will long remember their treachery. 
The narrator refers four times in as many pages to Murphy's 
success in achieving rapport with the mental patients (pp. 180­
83). This ironically foreshadows Murphy's failure with the only 
patient he really cares for, Mr. Endon. 
Utilizing a technique he introduced in More Pricks Than Kicks, 
Beckett calls attention to unreliable statements by repeating 
them. The following are among the misleading ideas that are 
reiterated: 
that Murphy is a strict nonreader (pp. 162, 234); 
that silence is one of Murphy's highest attributes (pp. 32, 39, 
164); 
that Murphy possesses great magical ability of the eye (pp. 
32, 39, 157, 183); 
that it is a striking coincidence for the moon to be full and at 
perigee (pp. 26, 121). 
Beckett's method involves using a formal device, repetition, to 
counter the errors in the subject matter. In this way, even when 
the content flirts with the truth, the style remains faithful to it. 
Sometimes—the episode about Ticklepenny's wages is an ex­
ample—the unreliable narrative contributes to the characteriza­
tion: one discovers that Bim, in addition to his many other 
defects as a human being, is miserly and incapable of affection. 
Other unreliable passages, like those about astronomy and 
astrology, suggest that it is pointless to argue about which type 
of knowledge is superior to any other. Every system that at­
tempts to give a faithful and comprehensive view of the outer 
world will eventually collapse under a weight of enigma or 
error. The various unreliable passages in the novel all hint at an 
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underlying theme: that the world is not what it seems to be, 
that it can never be what it seems to be. The unreliable narrative 
in Murphy is in an ultimate sense not at all unreliable; for it 
depicts, in a truthful way, the illusions and deceptions of the 
outer world. 
1. Samuel Beckett, Murphy (1938; rpt. New York: Grove Press, 1957); sub­
sequent references will be to this edition. "A strict non-reader," pp. 162, 234. 
This discrepancy has been noted by Ruby Cohn; see Back to Beckett (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 33. References to Fletcher, p. 49; 
Swift ("Lilliputian wine," etc.), p. 139; Wordsworth, p. 100; Dante ("Ante­
purgatory," etc.), pp. 77-78; Campanella, p. 17; Bishop Bouvier, p. 72. Ac­
cording to Hannah Copeland, Bouvier's book is an example of the "imaginary 
works" in Murphy (see Art and Artist in the Works of Samuel Beckett [The Hague: 
Mouton, 1975], p. 63). In fact, Jean-Baptiste Bouvier's Dissertatio in Sextum 
Decalogi pmeceptum et Supplementum ad Tractatus de Matrimoni was published in 
Le Mans in 1827, and went through a number of editions. 
2. On page 1 the narrator says of the chair, "it never left him"; on page 189 
he refers to the chair as "that aid to life in his mind from which [Murphy] had 
never before been parted." Even so, the original statement is misleading. 
3. A. Alvarez calls the passage about the scarves one of the two places he 
knows of in Beckett's works "where his arithmetic lets him down" {Samuel 
Beckett [New York: Viking Press, 1973], p. 9). 
4. John Mood, "'The Personal System'—Samuel Beckett's Watt," PMLA 
86 (March 1971): 255-65. Mood writes, "The mistakes were certainly planned. 
If there had been one or two, we could write it off as someone's error. 
Twenty-eight mistakes clearly indicate a deliberate strategy at work, particu­
larly when linked to the many other mistakes pointed out by the text itself" 
(p. 263). 
5. Ticklepenny says he was promised five pounds a month on page 89; he 
is offered one-six-eight on page 157. The irony in the phrase "a fancy not far 
short of love" emerges when it is repeated (pp. 156, 157). In the French 
version of Murphy, references to currency are usually converted from sterling 
to francs (e.g., Murphy's fourpenny lunch); here however, the currency 
remains unchanged, and the passage is translated with the same figure as in 
the English version. Beckett preserved the miscalculation, and wanted it to 
remain subtle: the difficulty of computing in the old British system is what 
makes Bim's maneuver hard to detect. See Murphy (Paris: Les Edition de 
Minuit, 1965), pp. 69 ("cinq livres par mois"), and 116 ("une livre six shillings 
et huit pence"). 
6. Page 92. A phrase related to Murphy's prediction, "Murphy was in­
clined to think" is repeated on page 92; this calls attention to the passage 
about the head male nurse. 
7. Mr. Endon, who never whinges, may not be a puppet; but on p. 241 he 
is called a "figurine." 
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8. The predictions about fits and quadrupeds are on p. 32; Murphy's fit of 
laughter, "more like one of epilepsy," is described on pp. 139-40; the warning 
about quadrupeds is justified when the dog Nellie eats Murphy's biscuits, p 
100. 
9. According to the statement in the horoscope, the moon's position at the 
time of Murphy's birth "promotes great Magical Ability of the Eye, to which 
the lunatic would easy succumb" (p. 32). The reference to the moon may 
indicate "the lunatic" is really Murphy. Murphy stares into Mr. Endon's eyes 
on pp. 248-49; and he concedes defeat on p. 250. 
10. Celia says, "Avoid exhaustion by speech" on p. 37, repeating a line 
from the horoscope. Later Celia, "in weary ellipsis of Suk," practices what she 
preaches and says only, "Avoid exhaustion" when she urges Murphy to 
remain silent (p. 138). 
11. Page 32. Suk is giving the position, in degrees, of the constellation that 
was rising when Murphy was born (the constellation is "THE GOAT," or 
Capricorn). Unless Suk invented the figures in the horoscope, he would have 
needed to know the time of Murphy's birth to within a few minutes: it takes 
about four minutes for a degree of longitude on the celestial sphere to traverse 
the horizon. 
12. Murphy is twice called a "young man" and twice a "young aspirant" 
(p. 53). On page 75 the narrator indicates that in a year it will be 1936; and the 
dates given by the narrator (e.g., he refers to Thursday, 12 September, and to 
Friday, 11 October, on p. 114) occur in 1935. 
13. According to Suk, Neptune is in "the Bull" (Taurus), and "Herschel" 
(Uranus) is in Aquarius (p. 33). Herschel is an old name for Uranus; and later 
the two planets are mentioned again (p. 230). The repetition serves as a clue to 
the unreliability in the horoscope passage. 
14. The sidereal period of Neptune is 163.9 years. If Neptune is in Taurus 
between 1874 and 1889, it would not return to that constellation in the twen­
tieth century; and it would not have been there more than once in the nine­
teenth century. Information on the zodiacal positions of the planets is taken 
from Grant Lewi, Astrology for the Millions, 4th ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 
1978), pp. 268, 259. 
15. On page 114 the narrator says that Celia's triumph over Murphy "was 
gained about the middle of September, Thursday the 12th to be pedan­
tic. . . ." The triumph (which is described on p. 41) comes "in the morning" 
(p. 29); the narrator says that the moon was full and at perigee on the night 
before (p. 26). This would be 11 September 1935. 
16. The moon was at perigee at about 6 P.M. on 12 September 1935. This 
and other data about the moon's position are from editions of Joseph 
Whitaker's Almanack (London) for the years 1931-35. According to the astron­
omer Fred L. Whipple, the moon is full and at perigee about once a year; see 
Earth, Moon, and Planets (Philadelphia: Blakiston Co., 1946), p. 106. 
17. The moon's average perigee distance is 225,757 miles, and the smallest 
perigee distance is 221, 463 miles. The maximum variation in perigee distances 
would be about twice the difference between these figures, or about 8,500 
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miles. It should be pointed out that such a figure represents an extreme: 
monthly variations in perigee distance are far smaller than this. Information 
about lunar distances is taken from Charles M. Huffer, et al., An Introduction to 
Astronomy (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), pp. 145-46. 
18. Coal-sacks, also known as dark nebulae, are clouds of dust that obscure 
the stars beyond them; but some stars, closer to earth than the clouds, still are 
visible in front of them. The most prominent coal-sack in the northern hemi­
sphere is in the constellation Lynx. For an observer in London (the M.M.M. is 
near London), only an object at the celestial north pole would seem to remain 
fixed in the sky. But there is no dark nebula in the immediate vicinity of the 
celestial pole; and a fairly bright star, Polaris, is located about a degree from 
the pole. 
19. There are other passages that suggest that the diminishing importance 
of the stars is a sign that Murphy is withdrawing into himself. The second 
time the narrator says that Murphy has confidence in only two systems (p. 
76), he adds: "So much the worse for him, no doubt." The narrator's attitude 
is like Suk's: both are skeptical about Murphy's theories. Suk advises Murphy 
to "resort to Harmony" (p. 32); this comment runs parallel to the narrator's 
observation about the "disharmony" in Murphy's two systems (p. 76). 
20. The "stars he commanded," p. 175; "his stars," pp. 76, 85, 93, 183; 
"superfluous cartoon," p. 189. Murphy's comments about "his stars" can be 
compared to one about "his own dark" (p. 91). This last phrase suggests that 
Murphy cannot see the stars from his garret because they are obscured by his 
own dark. 
21. The epigraph (p. 32) is from Romeo and Juliet, 5.1.24; the italics are 
Beckett's. 
22. Romeo and Juliet, 3.2.21. 
23. See Dante, Inferno, 3. 23; 16. 83; 34. 139. 
24. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. R. Haldane and 
J. Kemp (1883; rpt. London: Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1957), 1:532. (The 
subsequent volumes of this work contain supplements to the first; hence the 
end of the first volume can be considered the conclusion.) In German, the end 
of the passage quoted in the text reads, "diese unsere so sehr reale Welt mit 
alien ihren Sonnen und Milchstrassen—Nichts." 
25. Samuel Beckett, Proust (1931; rpt. New York: Grove Press, 1957), p. 8. 
For Schopenhauer's comments on "objectivation of the will," see The World as 
Will and Idea, 1:123 and ff., esp. pp. 140, 219; and 3:48 and ff. 
26. Page 183. The italics are Beckett's. 
27. The date can be established as follows: on page 235 the narrator says 
that it is the afternoon of 20 October; the comment about the moon having set 
refers to the next dawn. Information about sunrise and moonset is taken from 
Whitaker's Almanack (London, 1935), pp. 110, 114. It is possible to detect this 
inconsistency even without an almanac. The moon in its third quarter rises in 
the middle of the night and sets in the middle of the day (see Stanley Wyatt, 
Principles of Astronomy [Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974], p. 133). The narrator 
says that there was a full moon on 11 October; hence, eleven days later, on the 
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night of the 20-21, the moon is just past its third quarter and sets well after 
sunrise. This corresponds to the information in Whitaker's Almanack for 21 
October 1935: moonrise, 2:10 A.M.; moonset, 2:36 P.M.; sunrise, 6:34 A.M. 
28. Page 47. Beckett's account of the drowning of Hippasos is probably 
based on a passage in John Burnet's Greek Philosophy, Part 1 (London: Mac­
millan, 1924), pp. 55-56. The wording in Beckett's version of the story re­
sembles Burnet's but Burnet makes it clear that Hippasos was drowned at sea. 
The joke is preserved in the French version of Murphy: Hippasos is drowned 
in a sewer ("egout"), (Murphy, p. 40). 
29. The distortion is greater than it seems to be because the change of 
vowels in the Baccardi-Bocardo substitution completely alters the significance 
of the term. The terms Beckett refers to are the first four in a series of nineteen; 
each one represents a different type of syllogism. A description of the system 
can be found in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan and the 
Free Press, 1967), 5:69. 
30. Murphy, p. 18. 
H. Porter Abbott

The Harpooned Notebook: 
Malone Dies and the Conventions of 
Intercalated Narrative 
I wish to focus on how Samuel Beckett's Malone Dies carries on 
one of the traditional modes of the novel: the intercalated or 
nonretrospective narrative. In what I am calling a mode, I mean 
to include that abundance of novels in letter or diary form 
which have been produced from the earliest years of the novel, 
which are still with us, and which require at least two principal 
fictions: that the narrative we read is written by at least one of 
its principal characters and that the time of its writing is con­
tained by the time of the events recorded. Malone is the ex­
tremest example of the mode I know. So extreme is it that one is 
tempted to call it a travesty or grotesque satire. My argument is 
that it is in fact, in its extremity, not satire but a continuation of 
the mode, carried out in much the same spirit as that of its early 
practitioners. To tackle this, I must first reduce the field. There 
is an array of conventions, or topoi, that recur in a sort of loose 
confederation through the history of this mode, many of which 
can be found, faintly or vividly, in Malone. In my argument, I 
shall focus on three: two central and one peripheral. They are, 
respectively, the threatened manuscript, the merging of the 
times of narrative and narration, and the blank entry. 
The topos, or motif, of the threatened manuscript gives us a 
good place to start because it bears directly on the crucial docu­
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mentary character of the mode. It will allow me to expand a bit 
here at the beginning on the traditional importance, in this 
mode, of the text as a material object or empirical certainty. In 
studies of the eighteenth-century novel, this importance has 
generally been accounted for by its appeal to a conception of 
reality biased—by science and middle-class attitudes—toward 
the material and the measurable. Thus an art form came of age 
disguised as a form of nonart. It pretended not only to tell 
"true" stories in the words of "real" people (as opposed to 
professional authors), but also to provide the objective evidence 
of these stories in the form of letters or diaries that often com­
prised in themselves the whole of the narration. 
But if this emphasis on the physical text had its roots in a 
bourgeois or vulgarly scientific fixation on the visible and the 
material, one of its major consistent functions was to give testi­
mony to the invisible and nonmaterial. In a paradox that is 
perhaps more verbal than real, the text's degree of materiality 
and visible exactitude constituted its credentials as a testimony 
of the spirit. In the eighteenth century, this was particularly 
true of those novels that came out of a Puritan or sentimental 
frame of mind. When Pamela asks permission to rewrite one of 
her letters before turning it over to Mr. B., he protests that she 
must leave it exactly as it is "because," he tells her, "they are 
your true sentiments at the time, and because they were not 
written for my perusal."1 The letters are an archeological record 
of precisely how what we cannot see in Pamela—that is, what is 
really important about Pamela—moved at the time. And as we 
read them, our invisible natures are moved too. Not to be so 
moved is to miss their significance—that is, to be hopelessly 
materialistic. 
So what is curious is the combination. The spirit cannot be 
taken for granted. Correlatively, a story cannot be just a story. 
A material artifact is required as evidence of a particular spirit. 
As the time of her certain departure from this world draws 
near, Clarissa takes great pains to ensure the perpetuation of 
her letters—the literary evidence of her existence—in their exact 
form. The urgency of her concern is an odd element in the story 
of her life, considering her avowed confidence in the universe, 
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how it is constituted, by Whom and to what end. So it is possi­
ble that her concern for the texts of her letters in this material 
world expresses her—and no doubt her author's—submerged 
uncertainty about the invisible world. 
Readers shared Clarissa's anxiety about the physical preser­
vation of the manuscript, and for this reason threats to the 
existence of the document became standard equipment of the 
mode I am discussing. Manuscripts have been scorched and 
water-soaked, rescued from fire, mildewed, eaten by worms, 
stuffed in boxes, lost, buried, bottled and floated upon the sea. 
When the diaries of Lermontov's Pechorin are flung upon the 
ground in anger, one after the other, it goes to the heart. The 
drama of the survival of the text has become a part of the drama 
of the tale. Frequently augmenting this drama is the fact that 
the diarist or letter-writer is dead by the time we read the evi­
dence of his or her life. The text is all that remains. Moreover, a 
good many of the writers are not only dead as we read but 
doomed or dying even as they write.2 
This is the tradition that Malone dies into. In the context of 
Beckett's literary career, Malone Dies comes at that point when 
Beckett, moving closer and closer to the page, suddenly 
brought the document itself into focus before plunging on 
through it into the "Where now? Who now? When now?" of 
the monologue that follows. At the point of focus, Beckett 
brings the whole tradition of which I have been speaking into 
focus at the same time—but seen now, as it were, so close up 
that it appears a grotesque caricature. Never has there been so 
wasted a moribund. Rarely has the room in which he writes 
been so thoroughly an enclosure, so thoroughly an expression 
of his isolation. And rarely has the document itself been so 
continually at risk. Its existence depends not on a pen but on a 
pencil—and one so used that its life is barely that of the writer. 
Sharpened at both ends, it is reduced by the last pages to a 
small piece of lead. As for the exercise-book, it gets lost, falls on 
the floor, at one point is "harpooned" by Malone with his stick. 
By such means does Beckett augment the metaphysical anxi­
ety—for so long a part of the mode—that drives reader and 
writer alike to want to hold fast to the material document. This 
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anxiety is also brilliantly augmented by Beckett's inclusion of a 
distinct remnant of the novel's middle-class origins: the in­
ventory of his goods and chattels that Malone is so concerned to 
make. In evoking this annual rite of shopkeepers, here hope­
lessly botched, Beckett goes beyond satire to the heart of the 
businessman's very human ailment. You cannot take it with 
you. Moreover, once he is fully launched on his enterprise, 
Malone finds that by his definition (those things are his he can 
lay hold of) "nothing is mine anymore . . . except my exercise-
book, my lead and the French pencil, assuming it really 
exists."3 Now the French pencil, he cannot lay his hands on. 
And the lead is doomed. This leaves only one possession, as he 
has anticipated: "No, nothing of all that is mine. But the exer­
cise-book is mine, I can't explain" (p. 247). Malone's text is his 
only thing. 
In Malone Dies, the whole business of possessions and in­
ventories, of the entire material universe, draws to a point. 
Malone, at the end of this history, resigns himself to the sup­
pressed intuition that led Clarissa to expend so much energy on 
the fate of her letters. "This exercise-book is my life," he says at 
last, "this child's exercise-book, it has taken me a long time to 
resign myself to that" (p. 274). But in resigning himself, Malone 
at the same time relinquishes both the book and the "life." In 
coalescing words with things, Beckett puts them on one side of 
a gulf, on the other side of which Malone maintains his alle­
giance, however reluctantly, to the wordless and immaterial. In 
this Malone shows a deeper conviction of the invisible than 
Garissa, and a deeper commitment to it, just as his creator 
exposes the book and its words as a snare and a delusion—not 
the right vehicle after all. The skewered notebook brings to an 
end the tradition of meticulous fictional editing that begins with 
Richardson. 
The next element that I wish to discuss is the tendency of 
nonretrospective art to close the gap between the time of the 
narrating and the time of the narrated, of discours and histoire. 
To put this in other words, the narrative in this mode aspires to 
the warmest possible relationship to time. Early intimations of 
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this can be seen in Milton's expansion of the conventional epic 
invocation of the muse to a periodic reunion with time in which 
he expands on what Malone would call his "present state." This 
aesthetic merging with time is essentially what Beckett focused 
on in his valuation of Proust as a romantic. The classical artist, 
by contrast, "raises himself artificially out of Time in order to 
give relief to his chronology and causality to his develop­
ment."4 From this point of view, the dying Malone, whose time 
finally runs out, is the ultimate romantic artist; and his exercise-
book, the final collapse of art into time. 
What is missing in Malone and what is essential to many of 
his romantic predecessors is a belief that form and time are 
compatible: moreover, that genuine form (as opposed to arti­
ficial, classical form) can be tapped by merging with time. It is a 
theory that runs parallel to the theory of spontaneous artistic 
creation and resides in a faith that form is an aspect of the 
invisible. Goethe's Werther was guided by it in his effusions. 
Later, Coleridge, drawing on the ideas of Schlegel, called such 
form "organic" and opposed it to "mechanic" or imposed form. 
In his Conversation Poems, which are a species of diaristic 
moments, Coleridge sought to submit himself to this vital form­
ing agency by submitting himself to time. Tennyson sought the 
same thing in his long poetic diary In Memoriam. As Tennyson 
points out in the poem itself, it was only through his submis­
sion to time that he achieved the form of In Memoriam, a form in 
the shape of a curve extending from grief to rejoicing. 
The difference between Malone and his romantic predeces­
sors is that for Malone form and time are completely at odds. 
This dissociation, of course, is not new with Malone. During 
the evolution of intercalated narrative, one can find it implicitly 
or explicitly in a number of late-nineteenth-century French and 
Scandinavian diary novels, many of them inspired by the inti­
mate journals of Amiel. The most baldly explicit expression of 
the dissociation of form and time was developed by Sartre in 
his diary novel of 1938, Nausea. The difference between Malone 
and these later representatives of the tradition is that Malone 
maintains attention on the invisible, both as a mystery and as 
a kind of presence. Moreover, though one of his terms for the 
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invisible is now "formlessness," he carries over from his ro­
mantic precursors their awed regard for it. It is the source of 
seriousness and gravity. If it is the opposite of Milton's inform­
ing Spirit, Malone employs a very Miltonic intensity, echoing 
the fall of Satan, in expressing his devotion to 
darkness, to nothingness, to earnestness, to home, to him waiting 
for me always, who needed me and whom I needed, who took me 
in his arms and told me to stay with him always, who gave me his 
place and watched over me, who suffered every time I left him, 
whom I have often made suffer and seldom contented, whom I 
have never seen. (P. 195) 
So, again, as in the case of the threatened manuscript, 
Beckett maintains our attention on the absent subject by ac­
centuating a traditional element of intercalated narrative. He 
compounds the collapse of mechanic form by having Malone 
aspire hopelessly to the condition of the omniscient and omni­
potent artist. Malone draws on what remains of the left lobe of 
his brain to fulfill the requirements of a plan, a plan that, as we 
know, not only falls in ruins but begins to break down the 
moment it is formulated. His stories are swamped by his pres­
ent state; time lies heavy on the notebook. It does so because 
Malone cannot help but keep faith, more even than his ro­
mantic forebears, with the invisible power, shrouded in dark­
ness, that is the source of his vitality—"the nourishing murk," 
as he calls it, "that is killing me" (p. 193). 
The final convention I wish to consider is what could be 
called the Blank Entry. It is a more infrequent element than the 
two I have discussed already, one strictly limited to the diary 
strain of intercalated narrative. In the blank entry, one finds the 
date, followed by a blank, or a question mark or, at most, some 
verbal formula for blankness: "Nothing at all to report today." 
Its close relative is the Boring Entry, which could be any such 
desultory noncomment as "Ate at 7:00, fell asleep shortly there­
after." They are what can make the reading of real diaries such 
a low-yield, searingly tedious activity. Duhamel parodied both 
devices in Salavin's Journal when he had Salavin decide to be­
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come a saint. Salavin buys a new journal, which he begins with 
great anticipation: 
On with the new life! Would that I were older by one year, to be 
able to re-read this journal and weep with joy! I am ready. I'm 
waiting. I'm off to meet myself. 
January 8—Nothing to report. 
January 9—Nothing to report. 
January 10—Nothing. 
January 11—Nothing that has to do with the situation in any 
way. 
January 12—Nothing. 
January 13—Nothing. It's snowing, but that's of no importance. 
(To be struck out if I copy this journal.) 
January 14—Nothing. 5 
And so on for another fourteen entries. In Nausea Sartre paro­
died the same device when he had Roquentin make the entry, 
"Nothing. Existed,"6 which was especially coy, since 
Roquentin had just achieved insights into the linked nature of 
both Nothingness and Existence. 
In fictional diaries, the blank or boring entry is an obvious 
liability, one that is rarely indulged in with any frequency. Its 
principal function is one that it shares with a number of those 
devices that Ian Watt collected under the heading Formal Real­
ism. It is a way of saying, "This is not art" (assuming the logic 
that if this were art, there would not be this kind of wasted 
space). It increases the documentary illusion. But the matter is 
not quite as simple as this because inevitably we cannot help 
knowing that this is art and therefore necessarily concentrated, 
full of import. So the blank or boring entry is also a way of 
saying, "Watch out, something must be preparing itself." The 
ratio of these two opposed functions would appear to depend 
on just how firmly we believe that, despite the nonretrospective 
appearance of the document, there is a secret teleology at work. 
Roquentin's comment about the traditional fat of the retro­
spective story is apt even for the nonretrospective document: 
"It was night, the street was deserted."7 As he says, we do not 
let these words pass unnoticed. We read them as annunciations 
of adventure, endowed with meaning by the future that pre­
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exists them. Nonretrospective structure can at once increase the 
legitimacy of such dullness as it increases the excitement. 
Malone Dies is, in effect, an extension of the principle of the 
boring entry to the entire novel. It is one of the few books in 
which the teleological illusion Roquentin writes of, which re­
deems an entry of its tedium, appears to be convincingly de­
molished from the start. The only conclusion, a foregone one, is 
the writer's death, which, in the case of Malone, is basically a 
matter of being "quite dead at last." It is an arbitrary, radically 
unclimactic terminus for the words he writes. Its onset is 




The only thing blanker is the blankness of the page that one 
may project from the last word to infinity. 
But the actual blankness of the page is, in fact, something 
that plays a significant role in the body of this text. It pierces the 
text at points throughout—a whiteness separating blocks of 
prose. And it figures, if I am right, as the ultimate logical devel­
opment, not only of the device of the blank entry, but of the 
mode in which I am locating the book. And it expresses in its 
blankness the same double quality I have been discussing, for it 
implies at once nothing and something that exceeds the impor­
tance of the text it sets off. There are modern examples one can 
find of an approach to this extreme.8 But I can think of few that, 
in the manner of Malone Dies, actually incorporate the total 
blank as a recurring element in the text—an element that oper­
ates, if you will, as a signifier. 
"My notes," writes Malone, "have a curious 
tendency . .  . to annihilate all they purport to record" (p. 259). 
But in the blanks, "the noises begin again . . . those whose 
turn it is" (p. 206). In one forty-eight-hour blank, he claims that 
the whole "unutterable" business of Malone and the other was 
brought to a "solution and conclusion" (p. 222). These blanks 
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are, in effect, the ultimate means of humbling the text. They are 
where the action is. They signify a presence not completely 
unlike that for which Derrida took Rousseau to task. In the very 
violence Beckett exerts against the text, here in the last outpost 
of the notebook tradition, he preserves not only the idea but the 
urgency of the text's referential function. 
In reviewing these three conventions—the threatened manu­
script, the merging of the times of narrating and narrative, and 
the blank entry—I find that my humanistic perspective on 
Beckett has acquired a distinctly romantic coloration. I have 
tried to show how he writes not simply in the mode of inter­
calated fiction but in the spirit of its early development. In 
bringing each of these elements to an extreme, Beckett is per­
haps the last romantic, asserting his artistic allegiance to what is 
invisible and mysterious and forever beyond the text. 
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p. 92. 
6. Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Direc­
tions, 1959), p. 140. 
7. Ibid., p. 58. 
8. I am thinking particularly of such works as Max Frisch's I'm Not Stiller, 
Doris Lessing's The Golden Notebook, and Alberto Moravia's The Lie, all of them 
a part of the notebook tradition and all of them, in their individual ways, 
inviting us to look through the falsehood of words to an invisible and inex­
pressible internal reality. 
Allen Th.ih.er

Wittgenstein, Heidegger, the Unnamable, 
and Some Thoughts on the Status of 
Voice in Fiction 
I wish to discuss in this paper the relation between modern 
theories of language and the practice of fiction. Specifically I 
wish to suggest some homologies between issues raised in 
Samuel Beckett's The Unnamable1 and theoretical positions 
found primarily in the work of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, 
though I shall also make some allusions to the structuralist 
views of language derived from the work of Ferdinand de 
Saussure. And more specifically, I wish to ask what is the status 
of voice in Beckett and how this question is illuminated by 
considering theoretical or philosophical points of view on the 
status of voice within a general theory of language. For in a way 
curiously analogous to fiction, every language theory must ask 
who speaks and whence the speaker speaks. Modern theory 
answers these two questions in terms of a series of oppositions 
that, I would maintain, set the limits for the way we think about 
the status of voice in a literary text. And in turn, certain key 
literary texts, such as The Unnamable, contest those limits by 
actually living them as an impossibility. 
Much of language theory is concerned with setting the 
boundaries of the sayable. This creating of boundaries thus sets 
theory as an irritating other to the literary voice by making of it 
an arbiter of the boundaries of what might be said therein. This 
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state of affairs establishes a hostile complicity between litera­
ture and philosophy, and in many postmodern works this 
complicity gives rise to a kind of lamento about the work's desire 
for the unsayable. 
In this respect, one cannot overestimate the importance that 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus continues to have for the writer who 
faces language as a limit to his voice. In fact, the Tractatus re­
mains the locus classicus for the notion that the limits of (the) 
world are established by language, that the limits of my world 
coincide, insofar as I can speak my world, with the limits of my 
language. Wittgenstein's first work thus casts many doubts 
upon language by suggesting that it is somehow less pure than 
such perfect constructs as logic, mathematics—or silence. The 
only voice that can meaningfully speak, according to the 
Tractatus, is a voice that is certain of a limited number of atom­
istic propositions. Moreover, this meaningful voice can say 
nothing about itself, for the speaking voice is excluded from the 
world that discourse can represent: "The subject does not be­
long to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world" (5. 632). 
Thus, in a strict sense, the speaking voice can say nothing about 
what it is saying. It can only record states of affairs, much like a 
hyper-realist catalogue that excludes itself from its listing. 
Although Wittgenstein's second period of thought is essen­
tially a critique of the representational view of language that the 
Tractatus offers, there is little in his second phase that provides 
support for those traditional humanist views of language that 
assume an unmediated relationship between self and voice or 
voice and discourse. In the Philosophical Investigations, voices 
arise as forms of participation in the various language games 
that, with their innumerable overlappings, make up that entity 
we give the name "language." Language games are thus the 
multiple public spaces and the rules for their arrangement that 
go to make up the world. And if one asks where is the self that 
lies behind the speaking voice, the answer seems to be that the 
self is only a kind of abbreviation for talking about the multiple 
ways in which voices enter into language games. Or, if taken as 
a substantial notion, the self can only be viewed as a meta­
physical error arising from a misunderstanding about the 
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nature of language. There is no self to be spoken, no inner locus 
that is the source of meaning, for the locus of speaking is 
merely speaking itself. 
The writer who turns from Wittgenstein's work to Heideg­
ger's voluminous production may be surprised to find many 
analogies between the two. In Heidegger's early work, especi­
ally in Being and Time, he would discover that there is rarely, if 
ever, such a thing as an individual speaker. For what is taken to 
be the individual voice is really the voice of das Man, the anony­
mous "they" that speak, through inauthentic speech, the fallen 
logos of everyday existence. The only authentic voice would 
appear to be the voice of silence that stands opposed in silent 
resolve to the "they" that speak a language of publicly deter­
mined meanings, a language that has fallen from the plenitude 
of authentic being. Although Heidegger declares in his later 
work that language is the house of being, he never really gives 
up his view that everyday language is a form of fallen logos. But 
in his second phase, he does summon the poet to become a 
speaker of authentic language by listening to the call of Being 
and letting logos speak through him, such as Holderlin pre­
sumedly did. For it is language that speaks, not the Cartesian 
self that believes it is empowered to use language to mediate its 
thoughts. It is language that, in speaking, differentiates being 
against the backdrop of silence. Autonomous saying— 
Heidegger's die Sage—is a showing of being as being itself. 
Heidegger's claims for language in effect evacuate the self from 
language, leaving the writer in the difficult position of facing 
language as either the inauthentic expression of otherness or 
the grandiose revelation of Being itself. 
Heidegger's influence is also instrumental, I think, in the way 
many have come to interpret the Saussurian distinction be­
tween voice and language system. One encounters here an 
opposition that turns on the difficulty Saussure had in at once 
vouchsafing the individual's capacity to speak an autonomous 
parole, or speech, and his need to make of the individual 
speaker a mere repository of the autonomous linguistic system, 
or la langue. Later structuralists have certainly emphasized the 
second half of the opposition, which coincides with Heideg­
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ger's contention that language, not man, speaks. What voice 
can be said to speak if the speaker is only a storehouse of his 
culture's linguistic system, of its codes, syntagms, and potential 
paradigmatic options? Such a question finds an answer of sorts 
in Derrida's claim that it is therefore language that constitutes 
the subject, a formulation that aims, I think, to reverse two 
thousand years' of thought on the subject. And such a view of 
the autonomy of the linguistic system underlies Foucault's even 
more resounding and ironic claim that man is dead. 
Dead he may be, but this death does not prevent him from 
speaking, as we see constantly in Beckett's prolonged sonata of 
the dead. And it seems to me that this elusive Irishman's fiction 
presents exemplary postmodern responses to the questions and 
paradoxes that modern language theory brings up. For central 
to all of Beckett's fiction, and especially to the works written in 
French and even more particularly to The Unnamable, is a con­
stant self-interrogation about the status of the voice that 
speaks, about its relation to the language it speaks, and about 
the locus whence it speaks. 
Let us recall in this respect how the unnamable comes to be 
the final speaker in Beckett's trilogy of novels. First Molloy 
speaks to us about his narration, which is followed by Moran's 
voice narrating his attempt to join Molloy. Both of these voices 
seem to be present to the Malone of Malone Dies as he, another 
bedridden speaker, talks about his narration and offers the tale 
of Macmann. This bloody tale comes to its end with Malone's 
declaring that he will never say "I" again, although he im­
mediately breaks his vow as he concludes the tale of the homi­
cidal outing from the insane asylum. The refusal to say "I" 
brings the reader to the voice named the unnamable, who 
begins his speaking with a question: "Where now? When now? 
Who now? Unquestioning. I, say I." The original "Dire je" 
conveys even more forcefully the imperative sense of the voice 
that must order itself to use the first person pronoun and hence 
force itself into complicity with the structure of language. And 
his questions point at the same time to the separation that 
seems to exist between voice and language. For The Unnamable 
takes the reader into a narrative space that is inhabited by a 
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voice that cannot speak except in nearly contradictory fashion 
to assert that it is not his language that speaks; thus it is not he 
who really speaks, though the I-voice would appear to have no 
choice about using this language if the voice wishes to decry 
this intolerable situation. For the unnamable finds himself 
undertaking the impossible quest to get around language, a 
quest that must perforce fall back onto language, onto stories, 
pseudo-narrations, other voices and laments, if the quest is to 
exist at all. 
Beckett's reduction of fiction to this kind of self-reflexive 
rumination obliges us to ask what does it mean to say that voice 
and language are separated. For the unnamable's plight is per­
haps the central one for illuminating the way much of contem­
porary fiction functions and, moreover, for seeing how theo­
retical concerns have become the very stuff of this fiction. Or 
perhaps it would be more precise to say, how literature seeks 
strategies for overcoming its own unhappy belief in language 
theory. 
The homologies between Beckett's literary performances and 
the philosophical ones I briefly outlined are many, and they 
underlie the seemingly paradoxical assertion that voice and 
language can be separated, that there is indeed a place where, 
as the unnamable puts it, "language dies that permits of such 
expressions" (p. 335). The Unnamable's paradox first sends us 
back to read Heidegger again and to ask if we have found that 
region of intersection between the realm where authentic lan­
guage is heard only in silence and the realm of average every­
dayness where the babble one hears belongs to the anonymous 
other. For the unnamable, if he dreams of silence, seems to 
reside precisely in that region where the only language he finds 
is, by its very ontology, the language of everybody, and hence 
nobody. His narrative trajectory thus moves toward a para­
doxical ending that the other's language prevents from taking 
place: 
All this business of a labour to accomplish, before I can end, of 
words to say, a truth to recover, in order to say it, before I can end, 
of an imposed task, once known, long neglected, finally forgotten, 
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to perform, before I can be done with speaking, done with listen­
ing, I invented it all, in the hope it would console me, help me to 
go on, allow me to think of myself as somewhere on a road, mov­
ing, between a beginning and an end, gaining ground, losing 
ground, getting lost, but somehow in the long run making head­
way. All lies. I have nothing to do, that is to say nothing in particu­
lar. I have to speak, whatever that means. Having nothing to say, 
no words but the words of others, I have to speak. (P. 314) 
As pure voice, the unnamable can do nothing, for in Beckett's 
world to say is to do; and he cannot speak since he has no 
language, except the language of everyone and no one. The 
unnamable thus sits chattering, looking across a silent space at 
Heidegger's authentic man, that hero who remains locked in 
his quiet resolve. Yet the unnamable's antics let us know that 
he exists, however paradoxically, and by contrast one might 
well suspect that quiet authenticity is a figment of a loquacious 
philosopher's imagination. 
For the unnamable is a clown version of the man who would 
live authentically by speaking his own language. He is a clown 
who stands in relation to his own discourse much like the 
philosopher who uttered the axioms of the Tractatus, a work of 
metaphysical nonsense whose goal, according to Wittgenstein, 
was to annul itself. Yet the unnamable is irremediably caught in 
a bizarre public space where voices reverberate everywhere, 
public voices that seem to be a pluralization of das Man: 
It must not be forgotten, sometimes I forget, that all is a question of 
voices. I say what I am told to say, in the hope that some day they 
will weary of talking at me. The trouble is I say it wrong, having no 
ear, no head, no memory. Now I seem to hear them say it is 
Worm's voice beginning, I pass on the news, for what it is worth. 
Do they believe I believe it is I who am speaking? That's theirs too. 
To make me believe I have an ego all my own, and can speak of it, 
as they of theirs. Another trap to snap me up among the living. (P. 
345) 
What the rather schizoid unnamable presumably demands is an 
ideolect that would be the language of his absolute specificity, 
for the self that is spoken by public language is a mere conven­
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tion, a trap designed to ensnare as it transforms one into other­
ness. 
In another sense, Beckett's narrator puts into practice not 
only the notion that language is a publicly determined reposi­
tory of usages, but he also has a profound sense that his (or 
their) language is a social contract. The social bond that lan­
guage requires is but another form of pluralized otherness and 
the unnamable refuses that social quality even as he affirms, in 
common with structural linguistics and the Wittgenstein of lan­
guage games, the social basis of all language: 
It's of me now that I must speak, even if I have to do it with their 
language, it will be a start, a step towards silence and the end of 
madness, the madness of having to speak and not being able to, 
except of things that don't concern me. . . . Not to be able to open 
my mouth without proclaiming them, and our fellowship, that's 
what they imagine they'll have me reduced to. It's a poor trick that 
consists in ramming a set of words down your gullet on the princi­
ple that you can't bring them up without being branded as belong­
ing to their breed. (P. 324) 
Wittgenstein often said that to understand how a language 
game is played, it is often helpful to see how it is learned; for 
which the unnamable here sets forth the most general peda­
gogical principle the breed possesses for ensuring that the lin­
guistic system will be, literally, internalized. 
Thus the language of the tribe, as Beckett—after Mallarme— 
puts it in French, cannot be the language of the voice that is 
engaged in a curious struggle for sanity. To speak a single word 
is, as the unnamable would have it, to enter into complicity 
with the tribe's codified system—or perhaps into complicity 
with the tribe's way of theorizing about its linguistic system. To 
speak is to force the voice to enter into an alterity that can be 
only a form of alienation. And even to say "I"—that "putain de 
la premiere personne"—is to accept the linguistic token that 
designates all voices. To say "I" is to accept something of a hoax 
fostered by the tribe's system of pronouns: for can "I" be "I" if 
every voice is "I"? Structural linguistics may point out that such 
a pronoun functions as a shifter, but this will bring little 
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semantic succor to the speaker who feels that precisely such a 
semantic feature makes a mystification of the whole notion of 
personal identity. 
In this novel, Worm does not speak, nor, declares the nar­
rator, does he, and Mahood is aphonic. With this voiceless cast, 
who can, then, speak in this text, except perhaps language 
itself? And on the other side of language there might be— 
farcical hypothesis—a self possessing a voice unmediated by 
language, the pure self of Wittgenstein's Tractatus or Heideg­
ger's unalienated man. Except, of course, that this view of the 
separation of language and self is a schizo-comedy that takes 
desperate delight in its own impossibility. In this sense, 
Beckett's work ushers in the era of the schizo-text that is per­
haps the postmodern text par excellence. Beckett's work gives 
full expression to the voice alienated from itself, the voice for 
which the first and the third person pronoun are a matter of 
indifference. The speaker lives the "I" as an "it," for the voice is 
present to itself only as otherness: 
My voice. The voice. I hardly hear it any more. I'm going silent. 
Hearing this voice no more, that's what I call going silent. That is to 
say I'll hear it still, if I listen hard. I'll listen hard. Listening hard, 
that's what I call going silent. I'll hear it still, broken, faint, unin­
telligible, if I listen hard. Hearing it still, without hearing what it 
says, that's what I call going silent. Then it will flare up, like a 
kindling fire, a dying fire. Mahood explained that to me, and I'll 
emerge from silence. Hearing too little to be able to speak, that's 
my silence. (P. 393) 
And thus the notion that one might listen to one's voice as the 
voice of someone else brings us to the paradox that one might 
speak silence. 
For Beckett's narrators speak clamorously about silence. Like 
Wittgenstein's metaphysician narrator of the Tractatus, 
Beckett's narrators spend enormous amounts of logical energy 
saying the unsayable and talking about the unspeakable. And 
as in the case of Heidegger's vision of authenticity, one has the 
feeling that silence would be a kind of Utopia where the voice, 
divested of the tribe's language, would have direct access to 
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itself. In silence speaking and listening, I and it, would no 
longer be separated. The voice would be a pure self in which, as 
Derrida might have it, consciousness would be fully present to 
itself as a plenitude unmediated by the alienating otherness of 
the tribe's linguistic system. Yet Beckett's is a self-reflexive 
comic vision, and his noisy praise of silence mirrors Wittgen­
stein's dream of purity and Heidegger's claims for authenticity 
as in a distorting mirror: 
. . . with regard to me, nice time we're going to have now, with 
regard to me, that it has not yet been our good fortune to establish 
with any degree of accuracy what I am, where I am, whether I am 
words among words, or silence in the midst of silence, to recall 
only two of the hypotheses launched in this connexion, though 
silence to tell the truth does not appear to have been very con­
spicuous up to now, but appearances may sometimes be decep­
tive. . . . (Pp. 388-89) 
Appearances may be deceptive; yet in spite of all one's worst 
intentions, it does appear that the mere saying "I" fosters the 
illusion that a self has been created, that a character is present, 
that a voice speaks. The tribe's linguistic system has many 
powers, and Beckett's narrators are constantly playing with 
variations on the idea that mere naming suffices to grant exist­
ence or to offer being. Heidegger's poet may have the task of 
authentic naming and thus confer being against the backdrop of 
silence; but Beckett's unnamable narrator clearly wants to resist 
the power of language to hustle him into existence. To say 
"I"—how can this confer being when it offers existence to every 
"I" and thus to the pluralized no one. 
In Beckett's work and in many other contemporary texts, we 
find at work a comic equivocation about the nature of language. 
For, on the one hand, these texts declare that merely to name 
cannot of course confer existence, and that to accept the deceit­
ful appearances of mere pronouns is to give consent to a fraud 
fostered by language. But, on the other hand, it is precisely the 
nature of literary language, or a feature of the ontology of fic­
tion, that to name is to confer existence. Heidegger can, in his 
later writings, play with one side of this equivocation, and 
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Beckett, as if in response to these extraordinary claims for 
poetry, can play with the other side. And of course both are 
right, for to name in literature is to confer being—merely fictive 
being, yet being nonetheless. 
In another respect, however, Beckett's equivocation with 
regard to fictive and nonfictive language functions as critical 
irony. By allowing his narrators to act as if they were dealing 
with nonfictive language, Beckett allows them to undertake an 
ironic critique of errors that can only exist as illusions in the 
realm of nonfictive language. The schizo-text comically blurs 
the line of demarcation between fictive and nonfictive text in 
order to live out the madness that our various philosophical 
systems would ascribe to our daily lives. The schizo suspension 
of logic allows the unnamable to live his narrative project as an 
experiential critique of language theory, much as Wittgenstein 
flirted with madness in order to create such antimetaphysical 
fictions as the following: 
One may say of the bearer of a name that he does not exist; and of 
course that is not an activity, although one may compare it with 
one and say: he must be there all the same, if he does not exist. 
(And this has certainly already been written some time by a phi­
losopher. )2 
Seen in this light, the claim of Beckett's characters not to exist is 
at least as comprehensible as the claim that to say "I" might 
confer existence. 
To conclude, I should like to note then how Beckett's work, 
offering the "unnamable" as the name of our narrator, preludes 
with a great contradiction to the proliferation of postmodern 
works whose voices know not whence they speak or speak 
from that equivocal space called the text. Many of these works 
would go further than Wittgenstein or the unnamable in deny­
ing that language can reach any private sphere, that there could 
be such a thing as a private language, or that there could be a 
self that might exist beyond the voice that is created by lan­
guage. Yet few of these works have Beckett's richness, perhaps 
because they fail to allow for the view that there might be a 
not-I, a self to be translated by what is other than the self of 
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language, alienated in the tribe's fallen discourse. The unnam­
able also stands as a contradictory protest against, as well as 
ironic affirmation of, the idea that character and self may only 
be functions of language. After all, who can be happy with the 
belief that his voice grants him a self merely because rules of 
grammar have been hypostatized into metaphysical entities? 
Beckett's unnamable thus speaks with a voice that opens up 
most of the space of postmodern narration: voice is a comic 
automaton spoken by language, often the fallen language of 
public delirium that we have come to call pop. And, of course, 
these notions about voice and language tell us much about 
what has happened in contemporary fiction to what once was 
called character. Characters around 1900, as Queneau shows in 
his Flight of Icarus (Le Vol d'Icare), had such ontological sub­
stance that they could be stolen or could abandon the novel in 
which they were to appear. No such fears haunt the writer for 
whom a character is simply a repository of the tribe's language 
and need act only as a nominal function. 
1. Three Novels by Samuel Beckett (New York: Grove Press, 1965). All quota­
tions are from this edition. Page references appear in parentheses in the text. 
2. Zettel, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright; trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), no. 61. 
Kristin Morrison

Neglected Biblical Allusions in 
Beckett's Plays: 
"Mother Pegg" Once More 
Certain biblical allusions in Samuel Beckett's plays seem to 
have gone unnoticed. For example, the name "Mother Pegg" 
with its possible translation as "nail" and subsequent connec­
tion with crucifixion is faithfully repeated by most commenta­
tors on Endgame, but the much more immediate biblical allu­
sion in that passage is ignored. What I want to do here, briefly, 
is to point out a few neglected references and indicate what 
their presence contributes to the play; and also to point out 
something about Beckett's manner of alluding to the Bible that 
may account for the fact that some of his references seem to 
remain unidentified. 
There are, of course, biblical allusions in Beckett's plays that 
are unmistakable: Vladimir's story about the two thieves is an 
obvious example. But the references I am talking about are less 
obvious for two reasons: first, they do not usually comprise an 
entire dramatic unit (the way Vladimir's foray into a typical 
problem of nineteenth-century Higher Criticism does); second, 
they are usually so brief in their presentation that the reader/ 
listener must be attuned to the slightest echo. The allusions I 
am talking about hinge only upon a salient word or two. For 
example, in That Time consider the phrase "the passers pausing 
to gape." There is not much to confirm this as a biblical allusion; 
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yet we know that it is because Beckett has said so. And, also, 
anyone steeped in biblical stories would probably be reminded 
of the Crucifixion when hearing these words and not simply of 
a spectacular construction site or an interesting mugging on the 
upper West Side. This kind of biblical allusion depends upon 
verbal echo and good specialized memory: words and images 
heard so often and so clearly associated with their topic that 
they supersede all other uses and associations. The combina­
tion of "gape" and "passers" does it for this reference. In re­
hearsal notes for the German premiere of That Time, Walter 
Asmus records Beckett's remark that this phrase is from the 
Bible and records as well Klaus Herm's identification of the 
passage, '"Yes, from St Luke's Gospel'" and Beckett's interest­
ing response, '"I looked it up, but I didn't find it, aha, 
Luke. . . Z"1 Beckett is riding on the kind of memory I just 
described: the single word or two triggering an entire biblical 
allusion. He does not need to find the passage in order to use it; 
his audience does not need scholarship to recognize the words 
or feel their effect. What is operating here is not erudition but, 
rather, simple deep-in-the-bones knowledge of biblical story 
and the specific King James words and images that convey it.2 
The process of synthetic memory behind this phrase "the 
passers pausing to gape" is particularly interesting and reveal­
ing. The allusion is as much to Mark and Matthew as it is to 
Luke. All three gospel writers record Jesus' being stared at and 
reviled as he hung on the cross: "And the people stood behold­
ing" (Luke 23:35), "And they that passed by railed on him, 
wagging their heads" (Mark 15:29), "And they that passed by 
reviled him, wagging their heads" (Matthew 27:39). Luke's 
version contains a word that suggests the "gape" of Beckett's 
allusion; and Matthew and Mark provide the "passers." Fur­
thermore, all three gospel writers are themselves alluding to 
Psalm 22, which is associated with the Crucifixion both in the 
New Testament and in the liturgy for Good Friday; that de­
scription of the suffering savior contains the phrases "They 
gaped upon me" and "They look and stare upon me." Thus all 
these passages contain Beckett's image of the "passers pausing 
to gape" but no one of them contains all his actual words, 
Kristin Morrison 93 
which seem to come from a composite memory of these various 
related biblical passages. 
Beckett himself has stated, "Christianity is a mythology with 
which I am perfectly familiar, so naturally I use it."3 And Vivian 
Mercier has described his own and Beckett's experiences with 
the study of Scripture and religion at Portora Royal, founded by 
the same King James I whose Authorized Version of the Bible 
so frequently appears in Beckett's work.4 The record of 
Beckett's use of biblical allusion is charted throughout various 
studies by virtually every major Beckett scholar.5 If some few 
references have remained without commentary, it may be that 
they have seemed to a given critic too obvious to mention; but it 
may also be that their very brevity, as well as their perfect "fit" 
into context, has caused them to pass unnoticed. 
This seems to be the case with the Mother Pegg passage from 
Endgame. Hamm and Clov have been talking about the wasted 
state of the world; Hamm has protested that he does not know 
what has happened or whether it matters, and Clov challenges 
Hamm's feigned innocence by this accusation: 
When old Mother Pegg asked you for oil for her lamp, and you told 
her to get out to hell, you knew what was happening then, no? 
Pause. 
You know what she died of, Mother Pegg? Of Darkness.6 
This passage with its emphasis on oil for an empty lamp and its 
fatal outer darkness contains clear reference to the New Testa­
ment parable about the wise and foolish virgins, a story about 
salvation and damnation, ultimate life and death: 
Then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened unto ten virgins, 
which took their lamps, and went forth to meet the bridegroom. 
And five of them were wise, and five were foolish. They that were 
foolish took their lamps, and took no oil with them: but the wise 
took oil in their vessels with their lamps. While the bridegroom 
tarried, they all slumbered and slept. And at midnight there was a 
cry made, Behold the bridegroom cometh; go ye out to meet him. 
Then all those virgins arose, and trimmed their lamps. And the 
foolish said unto the wise, Give us of your oil; for our lamps are 
gone out. But the wise answered, saying, Not so; lest there be not 
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enough for us and you: but go ye rather to them that sell, and buy 
for yourselves. And while they went to buy, the bridegroom came; 
and they that were ready went in with him to the marriage: and the 
door was shut. Afterward came also the other virgins, saying, 
Lord. Lord, open to us. But he answered and said, Verily I say 
unto you, I know you not. Watch therefore; for ye know neither 
the day nor the hour wherein the Son of man cometh. (Matthew 
25:1-13). 
There is an allied parable, also about a marriage feast (Matthew 
22:1-14), that develops this imagery further, ending with a 
description of the damnation of one who is not properly pre­
pared: "Then said the king to the servants, Bind him hand and 
foot, and take him away, and cast him into outer darkness; 
there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. For many are 
called, but few are chosen." Oil, lamp, hell, darkness: these are 
the words in Beckett's passage that trigger the allusion.7 King­
dom of heaven, wedding feast, light in the darkness, the savior 
who comes unexpectedly: these are the words of hope and 
promise, the encouragement and the warning the parables con­
tain. They express in little the whole Christian message of sal­
vation, here used for ironic contrast, to intensify the sense of 
hopelessness in Endgame. Hamm is the god who damns by 
withholding, or by being unable to provide, the means that 
make life possible, whether it be bread in the wilderness (which 
he had earlier denied to the multitudes) or light in the darkness 
(which the lamp and the oil represent). That Clov's accusation 
rankles is illustrated by the fact that a few moments later the 
phrase "Of darkness!" interrupts Hamm's speculations about 
his own demise. It is important, I think, not to hear this phrase 
simply as a rather standard literary archetype in which "dark­
ness" stands for death and other such negatives but rather to 
recognize the quite specific biblical allusion it carries.8 It may be 
that Mother Pegg's name is supposed to suggest crucifixion. 
But that particular allusion seems much less germane to the 
details of the play than does the set of parables I have just cited. 
Yes, any suffering can analogously be called a crucifixion; but 
Endgame is rich in specific references to food, to bread, to inner 
place and outer wilderness, to light and darkness, to salvation 
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and loss—to what are the central images of these particular 
parables. The allusion itself does not change or add anything to 
the sense of misery and hopelessness that the play has previ­
ously established; it simply intensifies what is already there. 
The authorial memory that found those images—lamp, oil, 
darkness—relies on other memories to recognize them, per­
haps not consciously, at the moment, but enough so that the 
play is drenched once more with a feeling of fatal loss, a loss not 
peculiar to this peculiar scene, but one for which there is a long 
history, a loss that the old stories of our culture have recounted 
again and again. The biblical allusion lurking in this particular 
passage universalizes it by quietly reminding the audience of 
words they have heard before. 
This allusion in Endgame seems to me to be quite clear. There 
is another but more obscure use of the parable of the wise and 
foolish virgins in Waiting for Godot.9 One of the critical lines in 
that parable is the statement, "Behold, the bridegroom cometh, 
go ye out to meet him." These words seem to be echoed in 
Vladimir's triumphant announcement, "It's Godot! We're 
saved! Let's go and meet him!"10 Like the attendant virgins of 
ancient ceremony, these two derelicts have waited for someone 
who they are sure has a special claim on them, and in waiting 
have proved themselves worthy. "What are we doing here, that 
is the question. And we are blessed in this, that we happen to 
know the answer. Yes, in this immense confusion one thing 
alone is clear. We are waiting for Godot to come—" (p. 51+). In 
the parable, of course, the bridegroom does finally arrive and 
take those who are ready into the wedding feast (an image of 
salvation and blessing). But in this play, Vladimir is wrong; 
they are not saved, as he says, or blessed (that is to say, Godot 
does not arrive); and Estragon is right, they are "in hell" (p. 
47+). Once again the parable has served as ironic contrast to 
the dramatic scene: the received wisdom of Vladimir's world is 
untrue. He may regulate his behavior and set his expectations 
according to the old stories, but the old stories do not observe 
their part of the bargain; he may keep his appointment, but the 
bridegroom does not. In the parable, of course, the bridegroom 
tarries, arriving finally at midnight; and it is precisely this detail 
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of the story that traps Vladimir, the never knowing if he has 
waited long enough: perhaps Godot will come, tomorrow 
"without fail" (p. 58+). Vladimir is not, of course, consciously 
referring to this parable when he exclaims, "We're saved! Let's 
go and meet him!"; but its ethic resides in him, as his echo of its 
words suggests. And the audience, however vaguely recogniz­
ing the reference, feels once more a grimly comic moment of 
blighted hope. "Your only hope left is to disappear," Vladimir 
had said (p. 47+). Nonetheless, he and Estragon continue to 
wait, ambivalently hoping for a salvation, a deliverance, even 
though the various stories of salvation in this play mock any 
real hope they might have.11 
At this point, I must emphasize that I am not suggesting a 
Christian interpretation of Beckett's plays (in fact, I think a 
Christian slant rather badly distorts them). Nor am I suggesting 
that Beckett is mining his plays with Christian symbols. Nor do 
I imply anything about his personal beliefs. None of that. I am 
merely interested in verbal echoes of biblical passages, passages 
so well known that their distinctive phrases and images are 
securely fixed in the memory of any ordinary church-goer or 
careful Bible-reader; phrases that Beckett uses easily, not with 
the rather deliberate erudition of a Joyce or an Eliot, but com­
fortably, as part of the natural flow of the dramatic scene. 
Almost always these allusions are ironic, but not in a way that 
twists a scene away from its surface meaning; their irony simply 
reinforces an irony already present. 
And as I search to describe what I mean by an easy, integral 
use of biblical allusion, I find myself thinking about the lucidity 
that Beckett's critics have noted in his prose style. Despite the 
erudition that lurks there, the sentences themselves are im­
mediately available. The metaphorical coordination of the lan­
guage is subtle; the connections among words and allusions 
(their buried images and associations) are solidly forged but not 
intrusive, not even, in fact, noticed unless we double back to 
examine what has made a graceful passage so very felicitous. 
The same felicity that characterizes Beckett's prose style gen­
erally also governs his use of many biblical allusions. They 
merge perfectly and unobtrusively with his larger purpose, 
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present often only as subtle verbal echoes, whispered reinforce­
ments of moods, themes, ironies already established. They 
blow through the plays like "the wind in the reeds"—a subtle 
yet significant presence.12 
1. Journal of Beckett Studies, No. 2 (1977), p. 93. 
2. It is interesting in this regard to note Alan Schneider's comment not 
about the cause of some of Beckett's words but about their effect: "Beckett's 
plays stay in the bones. . . . His words strike to the very marrow. . . .  " 
("Waiting for Beckett: A Personal Chronicle," in Twentieth Century Interpreta­
tions of "Endgame," ed. Bell Gale Chevigny [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, 1969], p. 21). 
3. Colin Duckworth, Angels of Darkness (London: Allen and Unwin, 1972), 
p. 18. 
4. "Samuel Beckett, Bible Reader," Commonweal, 105 (28 April 1978): 266­
68. 
5. For purposes of this discussion, see in particular Ruby Cohn's chapters 
on Endgame in Samuel Beckett: The Comic Gamut (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1962) and Just Play (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1980). 
6. Endgame (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 75. 
7. Revisions in early versions of Endgame also help sharpen the biblical 
associations of the Mother Pegg passage. In the typescript of Endgame in the 
Special Collections at the Ohio State University Library, Beckett has changed 
the sentence "When old Mother Pegg asked you for oil for her lamp and you 
sent her packing" by crossing out the phrase "sent her packing" and writing 
in "told her to go hell" [sic], thus making even more explicit the biblical 
reference. 
8. Although it is true, as Richard M. Goldman maintains, that the various 
critical interpretations of Endgame fall short of the play (as indeed they do with 
any complex piece of literature), it is also true that relevant information can 
help illumine the play. His question "Who was Mother Pegg? Can one die of 
darkness—in its physical or even metaphorical sense?" becomes decidedly 
less rhetorical in the light of the biblical allusion Clov's accusation contains. 
See "Endgame and Its Scorekeepers," in Chevigny, p. 37. 
9. Josephine Jacobsen and W. Mueller, in The Testament of Samuel Beckett 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1964), have identified a passage in The Unnamable 
that also contains "oblique references to the twenty-fifth chapter of the 
Gospel according to Saint Matthew" (pp. 127 f.); they do not, however, 
identify the presence of this same passage in Endgame or Waiting for Godot. 
Though this particular identification in The Unnamable is accurate, Jacobsen 
and Mueller tend throughout their book to overstate the religious elements in 
Beckett's work, moving beyond clear textual references and going so far as to 
compare Beckett with St. Francis and Thomas a Kempis (see pp. 49 f.). 
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10. Waiting for Godot (New York: Grove Press, 1954), p. 47+. This edition is 
numbered consecutively only on the verso side of each leaf; pages with num­
bers will be cited here by their designated number; the next, facing page will 
be given that same number and the designation "+ ." 
11. There are three biblical references to salvation in this play: the easily 
identified account of the two thieves and the parable of the sheep and the 
goats, along with this more obscure allusion to the attendant virgins. All have 
an ironic function. 
12. This phrase suggests yet another neglected biblical reference. In Waiting 
for Godot, Vladimir's false alarm concerning Godot's arrival is met with 
Estragon's "Pah! The wind in the reeds" (p. 13+). The line has enough mean­
ing on its own to make sense to any member of the audience; but those 
familiar with the Bible will immediately remember that the same image is used 
to refer to the Messianic herald who goes unheeded: "Jesus began to say unto 
the multitudes concerning John, What went ye out into the wilderness to see? 
A reed shaken with the wind?" (Matthew 11:7). Thus the line has an overlay 
of ironic meaning. Literally, the phrase in context means, "there is nothing"; 
but through its biblical reference, the line suggests that once there was some­
thing or someone who went unrecognized; thus those who waited but did not 
detect him were not saved. The irony of this line in this particular play does 
not come from any suggestion that there really is salvation for Vladimir and 
Estragon if only they could see it, but quite the contrary, that there truly is 
"nothing"; all the many references to hope and salvation that occur in the 
play—whether as metaphors and idioms readily available, stories to be told, 
quotations to be identified—reveal the extent to which Vladimir and Estragon 
have been misled by their culture. They carry around with them shards of 
belief, snatches of biblical phraseology, fragments of philosophy and theology 
(as does Lucky in his monologue) that only tantalize them with desiring the 
impossible. Estragon is closer to their real situation when he remarks, 
"There's no lack of void" (p. 42+). In their desert, no savior appears. 
Yasunari Takahashi

Qu'est-ce qui arrive? Some Structural 
Comparisons of Beckett's Plays and Noh 
"Beckett and Noh" may sound a farfetched subject, for unlike 
Yeats or Claudel or Brecht, Samuel Beckett is, on his own evi­
dence, quite unfamiliar with Noh; much less has he ever tried 
to imitate or steal the riches of this ancient theater form of the 
East. The absence of actual influence, however, would be all the 
more significant if it could be shown that the two theater forms, 
with a vast temporal and spatial distance between them, do 
share some fundamental characteristics. 
"Nothing happens, nobody comes," complains Estragon. 
This would remind any "Japanalogist" of Claudel's famous 
dictum: "Le drame, c'est quelque chose qui arrive, le No, c'est 
quelqu'un qui arrive."1 One is almost tempted to suspect that 
Beckett is here making a conscious allusion to the insight of the 
French playwright-diplomat. But the allusion, if conscious, 
should be surprising for its wry obliqueness. For if one can 
claim that Waiting for Godot is a negation of the European notion 
of drama wherein some action must take place, one can also 
claim that the play is at the same time a negation of the essential 
dramaturgy of Noh insofar as Claudel is right in the second half 
of his dictum and insofar as Estragon is right in the second half 
of his complaint. 
Or maybe negation is not exactly the word. For something 
does happen, or indeed many things do happen, on this place 
100 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
dubiously called "The Board" (the stage): businesses with hats 
and shoes, gestural mimicries, dances, games, quarrels, even 
an attempt at suicide. But none of them are "real" dramatic 
actions: they are all "pseudo-actions" performed simply to kill 
time, all "non-events" tending toward no logically climactic 
moment. Similarly, someone does come if you count Pozzo or 
Lucky or the boy. But they are obviously not that "someone" 
who, by "arriving," is supposed to make Noh what it is, any 
more than they are Godot himself. 
Here some remarks on the origin and the structure of Noh 
would be in order. Noh is closely connected with the ancient 
Japanese belief in the unpacified spirit of the dead. The un­
quenched passion of love, grief, or hatred endows the dead 
with a sort of immortality, and the ghost is compelled from time 
to time to emerge out of the Buddhist purgatory in a corporeal 
form that was his or hers in life and visit the world of the living 
in order to gain a partial relief from present torments by telling 
someone the story of his or her agony, somewhat in the manner 
of Coleridge's Ancient Mariner. In the typical structure of a 
so-called Fukushiki Mugen-Noh (dream-noh in two parts), the 
Shite (protagonist) first appears as an ordinary village woman 
and then, after an exit, reappears as a veritable ghost to enact 
her life story before the eye of the Waki (secondary character), a 
traveling priest, who finally manages to pacify her agonized 
soul by the power of his prayer. Noh in this light could be 
regarded as theatrical transformation of a ritual of exorcism of 
the demonic power of the dead. 
But in a slightly different though related light, the protagon­
ist of Noh could also be taken for a specimen of what Japanese 
anthropologists call "mare-bito," literally, a "guest," but a 
special kind of sacred guest. This "epiphanic" stranger was 
entertained by the villagers with sumptuous hospitality in the 
hope that he would turn himself into a benevolent spirit and 
sanctify the village with his holy blessing. One might think of 
the Oresteia, in which the Erynies (the Furies) are transformed 
into the Eumenides (the Kindly Ones), who the Athenians 
hoped would bless the city of Athens. Of course, Zeami's 
theater is conceived in a scale that is anything but Aeschylean; 
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it is far less epic and totally apolitical, far more refined in its 
private lyricism—so much so that you could almost call it a 
"minimalist" art. Nonetheless, it is important to see in Noh a 
form of "holy theater" whose ultimate aim lies in making an 
epiphany possible, that is, in preparing a space, a kind of 
"void," so that this empty space may be filled in by the arrival 
of a strange guest, a sacred spirit in a human form, a god 
incarnate. 
What is to be stressed in this connection is the importance of 
the Waki, for it is he who actually does the preparing for the 
epiphany. Much more than a simple traveler, he is a priest 
possessed with a shamanic power to perceive (or indeed evoke) 
a supernatural presence (one notices here a curious reversal: he, 
a stranger from elsewhere, meets an indigenous spirit, a 
ghostly inhabitant of the place). He is a medium requisite for 
the supernatural hero to take flesh momentarily. It is even pos­
sible to argue that the central action of a Noh play, the "com­
ing" of the Shite in the second part, really takes place in a 
dream of the Waki, which is why it is called a "dream-noh." In 
any case, the audience finds itself at one with the Waki in an 
atmosphere taut with tension, waits for the apparition, watches 
the Shite dance out his or her undying fire of passion, and 
finally experiences a certain catharsis, be it Aristotelian or not, 
of fear and pity. 
Now some of the structural peculiarities of Waiting for Godot 
would seem to be illuminated by the light shed by the above 
observations on Noh. Didi and Gogo are seen to be not so 
much the real protagonists (Shites) as the secondary players 
(Wakis) who wait for the Shite to arrive. Of course they are far 
from resembling the serious-looking priest of Noh; they are 
much more like the comedians of Kyogen, a genre of farce 
usually performed as an interlude between two pieces of Noh 
plays. As for Pozzo, his arrival in the first act gives the Wakis an 
illusion that he might be the awaited Shite, which, however, is 
quickly proved to be false. And although his reappearance in 
the second act, much transformed and probably revealing his 
true identity, does remind us of the Shite in the second part of 
Noh, he is after all a "pseudo-Shite," a miserable caricature of 
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the true Shite, who is supposedly none other than Godot. Thus 
Didi and Gogo have to go on waiting for a true epiphany, and 
Godot's failure or refusal to come must leave the space, the 
stage, empty and unblessed with the visit of a ghostly guest. 
No transformation of reality, no communion of the sacred and 
the profane, takes place. No catharsis is allowed to the audi­
ence. 
It may indeed be doubted if the coming of Godot, should it 
take place, would be of any help to Didi and Gogo, for the fact 
that his name itself sounds like a parody of God might imply 
that all they can hope for is an endless sequence of "pseudo­
epiphanies" of "pseudo-Gods." One almost wonders if that is 
not precisely the state of modern man as envisioned by Beckett 
and if that is not precisely the state of Western theater as em­
bodied in the structure of Godot. I would submit that both situa­
tions are made poignantly conspicuous by the very absence of 
those elements that constitute the vision and the dramaturgy of 
Noh. Perhaps it is not so frivolous as it may seem to call Godot a 
kind of "anti-Mugen-Noh." 
Another aspect in which Godot sharply contrasts itself with 
Mugen-Noh is its attitude toward the past. The Shite in Noh is 
an apparition from the past, often a very distant time; he or she 
is dead, but the past is not; the presence of the Shite, which is 
as it were the time past made flesh and voice, is even more 
potently present than that of any human being alive. In con­
trast, everything in Godot is here and now (though "here" and 
"now" in this play are admittedly ambiguous enough in com­
parison with the unitary time-space scheme of a realistic play). 
The "dark backward and abysm of time" whose memory might 
torment the characters is deliberately dismissed; there is an 
almost hysterical revulsion against the "remembrance of things 
past" whenever the characters are faced with questions con­
cerning the past. All this, of course, may be a paradoxical testi­
mony to their obsession with time, and it is true that Didi and 
Gogo listen to the voices of the dead in the air, but there is no 
such encounter of the living and the dead, of the time present 
and the time past, as we find in Noh. 
After Godot it seems as if Beckett keeps approaching with 
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ever increasing seriousness an austere theater that, both in its 
skeletal bareness of structure and in its thematic obsession with 
past and memory, reveals a special affinity with Zeami's crea­
tion. Endgame is a play concerned with eschatology, the immi­
nent end of a game that is Western civilization itself. But in 
spite of (or perhaps exactly because of) that, we witness the 
characters being haunted by poisonous memories. Out of the 
dialogue between Hamm and Clov emerges their deep love-
hate relationship nurtured since their first contact when Clov 
was a child. We even see the time past literally present in 
Hamm's parents, still alive in the ash cans that obviously are 
parodies of graves. However, this play is probably too fiercely 
dramatic in content and too complex in form to make us feel its 
latent affinities with Mugen-Noh, and we have to wait for 
Krapp's Last Tape to meet a really suitable example. 
The play presents Krapp on the stage as the protagonist 
(Shite), but in this seeming monodrama, he is also playing the 
role of Waki, at least during those spaces of time in which he is 
straining his ears to listen to his own taped voices. And it is 
these voices that take the role of Shite during those moments. It 
goes without saying that there is a world of difference between 
the disembodied voices, on the one hand, that, coming out of a 
modern machine, with mechanical repetition narrate the stories 
of past passions (or "pseudo-passions"), and on the other 
hand, the overwhelming physical presence of the Shite in Noh, 
who both narrates and beautifully "dances out" his old but 
still-too-real passion, just as the half-crazy forgetful old man 
listening to his own voices is difficult to identify with the sane 
and intelligent priest who both watches and listens to the 
"other" character. And Krapp is of course utterly incapable of 
exorcising or pacifying his former self. Nevertheless, we find in 
Krapp the first unmistakable emergence in Beckett's canon of an 
essentially Noh-like structure: the voice (Shite) arriving out of 
an alien time-space dimension versus the character (Waki) 
listening to that voice. 
The purest example of this structural principle is Not I. Here 
we have, on the one hand, a Shite reduced to a bare outline of a 
"Mouth" of a woman, emerging out of the darkness and re­
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counting what she pretends to be another woman's life, though 
it is only too clear that it is her own life that she is narrating and 
that her babbling is an inadequate but compulsive attempt at 
reliving her earthly life. And we have, on the other hand, a 
typical Waki, whom Beckett calls "Auditor," vaguely priest-like 
with his hooded figure, facing "Mouth" diagonally across the 
stage (as in Noh), listening intently like a confessor to her voice, 
and apparently trying ineffectually to absolve the tormented 
soul. 
But we must remember that Not I is a rare exception in its 
clear-cut separation of the two roles. All the other plays by 
Beckett show a more ambiguous "doubling" of Shite and Waki, 
or (to put it the other way round) "splitting" of ego and alter-
ego. Krapp cannot be a Waki pure and simple because both the 
voice and the life it narrates are his own. Or take Eh Joe. One 
might think that Joe, the ostensible hero who remains silent 
throughout this television play, gets relegated to the role of 
Waki when the Beckettian Shite appears as a female voice. But 
one is reminded by the voice itself where it comes from: "You 
know that penny farthing hell you call your mind. . . . That's 
where you think this is coming from, don't you?" In Noh the 
Shite makes his or her entrance from the "Kagami-no-ma" (the 
looking-glass room), which is not simply a greenroom but 
symbolically represents an "other world," a purgatory, the 
depths of Jungian collective unconscious. Joe's "mind" does 
look as if it were a Beckettian version of Kagami-no-ma, but one 
must admit that this "penny farthing hell" is, if anything, more 
Freudian and personal than it is Jungian and archetypal (it is a 
superb joke that Joe's mind is materialized as a television set 
out of which issues a voice). The fact that the voice, albeit not 
his own, comes from his own mind and recounts his own life 
should deter us from claiming him to be a pure Waki. 
Rather it is our impression that Joe, with his face close-up 
and frozen in a tense expression, resembles what in Noh is 
known as "Hita-men" (Shite in a maskless role), and the 
muteness with which he listens to the voice could be compared 
to that particular style of Noh action called "I-guse," whereby 
the Shite sits utterly still and dumb while the chorus ("Ji-utai") 
chants long passages that are sometimes a description of his 
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misfortune and sometimes of his interior monologues. It should 
be noticed that the chorus in Noh has the astonishing freedom 
to enter inside the protagonist's mind and voice his own 
thoughts, hence the splitting of speech and act, as in I-guse, 
which the Western audience of Noh often finds very irrational 
and confusing. 
So I would suggest, at the risk of making my argument rather 
too complicated, that what we find in Eh Joe is the tripartite 
structure of Noh (Shite, Waki, and chorus) telescoped into a 
double structure. Joe listening to the woman's voice is at the 
same time the Waki listening to the Shite and the Shite listening 
to the chorus. Conversely, the voice is the Shite emerging out 
of "elsewhere" into the presence of the Waki at the same time 
that it is the chorus narrating to the Shite his own life story. 
It will not be difficult to detect a similar device not only in 
earlier plays like Krapp but also in most recent plays. That Time 
is an amalgam of Krapp and Eh Joe, for here is an old man sitting 
in the dark just listening to his own voices from three different 
periods of his life. He is a helpless passive Waki victimized by 
the aggressive, ghostly voices, but he is also a Shite caught in 
his anguished efforts to come to terms with his own past as 
narrated by those voices. Rockaby likewise splits the woman's 
physical presence in a rocking chair and her recorded voice. 
What is new about this play (for Beckett never repeats himself) 
is that the voice uses a third-person pronoun: " . .  . till in the 
end / the day came / in the end came / close of a long 
day / when she said / to herself / whom else / time she 
stopped." This produces an effect quite different from the first 
person used in Krapp, the second person in Eh Joe and That 
Time, or even from the third person in Not I, which, as I have 
pointed out, has a different dramatic structure. One of the most 
curious moments in the play occurs when the woman joins the 
voice, speaking in unison: "time she stopped." Although one is 
reminded of Krapp joining in the laughter of the taped voice, 
the closest parallel one can think of will probably be the im­
pression one gets when the Shite in Noh joins the chorus to 
recite a third-person narrative describing him. 
Ohio Impromptu is unique in having two characters on stage, 
Listener and Reader. Except for the fact, however, that the 
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voice of Rockaby is here incarnated as Reader, the fundamental 
structure remains unchanged; for it is suggested that Listener 
and Reader are, despite their separate identities, those halves of 
a split self that we are by now familiar with (see Beckett's direc­
tion that they be "as alike in appearance as possible")- And 
what Reader reads from the book is clearly a story of Listener's 
life, forcing upon him (Listener) a cruel realization of his life as a 
failure. 
Beckett started writing plays at the point in the history of the 
Western theater where all the realistic conventions of drama, 
including the assumption that the theater has nothing to do 
with the sacred, broke down, and it seems to be that, in his 
ruthless effort to strip the theater of everything that is not abso­
lutely necessary, he has arrived somewhere close to where 
Zeami started six hundred years ago. In both Zeami's and 
Beckett's theater1, nothing happens (everything has already 
happened), but someone does come out of an unknown 
"sacred" country that Beckett in one of his latest plays, Ohio 
Impromptu, calls the "profounds of mind." That "someone" is 
at once "the other" and one's deepest self; that "country" is at 
once "unknown" and half-remembered. Of course, Beckett, 
under a malediction undreamed of by Zeami, has had to delve 
down into the depths of modern self-consciousness where it 
threatens to turn into solipsism, autism, and schizophrenia 
("that way lies madness"). It is a triumph of Beckett's art that 
he has successfully incorporated the very structure of the split 
soul of the modern man. Zeami's ideal of theater consisted in 
"transmitting a hana [i.e., flower] from mind to mind." Al­
though in Beckett's "theater of mind" what is transmitted from 
mind to mind is something too bleak to be called "flower," we 
are grateful to him for creating a theater that is as deeply con­
cerned as Zeami's with the agonies of a soul that badly needs 
pacifying. 
1. Paul Claudel, "No," in Oeuvres en prose (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 
"Bibliotheque de la Ple'iade," p. 1167. 
Frederik N. Smith

Fiction as Composing Process: How It Is 
Twenty years ago, shortly after the publication of Comment c'est, 
Hugh Kenner remarked that the novel "looks like a draft of 
itself, as Endgame feels like a rehearsal of itself; packets of lan­
guage, set apart by spaces, like notes for paragraphs never to be 
composed, jotted down as some eternal voice dictates."1 
Others have observed that How It Is resembles a "rough draft" 
or "manuscript."2 These descriptions are apt. The subject of the 
book is the composing process itself. The novel demonstrates 
how the romanticized joys of authorship border in fact on a 
schizophrenic tug-of-war within oneself, where every flash of 
inspiration is countered by a terrible realization that what one 
has just thought may be somehow inaccurate, ill-conceived, or 
spoken in a voice not one's own. 
Writing is for Samuel Beckett an excruciatingly arduous task, 
and he typically uses the personal challenges of this task as the 
raw material for his fiction.3 His first published story, "As­
sumption," is about the struggles of a hypersensitive young 
author who is suffering from writer's block. But it is in the 
trilogy that Beckett's preoccupation with the process of story­
telling begins to subsume the story itself. The degree of his 
sensitivity to the mechanics of writing is demonstrated in this 
one astounding sentence from Malone Dies: "I hear the noise of 
my little finger as it glides over the paper and then that so 
different of the pencil following after."4 It would have seemed 
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that there was no place to go from here. But in How It Is (the 
immediacy of the title perhaps suggests the shift in focus), 
Beckett retreats from the page, or rather goes behind it, at­
tempting to catch the flux of the writing process at the moment 
it is occurring. Here we read: "ballpoint at the ready on the alert 
for the least never long idle if nothing I invent must keep busy 
otherwise death."5 Of course Beckett is fictionalizing here as 
well. But whereas in Malone Dies the emphasis is on the writing 
situation (pencil, exercise-book, room, lighting, and so on), in 
How It Is the emphasis is only secondarily on the requisite situa­
tion, and primarily on the mental and imaginative operations of 
the writer himself as he composes. Beckett's remarkable sensi­
tivity to the sound of the pencil moving across the paper in 
Malone Dies is matched in How It Is by an even more incredible 
sensitivity to his own process of turning the stuff of memory 
and imagination into words. 
Don Quixote, Tristram Shandy, Tom Jones, Pale Fire, Lost in the 
Funhouse, Project for a Revolution in New York, and Malone Dies 
are all works of fiction about the problem of writing fiction. In 
this respect, How It Is belongs to the same genre. It differs from 
these other novels, however, in that it dramatizes the problem 
at a more primal stage. It is in a sense an lir-novel. It is a 
published text that looks not so much like notes or manuscript 
or draft, but rather like something prior to the completion of a 
draft. It purports to document the process of writing a novel as 
it is occurring within the artist himself, to be a record of that 
series of miraculous moments when invention is busy trans­
forming memories into words on the page. In particular, the 
many references to dark and light and the halting, laborious 
journeying through a primeval mud suggest a Genesis situation 
in which something—in this case a literary work—is being 
shaped out of the mud of one's own experience. The odd 
"stanzas" of the novel quite literally imitate the stumbling at­
tempts to get started. And each stanza is composed of a series 
of phrases that draw attention to themselves as fragments of 
half-conceived, broken-off sentences. The pun in the original 
French title is revealing: this is truly how it is to begin. 
How It Is dramatizes the dilemma within every writer be­
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tween the chaos of the artist's inspiration and the need to give 
form to that inspiration. "The problem," says Peter Elbow, "is 
that editing goes on at the same time as producing. The editor is, 
as it were, constantly looking over the shoulder of the producer 
and constantly fiddling with what he's doing while he's in the 
middle of trying to do it."6 Beckett shows us more clearly than 
any other writer—and in this novel more clearly than in any of 
his other novels—the lonely struggle of all writing, which is 
characterized by an ongoing competition (I am aware of this as I 
conceive and revise this very sentence) played out inside the 
writer's own skull, inside his "little chamber all bone-white" (p. 
134). "I'm the brain," says Beckett at one point, "of the two 
sounds distant still" (p. 89). The novel is in a sense a transcrip­
tion of the struggle for dominance between the right hemi­
sphere's immediacy, its ability to work by way of images, and 
the left hemisphere's logicality, its desire to organize and cor­
rect.7 
The innumerable allusions in Haw It Is to various stages of the 
writing process hint at a step-by-step procedure of writing. 
These allusions can be used to construct a schema that would 
account for the phases Beckett himself may go through in the 
difficult process of contriving a novel out of his own real-life 
images torturously disentangled from the past: 















The endlessly repeated phrase "vast tracts of time" suggests 
not only the frightening white page but also the faraway time 
110 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
and space that have made up one's life but are lost altogether, 
or perhaps lodged as mere fragments in one's memory: "dear 
scraps recorded somewhere" (p. 25). Some form of the phrase 
"bits and scraps" is used nearly fifty times, and seems to signify 
the bits and scraps of one's memory as well as the composing 
process itself, which is the process of attempting to turn these 
fragments into "my life present formulation."8 These fragments 
are recoverable only as "images" or "scenes" (both words are 
repeated frequently) that fade in and fade out like the scenes of 
a film ("brief black and there we are again") or the staging of a 
scene of a play ("ABOVE the light goes on little scenes"). 
Sometimes these bits and scraps can be captured in jottings 
taken down in a notebook ("reread our notes"), and then 
through a process everywhere challenged by physical obstacles 
("here something illegible in the folds") or mental lapses ("at 
evening with his face to the huge sun or his back I forget") 
transformed slowly, painfully into a work of fiction.9 The whole 
process is an inching forward out of obscurity into a precarious 
and perhaps specious semicoherence: "prior to the script the 
refinements difficult to describe just the broad lines on stop that 
family beyond my strength he floundered I floundered but little 
by little little by little" (p. 61).10 These words are an appropriate 
description of the building up of How It Is itself, which would 
seem to contain numerous vivid images and recollections of 
Beckett's own childhood and youth.11 Of course we can never 
be sure—and this is as it should be—where autobiography 
leaves off and fiction begins. 
Invention in the novel is pitted against revision or the need to 
edit. One pole of the composing process is imagination or inspi­
ration, described by Beckett as "these sudden blazes in the 
head" that the writer experiences as a sort of "spectacle" (p. 
35). So too the indispensable sack, wherein the traveler keeps 
his provisions, suggests the scraps stored in the writer's mem­
ory.12 The other pole of the process is revision, or the writer's 
need to prune, to delete, or to make stern judgments on the 
products of his imagination. This second self is referred to 
when Beckett the creator wonders whether this other "might 
not with profit revise us by means for example of a pronounce­
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merit" (p. 140). He is "the scribe sitting aloof" (p. 44) and the 
"me bending over me" (p. 133). The competition between these 
two poles of the composing process is analogous to the ongoing 
struggle for authority in the relationships between the narrator 
and Pirn, Krim and Kram, and the more generalized "victim" 
and "tormentor." The endlessness of this repeated contest 
would seem to suggest that the best composition occurs when 
neither imagination nor revision gets the upper hand. Creativ­
ity is more than raw inspiration. But so too it is a great deal 
more than correctness and tripartite organization and finding a 
way to have done. 
Beckett's text bears a striking resemblance to some of Janet 
Emig's experiments with "oral composition."13 Emig was able 
to capture something of the dynamics of composition by bring­
ing together her students' produced texts with tape recordings 
of their oral comments on those texts as they were writing them. 
It was all yellow and everything as you walk into this (ten-second 
pause) you know. It was yellow and orange. Could I hyphenate 
yellow and orange if I want? (writing) . .  . It will make the con­
struction better. I walked into a warm-looking yellow-and-orange dress 
shop on East Randolph.^ 
Minus the punctuation and capitalization, this passage would 
look (and sound, if read aloud) a great deal like one of Beckett's 
stanzas in How It Is: 
one day we'll set off again together and I saw us the curtains parted 
an instant something wrong there and I saw us darkly all this 
before the little tune oh long before helping each other on drop­
ping with one accord and lying biding in each other's arms the time 
to set off again (P. 57) 
Although Beckett says at one point in the book that his process 
is "unbroken no paragraphs no commas not a second for re­
flection" (p. 70), there is, clearly, time for momentary reflec­
tion, and the reflection becomes part of the text itself. Emig 
suggests that a pause in the composition of a text is a moment 
of rest, a time for reconsideration before moving ahead; 
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Beckett's breaks in his text suggest the same sort of temporary 
slacking of creative energy.15 The passage from How It Is is 
clearly as "oral" as the passage from Emig. Only Beckett is not 
so kind as to italicize for us those words—if any at all—that 
have actually reached the page. 
Furthermore, Emig makes the point that there is a recursive 
tendency to all writing, a journeying forward into the un­
known, then a doubling back, then a journeying forward again. 
This tendency is apparent in both of the above passages, which 
reflect a hesitant, repetitive groping toward a description rather 
than being themselves finished descriptions. What we have in 
both cases is a sort of dialogue with the self, an unvocalized 
attempt at a particular phrasing followed by an unvocalized 
doubt as to the aptness of the proposed phrasing, and then a 
new formulation of the description. We watch as a statement is 
being worked toward, yet perhaps never fully realized. We are 
shown the struggle between alternate formulations: Is the shop 
"yellow" or "yellow and orange"? Are the speaker and Pirn 
"lying" or "biding" in each other's arms? And note the shift in 
tense in each passage. Both at least theoretically have as their 
subject a past happening, but both also try to deal with a 
present verbal formulation of that past, and at the same time 
attempt (in the first instance) to point to a future possible 
formulation, or (in the second instance) to project a verbal 
formulation of a possible future happening.16 The handling of 
time is certainly one of the most difficult challenges in any 
writing, and Beckett's valiant efforts to break his narrative into 
a neat "before Pirn with Pirn after Pirn" is everywhere under­
mined by the text's blurring of tense. The time of the story 
proper gets confused with the time of the telling of the story. 
"All my fault lack of attention want of memory," admits 
Beckett, "the various times mixed up in my head all the various 
times before during after vast tracts of time" (p. 107). 
How It Is is filled with Teachings back into time and forward 
into the text, but these sudden bursts of inspiration are con­
tinually interrupted by Beckett's desire to approve or disap­
prove what he has just thought to himself. Runs of more than 
several words are rare: "this voice ten words fifteen words long 
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silence ten words fifteen words long silence long solitude" (p. 
126). The subjective, personal voice of inspiration is repeatedly 
broken off by the objective, impersonal commentary of the 
reviser. Phrases such as the following occur throughout: 
"something wrong there" (which appears twenty-four times in 
the novel), "need then to emend what has just been said," 
"nothing to emend there," "not an iota to be changed in this 
description," "not right," "correct," "a mistake," "drivel 
drivel," "no point skip," "all hangs together," "no objection," 
and "a little less of to be present past future and conditional." 
Even phrases such as "the sack we're talking of the sack" 
would seem to be the author's objective self calling him back to 
the subject (and the writing task) literally at hand. As in all 
composing, these dogmatic interjections have at least the 
potential effect of crushing the tender shoots of authorial inspi­
ration; and the response of Beckett's reader must be much the 
same, for one's attention is thus repeatedly yanked away from 
the immediate subject and redirected toward a choice between 
a hypothetically better or worse verbal formulation of that sub­
ject. 
The drama of this struggle between inspiration and revision 
is literally found on every page of How It Is. An alternate word 
or phrase is repeatedly substituted for another without the 
deletion of the initial formulation: "I'll describe it it will be 
described" (p. 27), "midnight no two in the morning" (p. 44), "I 
am right I was right" (p. 55), "happy no unhappy" (p. 97), "a 
cry nay a sigh" (p. 143).17 These substitutions and the inclusion 
of internal reactions to words that have just happened in the 
mind account for much of the peculiarity of the style of this 
novel: "happiness one hesitates to use those awful syllables" 
(p. 25); "a fine image fine I mean in movement and colour" (p. 
27); and "tormenter or victim these words too strong" (p. 115). 
Gradually, in the course of the novel, this pre-textual debate 
between imagination and revision becomes ever sharper. The 
interior composing process is by definition a divided one, and 
at times the supposed author is trapped between two equally 
demanding urges: the phrase "I hear yes then no" occurs re­
peatedly. And as the vivid images of part one begin to fade, 
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"yes" and "no" appear more often. There is an increasingly 
frustrating split within the author's own head. His desperate 
attempts to make his story neat and certain only feed his 
anxiety, and in the final pages of the book the composing 
process has diminished to a schizophrenic shouting match be­
tween the inspirational "YES" and the editorial "NO." 
Often whole stanzas are based on a reproduction of the 
process of an as-yet-unformulated thought as it lurches 
through the mind. And Beckett will not oversimplify this 
process: 
as I hear it and murmur in the mud that I hoist myself if I may say 
so a little forward to feel the skull it's bald no delete the face it's 
preferable mass of hairs all white to the feel that clinches it he's a 
little old man we're two little old men something wrong there (P. 
54) 
Of course the absence of punctuation and the minimalization of 
grammatical connectives enable us to track the evolution of this 
thought without being reminded that what we are reading is in 
fact written discourse. So too the lack of punctuation permits 
the running-together of the supposed speaker's description of a 
present-tense movement, the speaker's interior weighing of the 
validity of his sensations, and the supposed author's question­
ing of his own process on writing about both of these. Thus the 
description "I hoist myself a little forward to feel the skull" is 
interrupted both by the speaker's interior reactions ("it's bald" 
and "that clinches it he's a little old man") and by the author's 
interior reactions ("no delete," "it's preferable," and "some­
thing wrong there"). But Beckett deliberately wants to blur 
these two different sorts of comments on the described actions 
in order to fuse the process of the story with the process of 
telling the story. Indeed, he suggests they are one and the 
same. Hoisting a little forward in the primeval mud is equiv­
alent to formulating a murmur out of the inchoate mass of one's 
memory. The staggering, uncertain movement of Beckett's 
syntax reproduces both. And something is dreadfully wrong in 
either case. 
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Beckett in How It Is probes yet further into the nature of the 
composing process. Part of the ongoing struggle between an 
author's sudden blazes of inspiration and his need to give form 
to that inspiration is the problem of voice in writing. Discovering 
the voice of his own inspiration is one difficulty for the author; 
but perhaps more difficult is the delicate job of transcribing his 
inner voice into words which manage to express the sound of 
that inspiration. Thus "voice" can mean either inspiration (for 
the writer) or the rhetorical form which captures this inspiration 
convincingly (for the reader)—Beckett uses the word in both 
senses. And references to voice increase as he works his way 
through How It Is, suggesting that this dual problem becomes 
gradually more important. Implicit in the novel are the follow­
ing very real questions: Is voice an individualized characteristic 
of an author's writing or somehow programmed into him by 
"the voice of us all"? Does an author have one or many voices? 
And more particularly, is it possible for voice to rise above what 
Elbow calls "the habit of compulsive, premature editing," 
which can interfere with the writer's attempts to get his own 
consciousness onto the page?18 
Although not every writer is as self-conscious about this mat­
ter as Beckett is, the presence of voice in a text is of critical 
importance to all writers and all readers. It marks the difference 
between what Richard Lanham calls the "monotone haste that 
swallows prose like castor oil" and prose that takes on a life, 
that has a rhythm and an identifiable tone, that creates a more 
or less distinct impression of someone speaking.19 Of course, 
voice in written discourse is nothing more than the arrange­
ment of words in such a way as to give the effect of such a 
presence, and Beckett understands this: "my voice so many 
words strung together" (p. 95). But words and phrases can be 
strung together like beads on a string, in which case there is no 
voice but only words; or words and phrases can be placed in 
such positions that they do in fact give the impression of some­
one speaking. And How It Is is a text that reads for the most part 
"almost mechanically at least where words involved" (p. 64). 
The majority of the book is composed in a phrase-plus-phrase­
plus-phrase fashion that sounds as if it were written not by an 
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author but by a computer. Sporadically, however, such voice­
less prose gives way to a momentary colloquialism that must 
have been spoken by a human being. Beckett's novel is in effect 
a demonstration of the irrepressibility of his own authorial 
voice. 
A good example of the mechanical laying down of words is 
the following stanza, which itself seems to allude to the labor of 
composition. 
intent on these horizons I do not feel my fatigue it is manifest none 
the less passage more laborious from one side to the other one 
semi-side prolongation of intermediate procumbency multiplica­
tion of mute imprecations (P. 41) 
The lack of punctuation, the verbal and phrasal disconnected­
ness, and the piling up of academic polysyllables never permit 
this prose to rise above an uninflected monotone.20 There is no 
voice here. And most of the novel sounds like this. But once in 
a while, such voiceless prose is interrupted or overcome by a 
decidedly human phraseology that carries with it an undeniable 
rhythm and tone: "the word we're talking of words I have some 
still" (p. 26); "I always say when a man's name is Pirn he hasn't 
the right" (p. 59); "the Boms sir you don't know the Boms sir" 
(p. 60); "Krim says his number's up so is mine" (p. 81); and 
"that wasn't how it was no not at all" (p. 144). The dependence 
in these excerpts on monosyllables, personal pronouns, and 
contractions moves the prose into a greater informality and 
allows a human inflection to emerge in spite of the absence of 
punctuation. Indeed, Beckett demonstrates that such conven­
tional signals are helpful but not absolutely necessary in creat­
ing voice in written discourse. 
Not infrequently Beckett within a single stanza allows his 
computerized style to give way, unexpectedly, to the sound of a 
real human voice. The following is an example. And note that 
the passage itself is at least in part about voice. 
blue the eyes I see them old stone perhaps our new daylight lamps 
it's possible I agree and in the head the dark and friend I agree but 
this voice the voice of all what voice I hear none and who all damn 
it I'm the thirteenth generation (P. 83) 
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Beckett's eyes are in fact blue, and he would seem here to be 
looking—or imagining that he is looking—at himself. But the 
personalized subject opens with a voiceless multiplication of 
phrases that by this point in the text has become the norm, 
typically introduces perceptual options by way of a "perhaps" 
and an "it's possible," and then seems to permit a response to 
itself in the form of an "I agree" and a "friend I agree." But who 
is this friend? And who is doing the agreeing? And in this 
bifurcated context, the reference to the "voice of all" seems 
oddly wrong, for we would seem to be already in the presence 
of at least two voices.21 Suddenly, however, as if demanding to 
be heard, as if reasserting itself over both the voiceless text and 
the confusion of voices above, there booms an angry "damn it 
I'm the thirteenth generation." Is this the superior Krim? Is this 
the unnamed speaker emerging momentarily from all his 
words? Is this Beckett parodying himself? In any case, we listen 
as a voiceless text begins first to fragment into a schizophrenic 
conflict with itself, and is then overcome by an unmistakably 
singular voice—not of some generalized "all" but of an indi­
vidual defending his inherited right to his presence in the book. 
And his right to his own voice. Not surprisingly, How It Is 
concludes with a final assertion of the importance of voice: 
"only me in any case," admits Beckett, and "my voice yes mine 
yes not another's no mine alone yes" (p. 146). The author's 
personal voice has in a sense survived the struggle to create. 
Beckett's novel is thus a brave attempt to bring onto the page 
the creative process, a process that remains most mysterious. 
He has of course fictionalized this process. How It Is is a novel 
and not necessarily a documentary of his own creative process. 
The repeated objections that there is "something wrong there" 
are fictionalized objections to something Beckett has himself 
written quite self-consciously. So too the search for a voice is a 
drama Beckett has intentionally built into his novel. Neverthe­
less, a glance at the original manuscript and first and second 
typescripts of How It Is would suggest that in the process of 
writing about the composing process, Beckett was in fact doing 
the same kind of things he has used as the stuff of his fiction.22 
One of the most interesting aspects of the material behind the 
final version of How It Is is the fact that Beckett worked increas­
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ingly hard to give his novel the look of unfinishedness, or, 
more accurately, the look of something scarcely begun. The first 
scrap of Comment c'est—a two-and-a-half-page fragment en­
titled "L'Image"—was published in November 1959, and the 
solid mass of text lends its pages at least the superficial ap­
pearance of traditional fiction.23 But five months later, in a 
manuscript dated May 1960, Beckett abandons capitalization 
and punctuation altogether; and only a few months after this, 
in the first several pages of the English version, published in 
the Evergreen Review (Beckett was at this time writing in French 
and English simultaneously), the text is broken into stanzas for 
the first time.24 Although it is not my purpose to trace the 
evolution of Beckett's English text, it is worth noting that the 
idea of a novel that pretends to be only a fragmented, internal 
record of the beginning of a novel was something that seems to 
have come to Beckett as he was in fact struggling to begin. In 
March 1960, in the very early stages of this new and difficult 
composition, when sending John Calder a piece of it in English, 
he referred to the enclosed material as a "work in regress."25 
That is how it was. Quite literally, Beckett's progression for­
ward into this new novel was turning out to be a regression 
backward into the composing process. 
Indeed, his efforts to prevent the text of How It Is from as­
suming the appearance of a conventionally printed text con­
tinued right down to the final stages of publication. The French 
Comment c'est had included many stanzas that look like stolid, 
rectangular units of type, their last lines running all the way to 
the right-hand margin; Beckett clearly wanted to avoid this ef­
fect of finality and certainty in the English version of his novel. 
On one page of the galley proofs for the Grove Press edition, he 
wrote a note to his printers: "If this comes at foot of page it will 
have to be changed, on principle that last line of page must 
always be incomplete or carried forward by hyphen to follow­
ing page." But the convention-minded typesetters persisted, 
and on one sheet of the London page proofs, Beckett wrote 
with understandable impatience, "As indicated on galley 
proofs, there must never be a full line at foot of page," and 
went on to show the printers exactly how he wanted the line 
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set, indicating that the "same mistake" occurred on eight other 
pages. In retrospect these typographical quibbles seem quite 
humorous, but for Beckett at the time the need to publish a text 
that would appear more fragmented, even less finished, than 
the original French version must have become almost an obses­
sion. His sense of his novel had evolved, and he wanted his 
current notion of it to be reflected in the published English text. 
Ultimately, Beckett had his way. In numerous places in both 
the New York and London editions, it is clear that the type­
setters have added space to a line so as to avoid having the last 
line of a stanza end at the right margin. And the author must 
have taken exquisite delight in discovering that on page 22 the 
final word of the stanza, "bottom," had to be hyphenated so as 
to bring its second syllable to the top of page 23, where "torn" 
stands alone. 
In a nice phrase—"the fragility of euphoria" (p. 38)—Beckett 
captures the idea behind How It Is.26 Writing—like living—is a 
tentative, precarious, and certainly most difficult task. More­
over, the precariousness of any attempt to transform a thought 
or image into words is intimately connected with the precari­
ousness of one's own being. The pangs of composition are the 
pangs of existence. Even the comparatively vivid images of part 
one are qualified by such phrases as "if I may believe the 
colours" (p. 29), "that must have lasted a good moment" (p. 
31), and "I wait for us perhaps to come back" (p. 32). One's past 
is fleeting at best. One's future is hypothetical. In truth only the 
present exists for the writer as writer and the writer as human 
being. At the beginning of part three, Beckett mentions "the 
humming-bird known as the passing moment" (p. 103). The 
moment. The voice. The text. That is all there is. 
1. Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study, new ed. (1961; Berkeley: University of 
Caifornia Press, 1968), p. 190. 
2. Michael Robinson, The Long Sonata of the Dead: A Study of Samuel Beckett 
(London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1969), p. 213; and James Knowlson and John 
Pilling, Frescoes of the Skull: The Later Prose and Drama of Samuel Beckett (1979; 
rpt. New York: Grove Press, 1980), p. 78. 
120 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
3. The entire corpus testifies to the difficulty of composition for Beckett. 
See also Richard L. Admussen, The Samuel Beckett Manuscripts: A Study 
(Boston: G. K. Hall, 1979), pp. 11-12. 
4. In Three Novels by Samuel Beckett (New York: Grove Press, 1965), p. 208. 
5. How It Is (New York: Grove Press, 1964), p. 81. Subsequent references 
to the novel will be to this edition and will be included within the text. 
6. Writing without Teachers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 5. 
7. As background, see the interesting article by W. Ross Winterowd, 
"Brain, Rhetoric, and Style," in Linguistics, Stylistics, and the Teaching of Com­
position, ed. Donald McQuade (Akron: L & S Books, 1979), pp. 151-81. 
8. This phrase appears frequently; see "my composition" (p. 52), "script" 
(pp. 61 and 69), "monologue" (p. 79), "recordings" (p. 107), "scriptions" (p. 
112), and "narrations" (p. 139). 
9. Beckett even jokes about the exercise-books of various colors that he 
typically uses for his actual composing: "blue yellow and red respectively 
simple once you've thought of it" (p. 82). See also Admussen, p. 10. 
10. On his first typescript, Beckett changed "prior to the writing" to "prior 
to the script." Similarly, on page 69 he changed "graphy" to "script." See 
note 22 below. 
11. See G. C. Barnard's discussion of the image of Beckett as a child pray­
ing at his mother's knee (p. 15)—clearly taken from an old photograph—in 
Samuel Beckett: A New Approach (London: V. M. Dent & Sons, 1970), p. 70. 
There are numerous such images in part one. 
12. Cf. Beowulf's "word-hoard." But elsewhere Beckett suggests that the 
sack is a womb, a lover, or the speaker's own body. 
13. The Composing Processes of Twelfth Graders (Urbana, 111.: National Council 
of Teachers of English, 1971), pp. 40-42. 
14. Ibid., p. 59. 
15. Ibid., pp. 66-67. Cf. the many references in How It Is to "silence" and 
also to "long pause" (p. 72) and "without pause" (p. 136). 
16. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 36. 
17. Beckett had experimented with this approach to writing as early as Watt 
(1953; New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 40: "The fit is perfect. And he knows 
this. No. Let us be calm. He feels it." 
18. Writing without Teachers, p. 6. 
19. Style: An Anti-Textbook (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1974), p. 100. And here I echo Susan Gibson, Voice Audience Content: A Writer's 
Reader (New York, Longman, 1979), p. 2. 
20. Beckett's novel is filled with such academic rarities: "instanter," "fre­
quentation," "capillarity," "scissiparous," "introrse," "dextrogyre," 
"thenar," "subprefecture," "malar," "infinitudes," etc. 
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Judith E. Dearlove

"Syntax Upended in Opposite Corners' 
Alterations in Beckett's 
Linguistic Theories 
Throughout his career, Samuel Beckett's style, mood, and atti­
tudes toward art change. These changes are related to, and 
grow out of, a series of changes that occur in Beckett's semantic 
and syntactic principles. Linguistically, Beckett moves from a 
celebration of syntax at the expense of semantic content, 
through both identification and later dissociation of the two, to 
a period of reconciliation in which he accepts the solace of form 
as being itself an adequate semantic comment. 
Beckett's early linguistic attitudes are suggested by the Verti­
calist manifesto he signed in 1932 advocating use of language as 
"a mantic instrument . . . which does not hesitate to adopt a 
revolutionary attitude toward word and syntax, going even so 
far as to invent a hermetic language, if necessary."1 According 
to the Verticalists, the artist is free to—perhaps even obligated 
to—fashion new syntactic orders and hence new patterns of 
meaning. This Verticalist conception of language that informs 
the prose of Beckett's earliest works is perhaps most clearly 
displayed in "Text,"2 a published extract of the unpublished 
Dream of Fair to Middling Women. Basically, the piece portrays an 
exchange between a "lust-be-lepered" lover and the woman he 
unsuccessfully importunes to be his "bonny bony doublebed 
cony." The real interest, however, lies not in the situation but 
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in the language that compounds aural devices into one long 
(approximately 180-word) sentence. Within the first two dozen 
words alone, there is a remarkable accumulation of alliteration, 
assonance, consonance, and internal rhyme: "Come come and 
cull my bonny bony doublebed cony swiftly my springal and 
my thin Kerry twingle-twangler comfort my days of roses days 
of beauty. . . .  " Sound replaces meaning as the interpersonal 
relationship is subsumed under a verbal one. We are more in­
terested in the way words tumble about each other's meanings 
than we are in the lover's frustrated efforts to tumble about 
with his cony. The piece celebrates not humanistic concerns but 
rather the power of the artist who forces his words to operate 
on all levels of meaning simultaneously, who makes each word 
refer both forward and backward in a flowing prose. For ex­
ample, in a dazzling display of metaphysical transitions, 
Beckett transforms the woman into a hunted rabbit, to nibbled-
up lettuce, to a plant covered by an insect's secretion, and back 
to a woman. The very density of images, in which human, 
animal, and vegetable allusions interconnect and overlap, testi­
fies to an underlying belief in the possibility of order, in the 
reality of the external, and in the capacity of language to project 
and display that order and that reality. Such beliefs affirm an 
order antithetical to the uncertainty, fluidity, and chaos that 
Beckett postulates, forcing him to find new linguistic models for 
his art. 
For the major portion of his career, Beckett pursues the lin­
guistic theory he ascribes to Proust and Joyce, that form is a 
spatial configuration of meaning: "for Proust the quality of lan­
guage is more important than any system of ethics or aes­
thetics. Indeed he makes no attempt to dissociate form from 
content. The one is a concretion of the other, the revelation of a 
world."3 An idea resides in its shape, and style reflects more 
accurately than any content a speaker's vision of the universe. 
It is as if Beckett could not argue strongly enough for the iden­
tity of form and content, for he insists on underlining his points 
in discussing Joyce: "Here form is content, content is form. . . . 
His writing is not about something; it is that something itself."4 
The identification of form and content encourages Beckett to 
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emphasize the structure of his own works and the shapes of his 
ideas: "I am interested in the shape of ideas even if I do not 
believe in them. . .  . It is the shape that matters."5 
Beckett's purported interest in the shape rather than the 
validity of ideas finds its best formal expression in the trilogy 
where form and content are made to seem identical and indivisi­
ble as the narrator creates himself, and incidentally the text we 
read, through the very act of narration: " . .  . I'm in words, 
made of words, others' words."6 Despite all assertions, how­
ever, the narrator/narrated is as irretrievably split as are form 
and content. On the one hand, the narrator is the formless, 
fluid speaker who rejects all that is alien to the nonverbal core 
of himself. On the other hand, he resides in the fixed shapes 
and external orders of his spoken words. He exists, as the Un­
namable observes, in the interstice between internal and ex­
ternal: 
. . . I'm in the middle, I'm the partition, I've two surfaces and no 
thickness, perhaps that's what I feel, myself vibrating, I'm the 
tympanum, on the one hand the mind, on the other the world, I 
don't belong to either. . . . (The Unnamable, p. 383) 
In "Shades of Syntax," Hugh Kenner examines the linguistic 
implications of Beckett's efforts to conflate form and context, 
observing that it is "a typical Beckett strategy, to equate syntax 
with logic, lull us with their coincidence, then trap us with the 
consequence."7 Kenner argues that, unlike a Joycean "interior 
monologue" in which the mind "exerts no effort to control its 
own contents," Beckett presents us in a work like How It Is with 
a narrator "struggling to utter sentences, which means to con­
trol his thoughts, which means to grasp and comprehend the 
reality in which he partakes. Each block of type is a unit of his 
effort; we can gauge his progress by keeping track of the syn­
tactic order he achieves" (pp. 30-31). The "overall symmetry" 
of How It Is creates the illusion that the narrator has achieved 
order and control. But the control is syntactic not semantic; the 
narrator has ordered his words to attain a symmetrical form, 
but he has understood little: "his effort . .  . is over­
Judith E. Dearlove 125 
whelmed . .  . by all the grim data he has not managed to clar­
ify nor explain" (p. 31). 
In the 1960s, instead of continuing to ignore the tensions 
between semantics and syntactics, Beckett reverses his linguistic 
theory and emphasizes their disparity. Instead of identifying 
form and content, he counterpoints them. In a 1961 interview 
with Tom Driver, Beckett acknowledges that form does not 
have to be content: "The form and the chaos remain separate. 
The latter is not reduced to the former. That is why the form 
itself becomes a preoccupation, because it exists as a problem 
separate from the material it accommodates."8 The shape of a 
work of art can be separate from the idea it accommodates. 
Structure may, in fact, work in opposition to chaos as it does in 
the Residua, where Beckett creates structures that mathemati­
cally and scientifically describe fantastic objects, people, and 
images. Paradoxically, the very artifice of these carefully con­
structed structures points toward their underlying structural 
meaninglessness, whereas the arbitrariness beneath their order 
gestures toward a more fundamental absence of order. "Less­
ness," for example, presents a randomly arranged collection of 
words, images, and sentences. In order to read the work, the 
reader must reverse Beckett's creative process and break the 
piece down into sentences and phrases, regroup the compo­
nents, and analyze the resulting families of sentences. The 
piece thus exists between composition and decomposition. 
In his residual works, Beckett successfully accomplishes what 
his Verticalist pieces failed to do: he uses language and litera­
ture to capture the essence of the void by implication and ex­
clusion: he expresses the chaos by avoiding it. Beneath the form 
lies the fluidity, uncertainty, and "mess" that Beckett seeks to 
accommodate. In the words Beckett used to distinguish himself 
from Kafka: ". . . Kafka's form is classic, it goes on like a steam­
roller—almost serene. It seems to be threatened the whole 
time—but the consternation is in the form. In my work there is 
consternation behind the form, not in the form."9 
The new mood of the most recent fictions marks yet another 
stage in Beckett's linguistic explorations. Instead of striving to 
portray the "consternation behind the form," "Sounds," "Still 
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3," and Company return to the solace of form. Serenity is pos­
sible because the pieces are indifferent to the distinctions be­
tween internal and external realms that troubled earlier narra­
tors. The figure in "Sounds" listens equally for the noise of the 
lightest leaf or for the sighs of his own breath. His postures 
intimate both Belacquaesque hermeticism, as he sits with his 
head in his hands, and exterior connections, as he stands em­
bracing a tree. Even his speech patterns mix once mutually 
exclusive worlds. The wind is described in terms of the self and 
its mutterings: the wind makes "no more sound than a ghost or 
mutter [of] old words once got by heart. . . ."10 It is no longer 
necessary to denounce associations or to seek absolute an­
swers. Peace comes as the agonized questions that informed 
earlier quests fade away: "No not yet not listening again in vain 
quite yet while the dim questions fade where been how long 
how it was" (p. 156). Imperatives, interjections, permutations, 
and interruptions disappear. Direct contradiction is replaced by 
alternative possibilities. Repetitions become less insistent, the 
phrases longer, the rhythms more sustained. As commas and 
periods become less frequent, the prose becomes more fluid 
and tranquil. The syntax and lexicon become simpler and more 
conventional. The recent pieces dispense with a learned vo­
cabulary including terms such as commissure, cacodemons, deasil; 
they eliminate word games such as the ones the narrator of "All 
Strange Away" plays with "Emma/Emmo" and "haven/ 
heaven" (p. 9); and they avoid the unconventionally ordered 
syntax of: "And finally for the moment and then that face the 
tailaway so common in untrained speakers leaving sometimes 
in some doubt such things as which Diogenes and what fancy 
her only" ("All Strange Away," p. 5). We are proffered instead 
the comfort of the familiar and the solace of conventional lin­
guistic forms.11 
Although the most recent pieces are without urgency, they 
are not without energy. "Sounds" and "Still 3," for example, 
are serene but not static. Just enough imagination persists to 
keep the narration going. Almost inaudible sounds recur just 
frequently enough to keep the silence from being absolute. 
Barely perceptible images appear just often enough to forestall 
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the growing darkness. Instead of an impasse, the pieces project 
a tranquil diminishing. Instead of falling into exhausted silence, 
the pieces drift softly to rest. As in Valery's "The Spinner," 
which ends at the same moment its drowsy spinner nods into 
sleep, Beckett's pieces tranquilly blend into the spreading calm: 
Leave it so then this stillest night till now of all quite still head in 
hand as shown listening trying listening for a sound or dreamt 
away try dreamt away where no such thing no more than ghosts 
make nothing to listen for no such thing as a sound. ("Sounds," p. 
156) 
There are no more sounds or images to disturb the peace, and 
an impotent speaker has been reconciled to an ambiguous uni­
verse. 
Reconciliation leads not to an exhausted silence but to images 
of serenity. Urgency, not artistry, disappears. Beckett no longer 
seeks the linguistically impossible: his art does not have to be 
the chaos. It is enough if he can return to conventions without 
reasserting their assumptions. A sense of sufficiency predomi­
nates, enabling Beckett to create from the solace of traditional 
linguistic forms new shapes to accommodate the uncertain and 
fluid human condition. To alter a phrase from "All Strange 
Away," syntax need no longer be upended in opposite corners. 
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Film and Formal Integrity

Far from working directly on celluloid, as some experimental 
filmmakers do, Samuel Beckett labored over his filmscript for 
Film, and many of his most interesting and revealing struggles 
with material and medium took place before the script was 
completed. Beckett's revisions for its composition reveal not 
only characteristic aesthetic preoccupations but also the par­
ticular difficulties Beckett had with film. In the composition of 
Film, we see a word man groping with an unfamiliar medium. 
A full biography of the composition of Film is not now possi­
ble because textual evidence is not as complete as for other 
works. Beckett's primary creative effort is recorded in a gold, 
soft-covered, seventy-leaf notebook (22 cm x 17 cm exterior 
measurement), now on deposit at the University of Reading's 
Beckett Archive, which contains two full holograph versions of 
Filmy The first, called both "Notes for Film" and "Tercipi' 
Notes," dated Ussy, 5 April 1963 (that is, 5.4.63), consists of 
sixteen pages (Beckett's pagination) and was completed at Ussy 
on 9 April 1963. The subtitle Beckett began with is an accurate 
description of the work: "For Eye and Him [revised to "One"] 
who do not wish [revised to "would not"] be seen" (p. 2). The 
version on the title page suggests that he has a very clear idea of 
the nature of this work from the beginning: "For one striving to 
see one striving not to be seen." This earliest version is fol­
lowed on pages 17-19 by a series of holograph notes and by a 
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second version, called "Outline Sent to Grove," undated at the 
start, which continues on pages 20-36, and was completed in 
Ussy on 22 May 1963. The second draft is also followed by 
"notes," pages 36-47. (The remaining twenty-three leaves are 
blank except for the last, where, in June of 1963, Beckett began 
his translation of Texts for Nothing.) The earliest typescript, 
dated May 1963 and on deposit at Washington University, St. 
Louis, is six leaves long.2 The notes in this version are again 
separate, in holograph, written on six graph-paper leaves, foli­
ated 7-12. Finally, the Reading Beckett Archive owns a forty-
leaf "Shooting Script," with 20 July 1964 noted as the shooting 
date. Moreover, the primary textual material is augmented by a 
transcript of a production conference, and a series of fourteen 
comments (thirteen numbered, one not) that Beckett made after 
seeing a rough cut of his film. 
The earliest notes available suggest that Beckett apparently 
began the composition of his film uncharacteristically, with a 
clearly established theme that remained unaltered throughout 
(though simplified, of necessity, in shooting), the Berkeleyan 
philosophical principle "esse est percipi" (that is, being is being 
perceived): "Eye: Those who look at Eye [on] street stairs turn 
horrified away." Beckett calls this early draft "'percipi' notes" 
(p. 2) and refers, further, to "H [Him] perceiving perceived by 
E" (p. 1). Beckett's major creative problems here were to de­
velop and to shape visual images not in order to embrace 
Berkeley's idealism but rather to explore the essential human 
consequences that follow from the philosophical proposition; 
or, in Beckett's words, "No truth value attaches to above, re­
garded as of merely structural and dramatic convenience."3 
This comment stands as a fundamental component in Beckett­
ian aesthetics. Beckett's art is often more concerned with formal 
relationships than with something we might call theme. In his 
production conference, Beckett explained the formal impor­
tance of the opening (lost in shooting): "I want to fortify the 
analogy between the inspection of the street and the inspection 
of the room in the complete series by having the elements in­
volved inspected in the same order. If it's 1-3-5-2-7-6 . .  . we 
give numbers to the elements in the room—exactly in the same 
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order—by E in the street and by O in the room. . . . It's a kind 
of integrity, formal integrity."4 
Despite the film's abstract theme and Beckett's concern with 
formal balance, his early creative concerns are with realistic 
detail, with fixing his work in a precise time and place, with 
setting O in a particular place, in a particular year, at a particu­
lar time of day. In the early pages of his notebook, Beckett 
explores a series of possibilities. The time is changed from 1914 
to 1929. The time of day is at first "midday or early afternoon," 
then, temporarily, "evening." But this is rejected: "Not even­
ing, to remove possibility of his putting off light in room. Mid­
day. Street animated by midday break. Or early morning and 
people on the way to work. Not Winter in this case." Even O's 
age is specifically set at "50"; yet he is also said to have been 
"25 in 1914." Beckett's mathematics may be a bit off; if O was 
born in 1889, he should be 40 in 1929, but arithmetic is less in 
question here than the fact that in Beckett's early stages of 
composition, matters of time and place are important to him. 
As the work develops, however, these realistic underpinnings 
are mostly eliminated as Beckett moved characteristically 
toward higher levels of abstraction. And in his production con­
ference, Beckett consistently stressed the near abstract nature of 
the whole film: "it's on an absolute street . . . absolute exterior, 
absolute . . . transition . . . abstract almost." "The principle of 
the room," Beckett continues, "is to seek the minimum . .  . a 
formal minimum. Even the table that carries the . . . bowl . . . 
just a support . .  . a kind of abstract support." 
In addition to the setting's being more concrete in the early 
versions of Film, Beckett is very concerned with logical motiva­
tion for O's behavior, and in fact the plot is generally more 
realistic than the final one. Such realistic preoccupation, evi­
dent in this early notebook for Film, seems almost the fulfill­
ment of Beckett's 1936 comment to V. I. Pudovkin that he wanted 
to "revive the naturalistic, two-dimensional silent film" (italics 
mine).5 In the final film, however, O's reasons for avoiding 
perception, his desire to negate being, his reasons for going to 
the room—that is, much of what might pass for plot in the 
film—are absent. Yet in the holograph versions, motivation is 
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clear, and in composition this information is transferred to the 
"Notes." Only there do we learn that O has gone to his 
mother's room, to which he has not been for some time, to care 
for her pets while she is in the hospital. Such information is 
potentially very revealing, even autobiographical, yet Beckett 
denigrates it: "This has no bearing on the film and need not be 
elucidated" (p. 59). Yet in his production conference, Beckett 
returns to these realistic underpinnings by way of "explaining" 
the film. "One might suppose," he tells the crew, "that his 
mother has gone to hospital." With this information, of course, 
the film makes more logical sense, is considerably more con­
ventional, and is even potentially autobiographical. It provides 
a psychological reason for O's escaping being, responding to 
fears and uncertainties surrounding his mother's illness or im­
pending death (she, after all, must be quite old). As such the 
film is another study of the possible responses to loss and pre­
cedes by only three months Beckett's discarded monologue of 
an orphaned girl in "Kilcool."6 In fact, with the knowledge that 
the room is his mother's, we can see another variation on the 
theme of a mother's death that we find in Krapp's Last Tape and 
Footfalls. Beckett finally cut most suggestions of the film's realis­
tic, psychological, logical level. In the notebook version, for 
instance, O carries "a suitcase," which might suggest a lengthy 
stay, not the final "briefcase." As late as the typescript, Beckett 
had O compare the apartment number against a slip of paper 
from his pocket, and further, he entertained the possibility that 
the picture on the wall would be one of O.v Almost nothing in 
the final film hints at this realistic level. Why O is in this room 
would remain an enigma without Beckett's published notes. 
But in the production conference, Beckett frequently refers to 
the realistic subtext of his film. One reason he posits for O's 
bumping into the couple is that he is "wondering has he got the 
right house . . . looking up the street." 
Although Beckett was firm about the absence of dialogue 
from the start, the film was originally intended to contain more 
sound than the final, single "ssh." The opening scene was to 
include at least realistic sound: "No cars. One cab drawn by 
cantering nag, (hooves) driver standing brandishing whip. 
Bicycles" (p. 3)7 After O's incident with the couple, we were to 
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hear, "Sound of his panting" (p. 6). The opening scene was lost 
in filming to the strobe effect, but the panting was cut by design, 
and with the cuts more of the realistic level of the film was 
eliminated. Beckett was clearly interested in emphasizing the 
unreal, stylized, comic qualities of the film. He wanted to stress 
the "unreal quality" of the room. Of O's walk Beckett says, "He 
storms along in comic foundered precipitancy" (Film, p. 12). 
And in a notebook entry, Beckett reminds himself, "O as comic 
physically as possible. Short fat in preference to tall thin (be­
cause of chair)" (p. 17). Of the film generally, Beckett notes, 
"Climate of film comic and unreal" (Film, p. 12). The emphasis 
on the comic and unreal is designed to counter the realistic 
nature of the medium and the potentially melodramatic plot. 
He even entertained the possibility that the dog and cat routine 
should be an animated cartoon but rejected that idea quickly on 
formal grounds, "then others necessary, two more at least." In 
a set of written comments (also on deposit at the Beckett 
Archive of the University of Reading) that Beckett made after 
seeing an early version of the film, he expressed disappoint­
ment about the dog and cat scene: "Because I don't feel the 
animal gag at all funny, I find it too long. Mais libre a vous." This 
statement is the clearest we have that Beckett seems to have 
been unsuccessful, to have lost some control over the project. 
The most revealing portions of the notebook versions 
demonstrate Beckett's struggling with his medium, trying to 
subjugate it to theme. Most of his problems were technical. E's 
point of view, Beckett notes, should not be compromised, so 
that E and O never share the same field of vision, and the 
perceptions of E and O are mutually exclusive. As Beckett notes 
to himself, H (that is, O) "perceives only when he feels himself 
not seen, i.e., when E directly or nearly directly behind 
him. . . . When he feels himself seen, or beginning to be seen, 
he closes his eyes" (p. 1). This technical limitation understand­
ably upset Buster Keaton because his face then would almost 
never be on film. O could never turn 90° and perceive an object, 
since in that relationship with E, O would close his eyes and 
cease perception. This sort of convention, of course, imposes an 
extraordinary limitation on movement in the film. It is theme 
limiting the possibilities of medium. 
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A second problem that Beckett had to contend with resulted 
from his major cinematic innovation; he had to distinguish in 
quality the perception of E and O. O's perception had originally 
been restricted to the room, but in filming, Beckett (or someone 
on the crew) decided to prepare for the images of different 
quality that were to appear in the room sequence. This question 
of different perceptions, Beckett notes, "poses a problem of 
images which I cannot solve without technical help" (Film, p. 
12). He rejects, however, any attempt to express the images 
simultaneously, as by "composite images, double frame, super­
imposition, etc." (Film, p. 58). Once again technique remains in 
the service of theme as Beckett rejects any physical image sug­
gesting unity and any technical sophistication of the medium. 
The solution is clumsy, as O's perception is a bit fuzzy, shot 
through a gauze filter, a solution originally entertained in his 
notebook (p. 9). 
The most interesting thematic use of medium that Beckett 
contemplated was ultimately rejected, probably because it 
would have altered the climactic tone. In the final image, the 
investment, Beckett wanted to suggest that E and O are mirror 
images of each other. E then would be "alter O" (p. 9). The 
penultimate image would be O, patch over right eye, frowning, 
followed by E, patch over left eye, smiling. Photographically, 
we would have had a print and its negative, the smile even a 
reversal of the frown. But the final image would have been 
Keaton's smiling face, and the bit of playfulness with the 
medium would have disrupted the final tonal balance. Beckett 
cut the sequence with the final comment, "impossible." 
That bit of mirror-image playfulness would also have de­
tracted from the ending ironies. For one, we see that we may be 
most conscious of self-perception, or rather it may, like Proust­
ian memory, come crashing into our consciousness, when our 
defenses are weakest, as in dreams, but it is always with us. 
The lack of self-perception is merely an illusion, for we see O 
even when he believes he is not being perceived; we and the 
camera perceive him even when he is "safely" within what 
Beckett calls the "angle of immunity." And here again we have 
Beckett exploiting his medium, using the camera as a relentless, 
omnipresent perceiver. Much of the artistic struggle with Film 
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was technical from the first. As late as the production confer­
ence, Beckett suggested that his principal problem was to find 
technical equivalents to the two visions: "we're trying to find a 
technical equivalent . .  . a visual, technical, cinematic equiva­
lent for visual appetite and visual distaste . .  . a reluctant . .  . a 
disgusted vision [O's] and a ferociously . . . voracious one 
[E's]." 
Despite Beckett's technical achievements with Film, the work 
never coalesces. Beckett seems, at almost every stage of the 
creative process, to have been engaged in a battle with his 
medium. The immediate rapport between artist and machine 
evident in the composition of Krapp's Last Tape, for example, is 
missing in Film. Despite his attempts, the final product appears 
to have been something different from what Beckett wanted, 
more realistic, less comic. He tried to maintain an atmosphere 
of unreality, to move the work toward higher levels of abstrac­
tion, to dramatize a fundamentally internal conflict, to balance 
or counteract the pathetic level of the film with comedy, but the 
final atmosphere of the film remains realistic, the conflict more 
external than internal, and much of its comedy falls flat. Admit­
tedly, some of Beckett's original vision was lost in translating 
script to film, including some of the formal symmetry that has 
been such an aesthetic preoccupation in the later work. But the 
replacement of the early street sequences with the opening eye 
seems to have been fortuitous. It moved the film further along 
toward the desired unreality and abstraction and was themati­
cally consistent with the emphasis on perception. Further, the 
opening eye provided the initial disruption of audience expec­
tation that Beckett is so fond of, especially in plays like Not I and 
That Time, which feature body parts as the primary stage image, 
and as such the eyeball anticipates those later plays. But the 
image may finally lack subtlety and integration. It may disrupt 
initially, but assaults only temporarily. Our sense of security is 
quickly restored once we view the street scenes. And the eye­
ball simply does not dominate the work as do the mouth of Not 
I or the floating head of That Time. In the manuscripts of Film, 
we can see clearly what Beckett would like to do, in what direc­
tion he was trying to shape the play; but in the final work, we 
can also see much of that intention unrealized. Perhaps the 
136 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
work began with too rigid a design. Unlike Film most of 
Beckett's works take their shape through the act of composi­
tion. Film seems to be one of Beckett's least existential works, 
since essence exists well before being. What we are left with in 
Film is a string of unsolved problems. Beckett does not solve 
these problems for another two years, some nine months after 
the actual shooting of Film, when he turns to television drama, 
restricts himself to the room, uses the camera as a slowly ad­
vancing, penetrating force, and can dramatize the interior 
struggle, the voices in the skull as effectively as he does in Eh 
Joe. But Beckett does not fully achieve the sort of "formal mini­
mum" he mentioned at the production conference until Ghost 
Trio and . . . but the clouds. . . . 
1. University of Reading MS. 1227/7/6/1. See also The Samuel Beckett Collec­
tion: A Catalogue (Reading, England: The Library, University of Reading, 1978), 
p. 43. 
2. See Richard L. Admussen, The Samuel Beckett Manuscripts: A Study 
(Boston: G. K. Hall, 1979), p. 48. Admussen notes, "one or more drafts are 
missing between A and B," that is, between the notebook at Reading and the 
typescript at Washington. 
3. Film (New York: Grove Press, 1969), p. 11. 
4. A tape of this production conference, which included Alan Schneider 
(director), Boris Kaufman (cinematographer), Barney Rossett (producer), and 
Samuel Beckett, is on deposit at Syracuse University. This is probably the 
poolside conference Schneider refers to in "On Directing Film." Quotations 
used with the permission of Samuel Beckett. My thanks to Martha Fehsenfeld 
for her transcript. 
5. Deirdre Bair, Samuel Beckett: A Biography (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1978), pp. 204-5. 
6. See my essay, "Beckett's Voice Crying in the Wilderness, from 'Kilcool' 
to Not I," Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 74 (1980): 27-47. 
7. Film was reshot in 1979 by David R. Clark for the British Film Institute. 
Max Wall played O. This version, while interesting in its own right, runs 
counter to the direction Beckett was trying to move his work in the manuscripts 
and in the filming. Clark shot his Film in color, added music (Schubert's "Der 
Doppelganger"), reintroduced sounds Beckett specifically cut from his script, 
and added vaudeville routines (O gets his foot stuck in a bundle of rope early in 
the film and, in the room, keeps kicking his briefcase away as he bends to 
retrieve it). Clark's version of Film is not necessarily worse or better than 
Schneider's, but it is considerably different from the film Beckett was trying to 
make. See "Film Refilmed," The Beckett Circle 1 (Fall 1978). 
Hersh Zeifman

Come and Go: A Criticule

As the curtain rises on Samuel Beckett's 1965 play Come and 
Go, the soft light from above dimly illuminates three motionless 
figures. Flo, Vi, and Ru—friends since childhood—are sitting 
side by side on a narrow bench-like seat; apart from the fact that 
each is wearing a differently colored full-length coat, the three 
figures are as alike as possible. Each woman in turn briefly 
exits, swallowed up by the surrounding darkness, allowing the 
two remaining to whisper some unheard, but obviously horri­
fying , secret about the one who has departed. When the three 
are once again reunited after their momentary exits, they clasp 
hands in a kind of chain, and Flo intones the play's closing 
words: "I can feel the rings." Since they have just been remi­
niscing about love and "what came after," Flo's comment 
would appear to refer to their wedding rings. Normally one 
would have expected this final comment to have come from 
Vi—partly because, given Beckett's concern with repetition and 
formal patterning, she was the first to speak, and partly be­
cause, as at the beginning, she is sitting in the center, theatri­
cally the most focused position. The fact that it comes from 
Flo, then, strengthens the wedding ring hypothesis; of the 
three, she is the only one holding two left hands, and thus the 
only one who could possibly be in direct contact with all three 
wedding rings. Yet Beckett clearly states in his notes to the 
play: "Hands made up to be as visible as possible. No rings 
apparent."1 
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Come and Go is so brief a play (even by Beckett's recent mini­
malist standards) that, in the time it takes an audience to 
wonder, like the bewildered Mr. Shower or Cooker of Happy 
Days, "What does it mean? . . . What's it meant to mean?"2 the 
curtain has already fallen. And yet, despite its brevity, the cen­
tral images of Come and Go continue to haunt us long after the 
play is over. Who are the three women? What is it that they 
whisper? What are the nonexistent rings Flo refers to? And why 
are we so deeply affected by this enigmatic, strangely moving 
"dramaticule" that takes only a few minutes to perform? 
Part of the answer to this last question—and thus indirectly 
to the previous ones—lies in the fact that, for all its deceptive 
verbal spareness, Come and Go is dense with literary echoes and 
mythic resonances. A subtle thread of allusions winds its way 
through the play—specifically, allusions to Shakespeare. 
Beckett has always been a great admirer of Shakespeare. 
Deirdre Bair informs us that, as a child, Beckett kept a small 
bust of Shakespeare on a bookshelf in his room,-3 as an adult, he 
honored Shakespeare's memory in a more meaningful way, 
incorporating numerous Shakespearean quotations into his 
writing. From his first published play Waiting for Godot, in 
which Lucky refers to "the divine Miranda" (p. 28B) of The 
Tempest,'1 to one of his most recent, A Piece of Monologue, in 
which the speaker evokes The Merchant of Venice through his 
description of the rain "dropping gentle on the place be­
neath,"5 Beckett's drama has consistently made use of Shake­
spearean allusions. Come and Go is no exception. The play is a 
series of "threes": three women; three brief movements; a 
three-word title; a roughly three-minute performance time,-6 
and, appropriately enough, three Shakespearean echoes to tie 
the play's images together and to help answer some of our 
puzzling questions. 
The first of these echoes, as almost every critic of Come and Go 
has noted, is the first full line of dialogue in the play—Vi's 
"When did we three last meet?"—in which we hear, too insist­
ently for mere coincidence, the opening line of Macbeth: "When 
shall we three meet again?" (1.1.1). The three women of Come 
and Go are thus immediately associated with Macbeth's three 
witches—"the weird sisters": 
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The Weird Sisters, hand in hand, 
Posters of the sea and land, 
Thus do go about, about; 
Thrice to thine, and thrice to mine, 
And thrice again, to make up nine. 
(1.3.32-36) 
"Weird" is derived from the Old English wyrd, meaning "fate"; 
Holinshed's Chronicles, Shakespeare's source for Macbeth, 
makes the etymological link explicit by referring to the witches 
as "the goddesses of destiny."7 Like their Shakespearean 
counterparts, then, Beckett's threesome—hand in hand, each 
going about, about—evokes an image of fate—or, rather, the 
Fates, another trio of sisters, spinning out the web of their life 
and pondering their destiny. 
The first Shakespearean echo thus suggests the theme of the 
play: Come and Go is, on one level at least, about human des­
tiny. And because we are so firmly rooted, from the very out­
set, in a Shakespearean ambience, we are more prepared to 
catch the play's subtle second echo: the significance of the char­
acters' names. In an earlier manuscript version of Come and 
Go—or, more precisely, in a tentative first sketch of a dramatic 
situation that would later evolve into Come and Go—Beckett 
referred to his three women simply as A, B, and C. The dialogue 
begins with a conversation between A and B, during the course 
of which they mention C's sister. Beckett apparently could not 
come up with the right name for the sister, and, instead of 
merely burrowing further into the alphabet, he gave her the 
title "Mrs" followed by a dash. In a later draft of the scene, a 
version he entitled "Good Heavens," the women were still 
being identified by letter, but Beckett had now chosen a specific 
name for the sister—Mrs. Flower. In yet a later draft—this one 
much fuller, and mercifully in typescript—the reference to the 
sister is dropped, but Beckett kept the "flower" concept of her 
name and transferred it to his three women, whom he calls 
Viola (a flower similar to a violet or pansy), Poppy, and Rose.8 
When Beckett finally came to write what we now know as 
Come and Go, he retained relatively little of his previous rough 
sketches. But he did retain, I suggest, the "flower" names for 
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his characters—names that sum up their fate: "As for man, his 
days are as grass: as a flower of the field, so he flourisheth. For 
the wind passeth over it, and it is gone; and the place thereof 
shall know it no more" (Psalms 103:15-16). Beckett has evoked 
this psalm frequently in his writings, but in Come and Go he 
strengthens and particularizes the image—first, by personify­
ing the flower in actual characters; and second, by selecting not 
just any flower names but very deliberate ones. In Hamlet the 
mad Ophelia, mourning the death of Polonius, offers flowers to 
the characters assembled on stage, alluding specifically to rue 
and uzolets, both of which are implicitly linked with death: 
There's rue for you; and here's some for me. We may call it herb of 
grace a Sundays. . . . There's a daisy. I would give you some 
violets, but they wither'd all when my father died. (4.5.177-82) 
Flo(wer), Ru(e), and Vi(olet)—Beckett's three women bear 
the cryptic traces of Ophelia's death-flowers; the secret they 
share is embodied in their very names. Thus the words they 
dare not speak aloud compose a threnody, whispered intima­
tions of mortality: each of them is suffering from the same 
terminal disease, the inevitability of death. In "Good Heav­
ens," Beckett had made the point explicit: 
A Mrs Flower told me C was condemned. 
She whispers in B's ear. 
B (appalled) Good heavens! 
A The worst kind. (Pause.) Three months. 
(Pause.) At the outside. 
B Does she know? 
A Not a suspicion. She thinks it is heartburn.9 
In Come and Go, however, Beckett wisely opted for a more 
oblique approach. The horror of the characters' whispered 
secret does not need to be spelled out; it is more palpably, 
powerfully evoked in being left unspoken. 
By naming his women Flo, Ru, and Vi, Beckett thus associ­
ates them, through an allusion to Hamlet, with both natural 
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phenomena (flowers) and death. A similar association under­
lies Flo's image of "rings," except that the natural phenomena 
are now different ones. For the characters in Come and Go, time 
is running out. Only yesterday, it seems, they were young 
girls, sitting together "in the playground at Miss Wade's. On 
the log." Now they have become like the log itself, the age of 
which is determined by the number of rings etched in its wood. 
"I can feel the rings," comments Flo, her veined hands clasping 
the others'. On one level, this is a brooding reference to their 
lost youth, to the rings of the log she recalls in her mind. On 
another, it is an image of the pain and hellishness of their life, 
for the rings suggest both the movement of Macbeth's weird 
sisters circling their "hell-broth" ("Round about the cauldron 
go" [4.1.4]), and the circles of hell in Dante's Inferno. And on 
still another level, the most profound level, it is a haunting, 
implicit acknowledgement of the characters' inescapable com­
mon destiny: the "rings" of inevitable aging culminating in 
their death. (Compare Beckett's description of the Eisner sisters 
in Molloy: "Two old hands, veined, ringed, seek each other, 
clasp" [p. 163].) 
And what do we do while awaiting this destiny? As the 
play's title suggests, we come and go—shuffling aimlessly back 
and forth, marking time with the sound of our footfalls, moving 
somewhere but getting nowhere. It is an image Beckett has 
used repeatedly in his work. Malone, for example, comments: 
"Yes, I leave my happiness and go back to the race of men too, 
they come and go, often with burdens" (p. 23). Similarly, 
Camier remarks "I sense vague shadowy shapes, . . . they 
come and go with muffled cries."10 In Endgame we find the 
following exchange: 
Hamm: How are your legs? 
Clov: Bad. 
Hamm: But you can walk? 
Clov: I come . . . and go. (Pp. 35-36) 
And Watt, attempting to emphasize the distinct "other­
worldliness" of his employer, Mr. Knott, describes him signifi­
cantly as "one who neither comes nor goes . . .  " (p. 57). 
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In the play Come and Go, however, Beckett uses the image 
somewhat differently. It is now not simply something to do 
while awaiting our destiny but rather an evocation of that 
destiny itself, an evocation of death. Our third Shakespearean 
echo is from King Lear. "Men must endure / Their going hence, 
even as their coming hither" (5.2.9-10; my emphasis). When 
each of the women in turn leaves the light and disappears into 
the darkness, we see acted out in that symbolic movement what 
is simultaneously being whispered about her. The verbal death 
verdict is thus translated into visual terms—a "going hence." 
Come and go—birth and death. For Beckett it is this entire 
birth-death cycle that is ultimately shown to be meaningless. 
When the three women clasp hands at the end, the unbroken 
chain they form becomes an ironic emblem of eternity.11 The 
monstrous treadmill never ceases: eternity is one endlessly re­
peated cycle, a coming into life followed by a going into noth­
ingness. 
Between the coming and the going, amid the coming and the 
going, there is nevertheless always time for pain and suffering. 
No wonder, then, that the three women of Come and Go are 
basically interchangeable. Each may have a slightly different 
"color"—the shade of her coat,12 the shade of her flower-
name—but, as in physics, the apparent color-spectrum is in 
reality merely a single color, variously refracted. Their indi­
viduality has narrowly constricted bounds: each is free to speak 
her "appalled" "Oh!" in a slightly different tone and inflection;13 
each is free to suffer and die in her own way. (Ophelia: "O, you 
must wear your rue with a difference" [4.5.179-80].) Like all 
Beckett's characters, they are victims of a heartless metaphysi­
cal ruse difficult to endure, an infinitely cruel divine hoax— 
specters from an abandoned work. 
The final English-language text of Come and Go contains 127 
words, most of them monosyllables, many of them repetitions; 
interestingly enough, the word most frequently repeated is 
"not." In an attempt to dramatize nothingness, Beckett has 
pared the play of all superfluities, has shed layer after excess 
layer until what remains is only the barest minimum of dra­
matic form. As Hugh Kenner has commented, "Beckett has 
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very nearly made a play out of silence."14 Very nearly, but not 
quite. The words are few, but they have powerful reverbera­
tions. Kenner notes elsewhere that the title of the play evokes 
T. S. Eliot: "In the room the women come and go / Talking of 
Michelangelo."15 The allusion is doubtless there, but if I had to 
choose a line from Eliot's poetry that best relates to Come and 
Go, I think I might be tempted to choose instead "Those are 
pearls that were his eyes"—Eliot's allusion in The Waste Land to 
The Tempest.16 For in the play's reverberations, what I hear most 
hauntingly are the traces of three Shakespearean quotations. 
Come and Go is skeletal drama of a very remarkable kind: a 
five-act Shakespearean tragedy played in three minutes by 
three ghosts playing with three echoes—Beckett's art of allu­
sion at its most delicate and its most cunning. 
1. All references to Come and Go are to the "final," most complete text of 
the play, published in Modern Drama 19 (September 1976): 257-60. See Breon 
Mitchell's accompanying article, "Art in Microcosm: The Manuscript Stages of 
Beckett's Come and Go," pp. 245-54. 
2. Samuel Beckett, Happy Days (New York: Grove Press, 1961; rpt. 1970), 
p. 43. Unless otherwise stated, page references to Beckett's works are from 
the sixteen-volume Collected Works of Samuel Beckett (New York: Grove Press, 
1970), and will henceforth be cited in the body of my text. 
3. Deirdre Bair, Samuel Beckett: A Biography (New York and London: Har­
court Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 20. 
4. There are a number of allusions to Shakespeare in Godot. For an infor­
mative discussion of Beckett and Shakespeare, see Ruby Cohn, Modern 
Shakespeare Offshoots (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 
375-88. 
5. Samuel Beckett, A Piece of Monologue, Kenyon Review 1 (Summer 1979), 
p. 2; Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, 4.1.180-1. All references to Shake­
speare are from Peter Alexander's edition of Shakespeare: The Complete Works 
(London: Collins, 1951), and will henceforth be cited in the body of my text. 
6. Ruby Cohn has noted that, in Beckett's own production of his French 
translation of the play, Va et vient, at the Odeon, Paris, 1966, he "slowed the 
playing time from three to seven minutes, so that each gesture seemed 
wrested from stillness" (Ruby Cohn, Just Play: Beckett's Theater [Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980], p. 235). 
7. Richard Hosley, ed., Shakespeare's Holinshed (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1968), p. 17. 
8. I am grateful to the librarians at Reading University for allowing me to 
consult these manuscripts, which are in their Samuel Beckett Collection. 
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same thing: "Mise'ricorde!"; "Malheur!"; "Misere!" (Samuel Beckett, Va et 
vient, in Comedie et actes divers [Paris: Minuit, 1966], pp. 40-41). 
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The Lost Ones: A Myth of 
Human History and Destiny 
The Lost Ones,1 like other works by Samuel Beckett, reflects two 
separate but parallel realities, one objective and one subjective, 
but the latter is only another way of perceiving the former. In 
other words, while the narration of The Lost Ones is a descrip­
tion and a source of information, apparently objective, it is at 
the same time an interpretation and a commentary. Someone— 
whom we shall call the observer—finds himself in an unrealis­
tic, seemingly underground universe ruled by its own internal 
time so that we cannot determine how long he has been there. 
His observations enable him to establish a synthetic image of 
this strange world. After explaining to himself the life and laws 
of this universe, he reports them on the basis of his own infer­
ences. The text of The Lost Ones is the result, and it resembles a 
report or a treatise. It is at once an account and a speculation. 
Analyzing it, one has to distinguish information from interpre­
tation, fact from hypothesis, and to bring to the fore those 
questions that the observer avoids. 
The universe is described as a cylinder some sixteen meters in 
diameter (fifty meters circumference) and sixteen high, made of 
an unknown, rubber-like substance, which produces no sound 
when hit and which somehow emits light and heat. In the 
upper half of the wall, all the way round, there are twenty 
niches, disposed in four irregular quincunxes. Many of them 
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are connected by tunnels hollowed in the wall, but some are 
blind. The niches and tunnels are something of a mystery. We 
never know whether they were made by the inhabitants of the 
cylinder or are natural features. Their irregular patterns as well 
as the fact that some are blind make the observer believe that 
they were probably drilled or dug by the cylinder dwellers: 
some "completed" by meeting other tunnels, one simply aban­
doned, "as though at a certain stage discouragement had pre­
vailed" (p. 12). The observer, however, never speculates about 
the discouragement. In fact, he avoids a series of significant 
questions. He does tell us that the wall is so hard that even 
scratching a mark into it seems impossible and that the only 
tools available to the cylinder's inhabitants are their hands and 
the rungs of the ladders. But he doesn't speculate about how 
the niches might have been dug or what happened to the exca­
vated substance? These are the sorts of questions the observer 
should be asking himself. He does, for example, explain a simi­
lar phenomenon, the missing rungs, which "are in the hands of 
a happy few. . ." (p. 10). But how could the bodies arrange the 
niches so harmoniously, since, we learn, they plant their lad­
ders randomly, without looking at the walls? Moreover, accord­
ing to the observer, no one in the cylinder can appreciate this 
harmony. The origin of the niches and tunnels finally remains a 
mystery. 
But there are aspects of the cylinder that we know with some 
certainty. It contains fifteen ladders that are part of the environ­
ment. The interior of the cylinder fluctuates with light and heat, 
which oscillate origin-less but regularly from wall, floor, ceil­
ing, and even tunnels. The light increases and decreases four 
times per second, and the temperature changes from five to 
twenty-five degrees and back in eight seconds. From time to 
time suddenly and unexpectedly, both vibrations cease. This 
period never lasts more than ten seconds, in which time all 
activity in the cylinder stands still. 
The cylinder is the abode of two hundred and five naked 
bodies of either sex and all ages. They differ in their motion and 
in the types of activities they perform and are divided into four 
groups: those who are in motion, those who pause sometimes, 
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those who lead a sedentary life, and those who remain perfectly 
still. We learn that the first group contains twice as many mem­
bers as the second, the second three times as many as the third, 
the third four times as many as the fourth, and the fourth group 
consists of 5 members. Thus one can easily calculate that 20 of 
the cylinder dwellers sit (4 x 5), 60 pause (3 x 20), and 120 are 
in motion (2 X 60). Four of the five still bodies ("the van­
quished," as the observer calls them) sit with their backs 
against the wall in the position that "wrung from Dante one of 
his rare wan smiles." It is the position of Belacqua (a version of 
whom we saw in Beckett's early short stories) in Dante's Purga­
tory. Seeing him, Dante smiled and described his posture as 
follows: "one of them, who seemed to me weary, was sitting 
and clasping his knees, holding his face low down between 
them." Beckett echoes the image with the description of "the 
first among the vanquished": "She squats against the wall with 
her head between her knees and her legs in her arms. The left 
hand clasps the right shinbone and the right the left fore­
arm. . . . The left foot is crossed on the right" (pp. 56-57). 
The bodies in motion either circle around the arena, wait their 
turn to climb the ladders, look for an appropriate queue or an 
appropriate place to plant the ladder, stand in line or on the 
ladder, climb it, sit in the niches, or crawl in the tunnels. All 
these activities, and the order of performing them, are subject 
to certain rules, which the observer attempts to reconstruct. 
However, he is only partly successful. The helpless questions 
he asks prove that certain things remain unexplained. 
All activities seem to have one purpose: finding a way out of 
the cylinder. But is there evidence that this is indeed the motive 
pushing the bodies to act? The various movements and actions 
may be merely a disorderly bustle. One has to admit finally that 
in the description of the life in the cylinder there is no proof that 
the action is purposive. Besides, a purely behavioristic descrip­
tion cannot in itself constitute a proof, since behaviorism does 
not explain intentions. All that we know about these motives 
comes from the observer. 
He says, "From time immemorial rumour has it or better still 
the notion is abroad that there exists a way out" (pp. 17-18). 
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Those words are followed by a characterization of two funda­
mental beliefs shared by the inhabitants of the cylinder con­
cerning the type and location of the exit: "One school swears by 
a secret passage branching from one of the tunnels and leading 
in the words of the poet to nature's sanctuaries. The other 
dreams of a trapdoor hidden in the hub of the ceiling, giving 
access to a flue at the end of which the sun and other stars 
would still be shining" (p. 18). But how does the observer know 
about all this? We assume he does know because he gives the 
information so categorically. Whenever he does not know or 
only suspects something, he never fails to make that clear. He 
states repeatedly that there are things he does not know—what 
is beyond the cylinder, for instance ("nothing but mystery")— 
and he does not find the ultimate explanation to many phe­
nomena. There are no grounds, therefore, to believe that in this 
case his abilities are out of the ordinary. His intelligence and 
cognitive possibilities seem to be average. So how can he know 
the content of their beliefs? Granting that he does not possess 
supernatural powers, the only source of information is speech 
or writing, but the bodies in the cylinder do not use language 
(this is why the phrase "rumour has it" has been replaced by 
"the notion is abroad"). 
In such circumstances the observer's knowledge comes from 
introspection. We shall discuss shortly how this knowledge is 
possible, what it means, and what results from it. It is worth 
noticing now, however, that it casts a new light on the ob­
server. It means that in a way he belongs to the cylindrical 
universe and that he is neither an outsider nor a stranger. 
Moreover, he seems to be connected or even tied to it. "The fact 
remains," he notes, " . .  . that of these two persuasions the 
former is declining in favor of the latter but in a manner so 
desultory and slow and of course with so little effect on the 
comportment of either sect that to perceive it one must be in the 
secret of the gods" (p. 19). And earlier, " . .  . Here all should 
die but with so gradual and . .  . so fluctuant a death as to es­
cape the notice even of a visitor" (p. 18). The observer is then 
not a visitor, but is in a privileged position, "in the secret of the 
gods." 
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The description of these beliefs, however, does not explain 
why the bodies look for the exit. It is not clear whether they 
want to leave their abode in order to find out what lies beyond 
its limits or simply to learn whether or not there is an exit. The 
members of the first group want only to satisfy their curiosity, 
since they believe that the mythical trapdoor in the ceiling 
would lead to a long chimney that itself would be impossible to 
climb. The others are closer to having the desire to leave the 
cylinder. However, considering the ambiguity of the expression 
"nature's sanctuaries" (p. 18), one does not know what they 
really expect on leaving their abode. It seems, however, that 
both beliefs indicate a longing for a world of nature as we 
understand it. For the first group, it is symbolized by the phrase 
"the sun and other stars" (p. 18), for the second by the abstract 
notion of "a sanctuary." 
Let us now return to the observer's hypothesis. He believes 
that the process he discerns is the principle of life in the cylin­
der. The fact that the bodies are divided according to motion 
and that the immobile ones formerly moved like the others 
leads him to conclude that the quest is not perpetual and in­
variable, but is diminishing and one day will cease completely. 
This deduction, "the notion" as he calls it, enables him to create 
a general theory of life in the cylinder. In the very beginning, all 
the inhabitants were in motion: "all roamed without respite" 
(p. 34); but finally, after a long period of constant bustle, the 
first body ("the woman vanquished") gave up. What was the 
reason? Was it due to the lack of force or rather to a lack of belief 
in the existence of the exit? We have no direct answer. How­
ever, the fact that the observer names the still bodies "the 
vanquished ones" and their attitude "abandonment" (p. 31) 
suggests that it was the second case, a failure of belief. He also 
stresses that the perfectly still cannot be considered as blind, 
that is, as people unable to continue to search. Significantly he 
attributes such a mistake to a "thinking being coldly intent on 
all these data and evidences" (p. 39), who seems to ignore the 
cylinder's fundamental secrets. These observations are further 
proof that the observer is not a mysterious stranger but a 
native. 
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After "the woman vanquished" (p. 56) came others, and the 
slow process—in which the bodies, one by one, grew motion­
less—was begun. The process suggests deterioration; the body 
begins to stop; then it assumes the sedentary position, and 
finally stops moving altogether. Sometimes the transition is 
more violent. In most cases, however, the change from one 
stage to another is neither abrupt nor irreversible. The body 
that assumed a sedentary position can continue its search just 
as before, until finally, having exhausted this need, it becomes 
immobile. Before it becomes perfectly still, however, it resumes 
the sedentary position and tries to search with its eyes. In order 
to describe the pace of this evolution, the observer uses the 
following simile: "Even so a great heap of sand sheltered from 
the wind lessened by three grains every second year and every 
following year increased by two . . ." (p. 32). But no one comes 
back to the state of perpetual motion. Those who paused will 
never circle incessantly again. This is perhaps the grain by 
which the metaphorical heap diminishes every second year. 
The gradual abandonment of the quest leads inevitably to 
complete cessation. Considering that each body requires a dif­
ferent amount of time to go through the whole cycle, the body 
that will remain will be the one that requires most. The observer 
suspects that after waking from lethargy the most persistent 
body will begin its last search. By this time, the others will have 
renounced it long ago. After performing some movements (it is 
difficult to predict which), it will finally approach "the woman 
vanquished" and look into her eyes, where it will see nothing 
but "calm wastes." Then it will leave her and squat somewhere, 
becoming immobile forever. At the same time, the light will 
fade and the temperature will drop to zero. The supposition is 
astonishing, since it assumes that the light and heat depend 
somehow on the bodies and their quest. But according to the 
laws of the cylinder, the relationship should be reversed; mo­
tion should depend on energy fluctuation. But the future is 
finally beyond the observer, except for a creative (fictional) 
possibility: "Then light and climate will be changed in a way 
impossible to foretell. But the former may be imagined extin­
guished as purposeless and the latter fixed not far from freezing 
Antoni Libera 151 
point" (p. 15). It is also worth noticing the observer's attitude to 
the notion of the exit. His description of life in the cylinder and 
his vision of the end make us believe that there are two possi­
bilities: he is convinced either that there is no exit or that there is 
no possibility of finding it, at least in the time allowed to the 
most persistent body. However, we never learn the observer's 
direct opinion on this question. Whether an exit exists or not, 
and, if it does, where it is located, are questions never settled. 
He says only that the abode is "vast enough for flight to be in 
vain." The force of this statement is pragmatic. It neither ex­
plains the reason for this futility nor provides information. It 
only shows the observer's ignorance on this matter. We can 
assume that if he did have something in mind, he would put it 
forward. Once more we are led to believe that he belongs to the 
world of the cylinder. 
Now that we have characterized the life in the cylinder and 
learned how it is seen and understood by the observer, we may 
try to determine the meaning of this world. What do the cylin­
der and its inhabitants represent? Who is the observer? And 
finally, how are we to understand the interpretation that he 
calls "the notion"? We have already suggested that the ob­
server belongs to the world of the cylinder and, at the same 
time, uses human language and is familiar with Western cul­
ture (he knows Dante, for example). He symbolizes, therefore, 
a form of humanity in its weird abode, and the cylinder may be 
interpreted as the human world, or more precisely, its al­
legorical image. The two hundred naked bodies inhabiting the 
cylinder would be the humans living on earth, and their situa­
tion and behavior would represent the human condition and 
activity. Life in the cylinder is a model of human history. The 
anonymous observer, who is not one of the bodies, but knows 
at least as much about the cylinder as its inhabitants do and, 
moreover, can draw conclusions and speculate, is the personifi­
cation of the human mind, which, in spite of being tied down to 
the earth, can, nonetheless, grasp it and learn the truth about it. 
He is the spirit of humanity—its power of self-analysis, its self-
knowledge—which, though restricted by the boundaries within 
which man is confined, goes far beyond the individual con­
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sciousness. It is the sum of human experience and therefore a 
common property. This is why the result of its speculation, the 
observer's report (the text of The Lost Ones), is not written in the 
first person. His attempt, which we are shown, to gain both 
descriptive and interpretative knowledge constitutes not an 
individual observation but a myth, the myth of the history and 
destiny of humanity. His "notion" is a theory of history, and 
the final vision, an apocalyptic prophecy. 
But what then is the significance of the myth? How does it 
help us interpret man and his life on earth? The gradually ceas­
ing search for the exit, which is the essence of the bodies' lives, 
has a double meaning. It shows that the inhabitants of the 
cylinder long for a world different from the one they know. The 
need to leave their abode indicates that they are not "comforta­
ble" there (there is not enough space, and it is at the same time 
too hot and too cold). This feeling is not, however, eternal and 
after some time dies down. Hence adaptation to these condi­
tions is possible. The abandonment of the search means that the 
bodies have grown accustomed to the situation and no longer 
seek change. Adaptation, however, means closing one's eyes 
and ceasing to see, that is, not accepting the surrounding re­
ality. This total renunciation leads to a final disappearance of 
the whole environment. After the last body becomes motion­
less, everything will turn into darkness, which in a way will 
annihilate the cylindrical world. It seems that the cylinder is not 
a cage into which the bodies were crammed but a lighted space 
created by the bodies themselves. The cylinder is just a glow 
that assumes an illusory shape in the middle of the neutral and 
boundless darkness. The cylinder is not, therefore, a necessary 
condition of the existence of the bodies but rather their func­
tion, or, still better, merely their way of being. The fact that this 
way of life restricts and compels the inhabitants of the cylinder 
and provokes them to run away, or alter their situation, means 
that its foundation—that is, the essence of being—is corrupt, 
false, and unfulfilling. Since the source of the erroneousness is 
the mere fact of existence, the only way of eliminating it is 
complete annihilation. This will not be attained immediately, 
but slowly, due to the gradually growing, albeit at first absent, 
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awareness of the dependence. It is a process of purging, and 
this is the essence of the bodies' life. 
What will happen when this process reaches its end? Or 
rather, putting aside the destruction of a given form of being, 
what is this end? The answer is to be found in the position the 
bodies finally assume, the position of the vanquished ones. At 
this point, let us notice that this very position is assumed by the 
two bodies in the white rotunda in Imagination Dead Imagine; 
there it suggests the fetal stage of life. Hence one can view the 
liberation from one form of life as a return to the starting point 
or to an even earlier phase. The two bodies in the white ro­
tunda, however, and the two hundred bodies in the dark cylin­
der are something completely different. So the liberation is not 
quite a return to the original starting point, but rather the ap­
proach to the beginning of a new one. It is like a return to a 
point situated in the same place but on a different circle of a 
spiral. 
Beckett gives us no hint of the future. What is going to hap­
pen next? One can only guess. If we assume that in Beckett's 
late prose the human body symbolizes the potentiality inherent 
in the world of being something like man, and the eyes, by 
opening, the means by which that potentiality is realized, then 
the general vision of existence suggested by Beckett would be 
as follows: the world as substance wants to find a form for 
itself. It does this by lighting up its darkness with the light it can 
produce. However, the world as substance does not know what 
this form should be. In other words, it does not know how to 
go about illuminating itself, and by what light. This is why the 
comportment of the world resembles a persistent process of 
experimentation. 
Originally it assumed the form of a rotunda, as in Imagination 
Dead Imagine. But the form was not satisfactory. The memorable 
words, "there is better elsewhere," express this. "Elsewhere" 
means here "differently," a different way of self-illumination. 
So the world "opens" itself anew and becomes the reality of the 
cylinder. But this again proves unacceptable. From this per­
spective it longs for a "natural" reality, with the sun and other 
stars. But there is no possibility of passing from the cylinder to 
154 Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives 
that reality. There can only be a new "opening," a new self-
illumination. This is why, the moment the world assumed the 
form of the cylinder, the light began to fade, which in practice 
meant a gradual abandonment of the quest. When the light 
disappears completely, the world comes back to the starting 
point and everything may begin again. What will be the result 
of the new attempt? What reality will the eyes see when they 
open once more in another way? Perhaps they will see that 
much-desired reality with the sun and other stars. Thus instead 
of the cylinder there will be the boundless firmament and the 
bodies will find themselves on the earth as true human beings. 
Will this be a successful and final attempt? Is it a successful and 
final attempt? Is the world satisfied with this world? To judge 
from our experience as human beings, it is not. If it were, the 
work entitled The Lost Ones could never have been created. 
The dialectic of the world manifests itself not only in the 
ontological sphere but also on lower levels of cognition. The 
fluctuating substance of life that during millions of years ap­
peared in various shapes, only to be subsequently rejected, 
assumed finally the human shape. Each of those forms—a 
protozoon, an alga, a Neanderthal man—was concentrated 
only on itself. Everything it did was meant to prolong the life of 
the species, to ensure its survival. In fact, however, this always 
resulted in the abandonment of that form and its attributes, and 
the passage to a different stage. Such was also the case with our 
predecessor, the Neanderthal man. He, gathering all the force 
he could muster, fought to withstand nature, to struggle for 
existence, to propagate his own kind, such as it was—hairy, a 
little stooped, and seemed with the very breath of his being 
intent on preserving his species, his Neanderthal world. And 
yet so intent, he destroys it with every step, with every act of 
propagation; so intent, he removes himself from it, razes it, 
thrusts it into oblivion. Instead of preserving his essence, he 
dissipates, annihilates it; instead of remaining himself, he be­
comes man. 
Man's behavior is similar. He gradually exhausts all the pos­
sibilities of his existence. He becomes, for instance, the man of 
antiquity: he creates religions and laws that he retains for some 
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time and then rejects in order to become a Christian. He is 
successively the man of the Middle Ages, the man of the 
Renaissance, the man of the Enlightenment. Each of these 
stages or forms of humanity is different, each has a different 
foundation, each represents a different kind of quest; each 
gives a different cognitive perspective and reveals a different 
vision of the world. For some this is a progression. For Beckett 
it is a regression. It is the elimination of various paths leading 
back to some starting point. The history of the world is in fact 
the history of "depopulation." It is the history of man's freeing 
himself from himself. Such a conviction is expressed in the very 
first sentence of The Lost Ones: "Abode where lost bodies roam 
each searching for its lost one" (p. 7)—in the French version, 
"son depeupleur." The entire text seems to support this thesis. 
The mysterious word depeupleur, which appears only in the 
sentence quoted above, may finally refer to the way of getting 
out of oneself, a search for a radical way of enabling one to stop 
being oneself. The bodies search for an exit, but in fact each 
searches for its lost one. They want to leave their abode, but in 
fact they relinquish the search, which is the essence of their life. 
People build and expand man's kingdom on earth, but in fact 
they are leading to the exhaustion of their possibilities and at­
tributes. They want to be more human and leave behind the 
world of animals, but in fact they begin to turn into a species 
that has nothing in common with man. 
Does this myth utter a truth? There can be no final answer to 
this question. However, as opposed to other myths created by 
man, it does not pretend to be ultimate and unshaken, nor does 
it require blind faith. On the contrary, it seems to stress its own 
relativity. The constant refrain-like repetition, "if this notion is 
maintained," suggests the observer's skepticism toward his 
own ideas, which is quite understandable; for if he maintains 
the inconstancy and relativity of everything, he cannot exclude 
himself from this rule, and must question his own "notions." 
Finally, it is also worth considering that the vision of man's 
history presented in The Lost Ones has much in common with 
the conceptions of Giambattista Vico. It might even be said that 
The Lost Ones is a poetic representation of his famous argument 
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that all human actions lead to goals different from the original 
motivating force of those actions, namely, to the realization of 
the goals of divine Providence. And in this case, divine Provi­
dence is the will to change from one form of existence to an­
other. 
1. Samuel Beckett, The Lost Ones (New York: Grove Press, 1972). All refer­
ences are to this edition. 
Enoch Brater

The Company Beckett Keeps: The Shape of 
Memory and One Fablist's Decay of Lying 
Every work by Samuel Beckett is likely to strike its reader as the 
discovery of some rich archaeological find. The Beckett special­
ist, moreover, Joyce's ideal reader suffering an ideal insomnia, 
can hardly wait to get his hands on each piece in order to track 
down that "stiff interexclusiveness" of those tempting relation­
ships to earlier materials. And so it is with Company: here 
Beckett again locates his work within the familiar network he 
has made so authentically his own. As readers of these texts, 
we too have a stake in charting the limits of such an exclusive 
territory. Yet the investment of our energy is a bit more prob­
lematical: almost before we have had a chance to appreciate the 
work on its own terms, we begin to situate it in the canon 
through a process Beckett long ago disparaged as "literary 
bookkeeping."1 The dilemma, of course, is by now inevitable. 
Beckett sets the trap, and we enjoy falling for the bait, especi­
ally when the bait is, as in the present instance, a kind of caviar 
to the general. But there is always a "danger in the neatness of 
identifications": it makes us inadvertently undermine the in­
tegrity and originality of Company at the same time that it en­
courages us to elevate its status as yet another victory in the 
battle this writer's words continue to wage with form. The 
point of this essay will be, then, twofold: to demonstrate how 
Company draws on the allusive texture of Beckett's formidable 
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literary past and to show how he now transforms it into some­
thing we may not have seen in precisely these same terms 
before. 
In Company the specific allusions to Beckett's works are 
legion. Let us pause for a moment to reflect on the following 
catalogue raisonne, which is, it must be pointed out in advance, 
by no means complete. We might begin with Endgame, where 
Hamm is one of the first to complain of something dripping in 
his head. "Perhaps it's a little vein," he speculates. Endgame as 
source material is particularly promising for, like Company, it 
features Zeno's "grain by grain in the mind"2 as well as a pos­
sible encounter with a dead rat. "What an addition to company 
that would be!" (p. 16), we read here, "A rat long dead" (p. 27). 
"If I don't kill that rat he'll die," Clov, we recall, had long ago 
lamented. Or, to keep our genres straight, we might prefer to 
begin with Malone Dies, which offers us the additional satisfac­
tion of a narrator, hero, and novelist manque who, like this one, 
"on his back in the dark" (p. 7), suffers a similar decay of 
lying—and in both senses of the word. But what precisely does 
any text signify when it speaks of a protagonist "loosely as 
lying" (p. 55)? "Which in other words," Company continues, "of 
all the innumerable ways of lying is likely to prove in the long 
run the most endearing?" (p. 55). The pun on "lying" will come 
up again, for this "fable" will resume "where the act of lying 
cut it short" (p. 62). Beckett, however, constructs his narrative 
truth from just such a pregnant series of lyings-in. Positions, 
once physical, now turn to Watt's "semantic succour": "From 
time to time with unexpected grace you lie" (p. 61). A little 
language is, once again, a dangerously animated thing. 
Malone Dies provides the proper atmosphere for a variety of 
other items: it uses the same anti-novelistic strategies of invent­
ing names for characters along the way and then quickly dis­
missing or replacing them, it wonders aloud about its own nar­
rative authority (is the figure under a sheet clothed or naked?), 
and it suggests a number of possible topics that might be taken 
up in the interests of the narrative. Malone Dies also delivers a 
prominent feature to Company in the shape of memory, for it 
shares with it the same cutting retort a mother makes to a 
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young boy when he asks her if the sky is not in reality much 
less distant than it appears to be. Let us look at the different 
shapes Beckett has the same "memory" assume as it passes 
from one literary permutation to the next: 
One day we were walking along the road, up a hill of extraordinary 
steepness, near home I imagine, my memory is full of steep hills, I 
get them confused. I said, The sky is further away than you think, 
is it not, mama? It was without malice, I was simply thinking of all 
the leagues that separated me from it. She replied, to me her son, It 
is precisely as far away as it appears to be. She was right. But at the 
time I was aghast. I can still see the spot, opposite Tyler's gate.3 
You make ground in silence hand in hand through the warm still 
summer air. It is late afternoon and after some hundred paces the 
sun appears above the crest of the rise. Looking up at the blue sky 
and then at your mother's face you break the silence asking her if it 
is not in reality much more distant than it appears. The sky that is. 
The blue sky. Receiving no answer you mentally reframe your 
question and some hundred paces later look up at her face again 
and ask her if it does not appear much less distant than in reality it 
is. For some reason you could never fathom this question must 
have angered her exceedingly. For she shook off your little hand 
and made you a cutting retort you have never forgotten. (Company, 
pp. 10-11) 
Although in Company Beckett carefully suppresses the auto­
biographical details of one of the first "loopings of the loop" at 
the Leopardstown racecourse near his boyhood home in Fox-
rock, a suburb of Dublin, the memory, distilled this time, 
lingers on—and not only for its author. In using a scene he has 
used before, Beckett makes us share in his novelistic history: 
our memory in this instance is carefully focused all the way 
back to Malone Dies. Beckett has taken a detail from his own life 
and elevated it into fiction, a fiction he counts upon us to re­
member. Seen in this context, the haunting lines of Company 
begin to refer to us and to our own situation as Beckett's reader: 
"Yes I remember" (pp. 16 and passim). 
Despite all these close approximations—and there will be 
others—one must be careful not to overemphasize the similari­
ties uniting Malone Dies and Company, for the latter text will be 
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just as liberal in its borrowings from other Beckett works. The 
window looking west and the "some movement however 
small" (p. 20) remind us of Still, as does the highly specialized 
vocabulary of "withershins" (pp. 38, 50), which, contrary to 
"deasil" in the earlier work, means to move in a direction con­
trary to the apparent course of the sun, that is, counterclock­
wise and therefore unlucky. The computation of distance trav­
eled is right out of Enough, though here we read about another 
character "with bowed head on the verge of the ditch" (pp. 
14-15) who converts "into yards" (p. 15) (the ditch in this case 
coming from Molloy or Waiting for Godot). The voice "now from 
one quarter and now from another" (p. 15) re-creates the stag­
ing of That Time, and a voice avoiding the first person singular 
brings us back to Not I, as does Croker's Acres, a real place near 
Beckett's childhood home. Not I also brings to Company its Lis­
tener, called in this case the "hearer," and yields as well the 
special emptiness of "No trace of love" (p. 47) and the disturb­
ing imprecision of not knowing whether one is "standing or 
sitting or lying" (p. 26), though in this instance "kneeling" is 
omitted from the battery of possible posturings. The "God save 
you little master" (p. 17) in the vignette of the old beggar woman 
resurrects the whole bloody business of a savior from Waiting 
for Godot, a work that will be referred to again when, like 
Estragon, a female character assaulting the voice's memory 
murmurs appealingly, "Listen to the leaves" (p. 48). The specu­
lation on crawling is from How It Is; the "comfort" of mathe­
matics makes us think of Dan Rooney ("Not count! One of the 
few satisfactions in life?"); an unwanted pregnancy and a pain­
ful delivery resemble the uneasy situation in First Love; "conjur­
ing of something out of nothing" (p. 53) recycles Watt's lexical 
predicament; the "All you had seen was cloud" (p. 25) reshapes 
the central metaphor in ". . . but the clouds . . ."; the "dissolve" 
(p. 42) to a father sitting on a bench in a summerhouse uses a 
technical option of Beckett's "comic and unreal" Film, as does 
"of course the eye. Filling the whole field. The hood slowly 
down. Or up if down to begin. The globe. All pupil. Staring up. 
Hooded. Bared. Hooded again. Bared again" (pp. 20-21); the 
"footfalls" (p. 14 and passim) and the "unnamable" (p. 32) 
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bring to light the play and the novel of the same names, and 
with this in view, a "Devised deviser devising it all for com­
pany" (p. 46; emphasis mine) especially resembles the May 
who so addictively revolves "it all" as she paces back and forth 
before us on stage; the "Be again" (p. 20) repeats a futile com­
mand of Krapp's Last Tape, a work that shares with this one a 
"lamp left lit above you" (p. 59); a "tiny cycle" (p. 17) brings to 
mind those misshapen vehicles we have seen before in pastures 
similarly "strewn" with uneaten sheeps' "red placentae" (p. 
35); the absurd position of "Head resting mainly on occipital 
bump aforesaid. Legs joined at attention. Feet splayed ninety 
degrees. Hands invisibly manacled crossed on pubis" (p. 57) 
sounds like a further development of the physiognomic irregu­
larity we have met before in Imagination Dead Imagine; "Hodg­
kin's disease or if you prefer Percival Pott's" (p. 61) is medical 
terminology as technical as the "Blight's disease, Grave's dis­
ease, strangury and fits" specified in Murphy, where "cona­
tion" is also an option; the "Palest blue against the pale sky" (p. 
25) asks us to reconsider two prominent images from the ruins 
of Lessness, a piece inevitably referred to in the repeated ap­
pearance of such "lessness" words as "moonless," "starless" 
(p. 54), "cloudless" (p. 25 and passim), "bootless" (p. 55), and, 
finally, "comfortless" (p. 55); "the unthinkable last of all" (p. 
24) repeats a moment of closure from The Lost Ones, which also 
brings to Company a French "esquisse" (p. 45) in place of its 
own "apercu" and makes us consider a similar geometry of 
space that replaces cones, cylinders, and quincunxes with ob­
longs, rhomboids, and a rather spectacular "rustic hexahedron" 
(p. 38); and "Better a sick heart than none" (p. 26) messes up 
the same biblical quotation that Winnie mangles in Happy Days, 
though in this case "Better a sick heart than none." An M and a 
W put in cameo appearances in this prose tract, and we should 
be relieved to see that Belacqua Shuah, Dante's ever-present 
Florentine lute-maker, is also here. At long last, a text bids him 
a tender and generous farewell for, having waited so long in 
Beckett's fiction to be purged, he is "now perhaps singing 
praises with some section of the blest at last" (p. 60). "Yes," we 
say again as we read this text, "I remember." 
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The mention of Dante's "first quarter-smile" (p. 60) might 
make us think that at least some of the allusions in Company 
point back to a literary tradition that is not entirely of Beckett's 
own making. Yet in this citation, the emphasis is not so much 
on Dante as it is on Beckett's earlier use of him, that special 
Dante appropriated all the way back in More Pricks Than Kicks 
and the figure of Belacqua who walks through Beckett's fiction 
all the way up to The Lost Ones and Company. Beckett has taken 
a small piece of The Divine Comedy and therefore made it an 
integral part of his own intimate repertory. He has done the 
same with his gleanings from the Bible. "Better a sick heart than 
none" is Beckett, not the book of Psalms, and the memory is of 
Winnie rather than of David. Shakespeare will be similarly 
colonized: "labour lost" is the same kind of residual allusion to 
the Bard that skirts the surface of such earlier works as Footfalls, 
That Time, Come and Go, and Happy Days, to mention only a few 
of the most notable.4 The "half blind" (p. 16), "the shadowy 
light" (pp. 18-19), the "dark" that "lightens" (p. 19), and the 
"Died on to dawn and never died" (the last phrase by way of A 
Piece of Monologue) similarly resurrect Milton and more particu­
larly Beckett's earlier use of him in such works as Happy Days, 
where an intrepid Winnie opens act two with a direct quotation 
from Paradise Lost: "Hail, holy light." Beckett, of course, can be 
counted on to elevate Joyce and his own indebtedness to this 
modern master to such distinguished company: "Bloom of 
adulthood. Imagine a whiff of that" (p. 38). Dante, Shakes­
peare, the Bible, Milton, Joyce: the company Beckett keeps is 
rarely uncertain. External allusions in this work are primarily 
there to remind us of the same literary patterns Beckett has 
urged us to consider before as he weaves the web of his own 
private mythology. 
The shape of fictional memory in Company will also extend to 
the characteristic intrusion of learned vocabulary that we as­
sociate with so many other enterprises, the "hog's setae" of 
Happy Days, the "Schimmel" of From an Abandoned Work, the 
"ramdam" of All That Fall, the "tremolo" of The Lost Ones, the 
"passing rack" of Footfalls, or the "viduity" of Krapp's Last Tape, 
which the seedy hero actually looks up for us in a dictionary. In 
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Company the hermetic language is extended, this time embrac­
ing such a motley of items as transportation, the French lan­
guage, and human anatomy. Let us begin with the "De Dion 
Bouton" (p. 14), the automobile manufactured in Paris circa 
1904 and conveniently parked in this story in the family's coach 
house. The text will make a sly reference to this same vehicle 
later on when, in the subsequent vignette that takes place in the 
summerhouse, the characters sit "vis-a-vis" (p. 39). The De 
Dion Bouton was one of the few automobiles that allowed for 
this possibility. It featured a four-passenger model called, in 
fact, the "Vis-a-Vis": seats faced one another and the steering 
mechanism was placed in the center. "Vis-a-vis" neatly links 
recherche automotive history with recondite language study. 
Here Beckett has some fun with the French pronunciation of 
"Haitch," the name this text momentarily considers for its 
"hearer," yet another English word, like the "he," the "him," 
and the "hope" of the same paragraph, which also begins with 
an "Haitch." The French language, of course, considers two 
phonemes for "h," the h-muet and the h-aspire: "Let the hearer 
be named H. Aspirate. Haitch. You Haitch are on your back in 
the dark. And let him know his name. No longer any question 
of his overhearing" (p. 31). "H" is therefore no name at all for 
the simple reason that it is so difficult to pronounce for a French 
speaker: "Then let him not be named H. Let him be again as he 
was. The hearer. Unnamable. You" (p. 32). The fictional lan­
guage for the human anatomy in Company will prove as esoteric 
and in at least one instance similarly tricky. "All the way from 
calcaneum to bump of philogenitiveness" (p. 51) is a mistake in 
the published text that should read, according to Beckett, "All 
the way from calcaneum to bump of philoprogenitiveness."5 
Like Krapp we are sent scurrying to the dictionary: philo­
progenitiveness means tending to produce offspring, prolific; 
of, relating to, or characterized by love of offspring. This makes 
for a properly improper pun; the bump is phallic and also takes 
us back to Hamm's "accursed progenitor." 
Before entirely abandoning the arrant pedantry of what this 
text calls "readier reference" (p. 42)—which for the purpose of 
the argument will force us to omit the "i" in the Beckett tradi­
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tion and thereby take for reader reference—let us notice some of 
those narcissistic rhetorical flourishes that have become char­
acteristic specialties in the Beckett iconography. The whole 
motif, in fact, of appealing so slyly to the reader has been a pose 
taken up before. Murphy makes a novelistic pact with its reader 
by directly addressing him as the "gentle skimmer," and May 
in Footfalls calls our attention to an old Mrs. Winter, "whom the 
reader will remember," though unfortunately no such reader, 
"strange or otherwise," has been able to track her down, much 
to our dismay and frustration. Several other linguistic patterns 
will accompany us back to still other voices in narrative situa­
tions we have already confronted. "Up to a point" (p. 12 and 
passim), for example, reenergizes a critical moment of sexual 
innuendo in Enough, and "nought anew" (p. 15 and passim) 
recycles the "nothing new" (by way of Ecclesiastes) on which 
the sun shone, having no alternative, all the way back in 
Murphy. The use of a simple word like "home" will also prove 
similarly self-referential. In Malone Dies we read, "The man has 
not yet come home. Home," which Company renders as "And 
never once overstepped a radius of one from home. Home!" 
Not I also picks up on the same rhetoric of meaning: ". . . one 
evening on the way home . . . home! . .  . a little mound in 
Croker's Acres . . . ," as does III Seen 111 Said, where the lin­
guistic phenomenon takes place three times: 
At this rate it will be black night before she reaches home. Home! 
How find her way home? Home! Even as the homing bird. 
Alone night fallen she makes her home. Home! 
In each case the elementary repetition of a single word makes a 
simple sentence wax lyrical in its yearning for a lost security 
forever out of reach. But foremost among all these syntactical 
echoes is the word-sentence "Imagine" (p. 7 and passim), 
which was, of course, used so effectively in Imagination Dead 
Imagine and again in All Strange Away. Consider "Imagine" and 
one comes to see straightaway the difficulties inherent in any of 
these prose undertakings. As a single word, capitalized and 
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followed by a period, the reader first takes it as a verb. The 
subject, however, falls far from the verb and lands, character­
istically, somewhere in the void. Grammatically, the subject is 
supposed to be understood, but it is also supposed to be sup­
pressed, a pronoun the person and number of which we expect 
will be conventionally clarified in the context of what follows. 
Yet Company will use convention to confound and expand 
beyond any easy presuppositions. "Imagine," then, functions 
simultaneously as an imperative, an invocation, and a casual 
observation addressing both the narrative voice and the reader. 
Once invited in this way to utilize his own creative faculties in 
conjunction with this text, the gentle and unsuspecting "skim­
mer" embarks on a subtle adventure that implicates everything 
and everyone, past allusions as well as present readings, as the 
title Company so disingenuously suggests. 
But the allusions that really make the difference in Company 
are not the specific self-references this particular text makes 
sometimes subtly, sometimes aggressively, to so many of the 
earlier works. What matters here is the evocation of a new 
pattern of memory that refers to the earlier works not so much 
nominally as it does stylistically. For Company offers us two 
distinct rhythms, one for mind and quite another for heart. 
Both provide us with uncertain "company": 
Yet a certain activity of mind however slight is a necessary adjunct 
of company. That is why the voice does not say, You are on your 
back in the dark and have no mental activity of any kind. The voice 
alone is company but not enough. (P. 9) 
This particular voice, however, is woefully "reason-ridden" (p. 
33); it makes for some good company, "but not enough." The 
highly cerebral reflections on the nature of the voice, its origin, 
its person, and its number, soon turn in another direction. A 
vignette suddenly intrudes, providing, one suspects, more wel­
come "company" in the shape of remembrances of things past. 
Memory, as in Krapp's Last Tape, adds a significant and power­
ful dimension to Company, one that will be employed with tan­
talizing restraint. The appearance of these digressions from the 
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current dire situation, as suddenly represented by the voice in 
the dark, gives the piece far greater depth. The particularized 
exploration of a room and a desperate state of affairs becomes 
animated when the voice adopts a tone registering the possi­
bility of a human existence that supplies us with background as 
well as psychological texturing. These scenes are, then, crucial: 
they expand the terrain the reader and the protagonist traverse 
in the course of this story. They also offer us a powerful induce­
ment to read this work autobiographically. For the scenes of 
memory have about them a highly charged emotional impact, a 
deeply "felt" disposition, that appeals to a reader's inclination 
to identify a heart behind the mind we have so often en­
countered: 
You stand at the tip of the high board. High above the sea. In it 
your father's upturned face. Upturned to you. You look down to 
the loved trusted face. He calls to you to jump. He calls, Be a brave 
boy. The red round face. The thick moustache. The greying hair. 
The swell sways it under and sways it up again. The far call again, 
Be a brave boy. Many eyes upon you. From the water and from the 
bathing place. (P. 18) 
But autobiography is always a trap; Beckett denies its certainty. 
His text repeatedly reminds us that these vignettes contain 
"creatures" that are an integral part of the emerging "fable," 
the long dissolution that is every Beckett hero's life. However 
much they may conform to the known or suspected details of 
the author's life (the Irish names of roads and stores, the birth 
on Good Friday, the suggestion of upper-middle-class afflu­
ence in the make of a fancy car), the personal flavor imparted in 
these very moving scenes does not escape their role in the 
structured and highly self-conscious work of art. For like the 
origin of the voice itself, these scenes provide a problematic 
dimension to Company and remain inextricably tied to every­
thing else in the text. Isolating them at the expense of the more 
intellectual reflections by "one on his back in the dark" (p. 7) 
succeeds only in altering the work. An autobiographical ex­
plication of Company, like one of Malone Dies, which in this 
respect it so closely resembles, will be, necessarily, reductive. 
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The situation, to borrow a phrase from Murphy, is "less Words-
worthy": these vignettes present no "spots of time," but offer 
instead the "limits to part's equality with whole."6 
Autobiography has therefore been a fiction, like everything 
else in this tale, for "saying" is inevitably "inventing." The 
scenes culled from the past bring not memory but a construct in 
the guise of memory to the shape that Beckett's narrativity 
assumes. They also impart a special movement to the text, for 
unlike the rhythm of reason, constantly backtracking on itself to 
amend a phrase, repeat it with minor variation, or take up yet 
another possible alternative, the rhythm of memory, even 
when fabricated by a voice in the dark, is swift, incisive, and 
direct. It is also honest, at least as candid as any made-up 
memory can be. Yet this too is necessarily imagined. Some of 
these memories have even been given to the voice secondhand, 
things told to him by others and then passed off as his own: 
You first saw the light in the room you most likely were con­
ceived in. . .  . The midwife was none other than a Dr Hadden or 
Haddon. Straggling grey moustache and hunted look. It being a 
public holiday your father left the house soon after his breakfast 
with a flask and a package of his favourite egg sandwiches for a 
tramp in the mountains. There was nothing unusual in this. But on 
that particular morning his love of walking and wild scenery was 
not the only mover. But he was moved also to take himself off and 
out of the way by his aversion to the pains and general unpleasant­
ness of labour and delivery. Hence the sandwiches which he 
relished at noon looking out to sea from the lee of a great rock on 
the first summit scaled. . . . When he returned at nightfall he 
learned to his dismay from the maid at the back door that labour 
was still in swing. . . . He at once hastened to the coachhouse 
some twenty yards distant where he housed his De Dion Bouton. 
He shut the doors behind him and climbed into the driver's 
seat. . . . Though footsore and weary he was on the point of set­
ting out anew across the fields in the young moonlight when the 
maid came running to tell him it was over at last. Over! (Pp. 12-14) 
Company's so-called memory plays tricks with imagination: 
things told to us are sometimes indistinguishable from events 
we actually remember on our own. To amplify this point, 
Beckett follows the scene of birth with a much less personalized 
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one of a child in a nursery: "A mother's stooping over cradle 
from behind. She moves aside to let the father look. In his turn 
he murmurs to the newborn. Flat tone unchanged. No trace of 
love" (p. 47). The presence of Beckett's Proust hovers every­
where in the background. For there we read how memory 
shapes the past: "It presents the past in monochrome. The 
images it chooses are as arbitrary as those chosen by imagina­
tion, and are equally remote from reality."7 To remember in 
Company is therefore to imagine. And despite the text's dis­
claimer of imagining "ill" from time to time, the memories we 
get here are as fluid as Proust's—or as our own. In the vignette 
of the summerhouse, for example, the voice will make a double 
journey into the past before returning us to the present. Freely 
moving "to and fro," as in Rockaby, the voice moves from dis­
tant past, to more distant past, to less distant past, mixing an 
encounter with his lover and her pregnancy ("She is late" [p. 
39]) with a memory of his father reading Punch with yet another 
memory of the touch of two naked bodies in bed. Time is all at 
once set free, as though the distinct voices of A, B, and C in 
That Time now meet in one. Memory can work wonders, espe­
cially when it has been so explicitly crafted to do so. 
In Company, moreover, Beckett gives rapid rhythm to the 
voice of memory and slow rhythm to the voice of reason, then 
lets them play against one another in vigorous counterpoint. 
This technique brings much finesse as well as enormous vitality 
to the whole, setting in motion a dynamic conflict of styles 
within the writing of the fiction itself. Mind and heart wage a 
war of words in two competing tempos. We never know for 
sure just when one will intrude its distinctive presence on the 
other. Emotion fights with reason, and the as yet unidentified 
narrator will make clever use of the latter to recover from the 
devastating effects of the former, which, despite his valiant 
attempts, he does not appear likely to control. 
What makes Company a special edition in the Beckett canon is 
the risk he now takes with the dualism he has balanced so 
delicately in this work: heart wins hands down in the end. 
Despite the reason-ridden intellect, emotionally charged 
memories, no matter how formulated, recast, and patched up, 
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shine through in the end in the shape of haunting images that 
will quite simply not go away. Their successful battle with what 
Molloy calls "the falsetto of reason" makes them avoid any taint 
of sloppy sentimentality. All that remains for Krapp, too, after 
all is said and done and taped, is one essential image from the 
past: "the eyes—like chrysolite." As we sit in the theater and 
watch Krapp with our own eyes, all that exists for us is an 
image too: an old man isolated on stage space is suddenly not 
alone. Staring into the void, he is actually staring at us. The 
image has offered us an unexpected instance of communion 
with a private world in the public forum that is theater. Com­
pany will similarly offer us reminiscences in the form of images, 
and even though they represent loss, they provide the reader 
with powerfully drawn scenes that effectively counter and en­
rich the narrator's diminished state. "Now I'll wipe out every­
thing but the flowers," the narrator of Enough intones near the 
end of his quite different fictional journey. Everything dis­
appears but the words and the images they can be depended on 
to create. 
Consider some of these images: a mother scolds a young boy 
for no apparent reason after he asks a question, typically, about 
depth and perception; a small boy teeters on the limb of a tree 
or contemplates a jump into deep waters and into his waiting 
father's arms; a youth finds a hedgehog and imposes his will 
upon it, ending in death and a loss of innocence; a young man 
meets his lover and confronts his culpability in her pregnancy, 
if such is indeed the case; a grown man now walks by himself in 
the fields near his childhood home but recollects in tranquility 
his beloved father's "shade"; an old man finds he moves un­
steadily, suddenly conscious of the fact that he has been de­
serted forever by the warmth of his once youthful vigor—these 
scenes evoke the arbitrary pattern of loss in one man's exist­
ence. Everything "falls" and soon fades away. Any renewed 
effort of mathematics or science to define or locate the voice that 
broadcasts these images pales by comparison with the striking 
quality of such sharp visual stimulation. For the company 
Beckett keeps is strictly with these words and the metaphors 
they have been made to create. They will never leave us 
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"alone," for they constantly return us to the initial charge of 
this text, which was, we should remember, to "imagine." For 
even in the midst of memory, Beckett's Company has been ask­
ing us to "imagine" along with it. "You may imagine his 
thoughts before and after as he strode through the gorse and 
heather" (p. 13), the voice states of a father anxiously awaiting 
his child's birth, an appeal to the reader soon to be echoed by 
another as the same man is discovered alone in his De Dion 
Bouton: "You may imagine his thoughts as he sat there in the 
dark not knowing what to think" (p. 14). So imagination is not 
quite dead, at least as far as the narrative strength of Company is 
concerned. Like the sun in Murphy—there is another image—it 
shines through once again, having no real alternative. Imagina­
tion therefore becomes the only possibility for company, for it is 
always full of potentiality. Time hangs "heavy already on our 
hands" (p. 29), it is true, but even the movement of two hands 
on a watch provides "variations and constants" (p. 59) ripe for 
narrative exploration. And when this story ends, there still 
remain many "matters yet to be imagined" (p. 27), "form and 
dimensions yet to be devised." 
The "fable of one fabling . .  . in the dark" (p. 63) has there­
fore not left us in the dark at all. This fiction may have set out to 
expose the limits and mechanisms of its own fictivity, but in the 
process of its reasoning—which in this text "reasons ill" (p. 
12)—we recognize that the voice that has all along been drip­
ping inside this character's head is nothing less than a human 
heart. "A heart, a heart in my head," cried out Beckett's Hamm 
long ago. And as long as Beckett's characters have the minia­
turized tenderness of these words, this company, the present 
fable seems bent on reassuring us, can never be entirely in vain. 
Mixing memory and desire, the voice of Company gives shape to 
memory and in so doing offers us lies like truth. The last word 
of this text, set by itself in a lonely little paragraph, is "Alone" 
(p. 63). But that too is a word we have seen before in the Beckett 
canon, and that too presents us with an intimate image we can 
only encounter on our own. For we are never really alone once 
we hold Beckett's text in our hands. Devised allusions to the 
past and to past works have therefore fostered a magnificent 
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new illusion where we may have least expected it: just who is 
the narrator and who is the company really does not matter 
when the reader's regular guest is Beckett's unnamable voice. 
1. Quotations in this paragraph are from Beckett's "Dante . . . Bruno. 
Vico . . Joyce," in Our Exagmination Round His Fortification for Incamination of 
Work in Progress (Paris: Shakespeare and Co., 1929), pp. 1, 4, 8. 
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3. Malone Dies (New York: Grove Press, 1956), p. 98. 
4. Several critics have noticed the Shakespearean echoes in Beckett's work. 
See, for example, Ruby Cohn, just Play: Beckett's Theater (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 22, 36, 70, 78, 84,143,179; Enoch Brater, 
"Fragment and Beckett's Form in 'That Time' and 'Footfalls,'" journal of Beckett 
Studies, Summer 1977, p. 70-81. 
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1980. My thanks to Martha Fehsenfeld for calling my attention to this mistake in 
the printed text of Company. 
6. Watt (New York: Grove Press, 1969), p. 247. 
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Nicholas Zurbrugg

Beckett, Proust, and Burroughs and the 
Perils of "Image Warfare" 
The points of intersection are very important. . .  . In cutting up 
you will get a point of intersection where the new material that you 
have intersects with what is there already in some very precise 
way, and then you start from there. 1 
As this quotation from the novelist and professional wicked 
uncle of postmodernism, William Burroughs, suggests, one of 
the central concerns of the twentieth-century writer is the func­
tion of those "points of intersection" where different clusters of 
words and images interact. Burroughs's work may best be in­
troduced anecdotally, in terms of French poet Henri Chopin's 
observation that when visiting Burroughs one finds that "the 
television is characteristically switched on, with the sound 
turned off, while images flicker by." Chopin perceptively adds 
that Burroughs is "above all an observer, who subsequently 
imagines cut-ups, thanks to this flood of images."2 
Burroughs has himself discussed the attraction of flickering 
"old movies," avowing that "when talkies came in and they 
perfected the image, the movies became as dull as looking out 
the window."3 This fascination for the ambiguous flickering 
image, as opposed to the "perfected" image, is by no means as 
eccentric as it might appear. In precisely the same way, pioneer 
film-maker Sergei Eisenstein insisted upon the "distinct non-
synchronisation" of sound and visual imagery, arguing that 
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"only a contrapuntal use of sound in relation to the visual 
montage piece will afford a new potentiality of montage de­
velopment and perfection/' and that "every adhesion of sound 
to a visual montage piece increases its inertia."4 In his very last 
interview, Eisenstein elaborated these ideas, remarking: "Art 
begins the moment the creaking of a boot on the sound-track 
occurs against a different visual shot and thus gives rise to 
corresponding associations."5 Briefly, both Burroughs and 
Eisenstein appear preoccupied with the ways in which dis­
cordant combinations of images, words, and sounds generate 
what Eisenstein terms "corresponding associations." In 
Burroughs's terms: "I've been interested in precisely how word 
and image get around on very, very complex association 
lines. . . . Cut-ups establish new connections between images, 
and one's range of vision consequently expands."6 
In the context of this comparison of Beckett's, Proust's, and 
Burroughs's use of the image, it is essential to make a funda­
mental distinction between Eisenstein's and Burroughs's re­
sponses to "contrapuntal" images. Both agree that such images 
augment art's development and perfection; in Burroughs's 
opinion, "cut-up . . . enriches the whole esthetic experience, 
extends it."7 To this extent, Eisenstein's and Burroughs's ex­
periments simply confirm the modernist creator's infatuation 
with surprising links between disparate sensations, which is 
best expressed by "Breton's law": "The value of the image 
depends upon the beauty of the spark obtained; it is conse­
quently directly proportional to the difference in potential be­
tween the two conductors."8 Put another way, in symbolist 
rather than surrealist terms, the value of the image is directly 
proportional to the sensitivity of the "superior man" who alone 
can walk as master in the fantastic temple 
whose living pillars 
sometimes give forth indistinct words 
while the imbecile human flock, duped by the appearances that 
lead them to the denial of essential ideas, will pass forever blind 
through forests of symbols 
which watch him with familiar glances.9 
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These lines from Aurier's "Symbolism in Painting: Paul 
Gauguin" (of 1891), with their quotation from Baudelaire's 
poem "Correspondances," clearly assert that the poet may 
make sense of "indistinct words" and "forests of symbols," in a 
world in which "Les parfums, les couleurs et les sons se 
repondent [Perfumes, colors, and sounds answer one an­
other]."10 Eisenstein's reference to "corresponding associa­
tions" resulting from contrapuntal images and sounds similarly 
implies that his materials finally "answer" one another in what 
he termed "'synthetic' combinations of tonal and overtonal 
montage."11 The crucial distinction between this predomi­
nantly modernist response to the contrapuntal and Burroughs's 
essentially postmodern response resides in Burroughs's pre­
occupation with disparate words, images, and sounds that re­
fuse to answer one another, and that rather than resolving their 
differences in "synthetic combinations," clash all the more vio­
lently in states that might perhaps be thought of as image 
warfare. 
In other words, whereas such modernists as the symbolist 
poets, the surrealist poets, and Eisenstein combined contrast­
ing images in order to generate new dimensions of artistic unity, 
Burroughs seems most interesting as an author exploring the 
social and political potential of the word and image as a "virus" 
propagating chaos. Burroughs has set forth his ideas on this 
subject in his book entitled Electronic Revolution and in his inter­
views with Daniel Odier collected in The Job.12 The latter vol­
ume reprints Burroughs's early essay entitled "The Invisible 
Generation" (1966), in which Burroughs introduces his theo­
ries, first, in terms of experiments with one's own responses to 
words and images, and second, in terms of the potential public 
application of these experiments. The essay begins: 
what we see is determined to a large extent by what we hear you 
can verify this proposition by a simple experiment turn off the 
sound track on your television set and substitute an arbitrary 
sound track prerecorded on your tape recorder . . . you will find 
the arbitrary sound track seems to be appropriate and is in fact 
determining your interpretation of film track on screen people 
running for a bus in picadilly with a sound track of machine gun 
fire looks like 1917 petrograd.W 
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With these admittedly somewhat dubious propositions in mind, 
Burroughs speculates: 
you want to start a riot put your machines in the street with riot 
recordings move fast enough you can stay just ahead of the riot 
surfboarding we call it no margin for error recollect poor old burns 
caught out in a persian market riot recordings hid under his jallaba 
and they skinned him alive raw peeled thing writhing there in the 
noon sun and we got the picture do you get the picture.14 
With the entry of the anecdote about "poor old burns," Bur-
rough's theories drift into fiction and back again, as Burroughs 
proposes that this picture of "poor old burns" might itself be 
used subversively in an analogous context. Consistently illus­
trated and exemplified by the most grotesque fictions, Bur-
roughs's ideas tend to defy credibility, especially when uttered 
by such freaks as the "death dwarf" from Nova Express, who 
informs his captors: 
"Images—millions of images—That's what I eat—Cyclotron shit—
Ever try kicking that habit with apomorphine?—Now I got all the
images of sex acts and torture ever took place anywhere and I canjust blast it out and control you gooks right down to the 
molecule."15 
Although the comic genius of Burroughs's writing resides pre­
cisely in the death dwarf's subsequent antics: his repetition of 
the words "My Power's coming—My Power's coming—My 
Power's Coming," and his duplication of "a faith healer routine 
rolling his eyes and frothing at the mouth" (antics made all the 
more explicit in Burroughs's reading of this passage),16 the 
most interesting factor here seems to be the emphasis upon the 
way in which images of sex and violence may disorient the 
dwarf's victims when "cut" into their habitual lifestyles, and 
thereby "control" them "right down to the molecule." For Bur-
roughs, such "control" inevitably implies the provocation of 
some sort of humiliating and disordered reaction. Thus Elec­
tronic Revolution suggests that 
A mike secreted in the water closet and all his shits and farts 
recorded and scrambled in with stern nanny voices commanding 
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him to shit, and the young liberal shits in his pants on the platform 
right under Old Glory. I7 
Burroughs's undeniably idiosyncratic visions of image "war­
fare" offer a remarkable model for the kind of confusion experi­
enced by the Beckettian hero, a coincidence that is best intro­
duced in terms of the distinction that Burroughs made between 
their respective concerns when reflecting: 
What I want to do is to learn to see more of what's out there, to 
look outside, to achieve as far as possible a complete awareness of 
surroundings. Beckett wants to go inward. 18 
At the risk of indulging the intentional fallacy, this statement 
may be read as a valuable indication of Burroughs's interest in 
the role of images in the context of the "outside" of problems of 
social control, as opposed to Beckett's "inward" preoccupation 
with conflicting images of the self. To extend this distinction, it 
might be argued that whereas Burroughs enthusiastically con­
templates ways of precipitating image "warfare" within society 
(by causing riots, for example), Beckett's characters seem the 
reluctant victims of the rioting images within their own 
minds—rioting images, moreover, that they would do anything 
to calm. 
Malone Dies thus depicts the torments of Lemuel, who is 
"flayed alive by memory, his mind crawling with cobras, not 
daring to dream or think and powerless not to," whose only 
solution is to strike his head with a hammer.19 Malone himself 
is similarly tormented. Describing his anguish in terms remark­
ably reminiscent of those of Burroughs, he comments: 
Words and images run riot in my head, pursuing, flying, clashing,
merging endlessly. But beyond this tumult there is a great calm,
and a great indifference, never really to be troubled by anything 
again. 20 
Malone's complaint, and that of the majority of Beckett's 
heroes, is that they seldom attain, let alone retain, this ideal 
calm. This essential dilemma utterly subverts the ideals that 
most Beckettian critics associate with Beckett's heroes. 
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The greatest confusion in Beckettian criticism almost certainly 
results from the repeated identification of Proustian virtues 
with Beckettian virtues. Nowhere has this identification been 
more misleading than in the case of Beckett's suggestion, in his 
study of A la recherche du temps perdu entitled Proust, that: 
The artist is active, but negatively, shrinking from the nullity of 
extracircumferential phenomena, drawn in to the core of the eddy. 
He cannot practice friendship because friendship is the centrifugal 
force of self-fear, self-negation. 21 
Taken in tandem with Beckett's subsequent reference to the 
Proustian artist's contempt for "the grotesque fallacy of a real­
istic art—'the miserable statement of line and surface,' and the 
penny-a-line vulgarity of a literature of notations" (p. 76), the 
above statement has persuaded critics that Beckett's heroes 
similarly probe the "eddy" of the self, reject the "extracircum­
ferential," and despise the superficiality of "line and surface." 
It is arguable that these ideals inspire certain Beckettian heroes, 
such as Murphy, at the beginning of their careers. But it is 
equally evident that by the end of their respective books, 
Beckettian heroes suffer so intensely from introspective "words 
and images run riot" that they retreat from what Murphy terms 
the "fly in the ointment of Microcosmos" to the relative safety 
of macrocosmic mathematics, such as Molloy's sucking-stone 
calculations.22 
By the end of Murphy, Murphy confronts what he terms a 
"spool" of disturbing autobiographical images, or rather frag­
ments, as "scraps of bodies, of landscapes, hands, eyes, lines 
and colours" rise in front of him; yet instead of descending 
to the "eddy" of these images, he decides that his experi­
ence "should be stopped . . . before the deeper coils were 
reached."23 Both Beckett's subsequent Film and the more re­
cent A Piece of Monologue dramatize this retreat from deep auto­
biographical reality even more explicitly, the former depicting 
the "scene of inspection and destruction of photographs," the 
latter depicting the "Speaker" red-handed, as it were, at the 
scene of the completed crime, avoiding all photographic and 
verbal "intersections" between his present condition and his 
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past, and relating "Pictures of . .  . he all but said of loved 
ones. . . . Down one after another. Gone. Torn to shreds and 
scattered. Strewn all over the floor."24 Far from avoiding friend­
ship, in order to facilitate introspective centripetal activity, most 
Beckettian heroes, such as the narrator of Company, deliberately 
evade centripetal introspection by following the centrifugal 
impulse to acquire the fictional friendship—or "company"—of 
imaginary, nonautobiographical data. Thus the narrator of 
Company expressly defines his dilemma as that of "the craving 
for company . .  . In which to escape from his own."25 This is, of 
course, the very reverse of the Proustian strategy of composing 
fiction to assist self-knowledge; and it is perhaps no coincidence 
that Beckett annotated Marcel's final wish to offer his readers "le 
moyen de lire en eux-memes" or "the means of reading them­
selves" with the incredulous, and doubtless disapproving, re­
joinder: "Balls. "26 
This curious hostility to introspection seems especially bi­
zarre, coming as it does from an author who quite plainly ad­
mires the Proustian hero's rejection of the "nullity" of habitual, 
macrocosmic reality. What made Beckett reject the Proustian 
virtues? The answer would seem to be: the Proustian vices. Or 
more accurately, Beckett's preoccupation with modes of in­
tolerable "image warfare" in Proust's novel appears to have 
been far more enduring than his dutiful account of the way in 
which involuntary memory transforms image warfare into 
perceptual victory asserting the positive permanent reality of 
the self. Beckett's analyses of moments of image warfare in A la 
recherche du temps perdu are especially rewarding, for they not 
only point to a neglected dimension of Proust's novel but also 
indicate the way in which Beckett's critical priorities define his 
vision as being substantially different from that of Proust. 
The two most interesting sections of Beckett's Proust concern 
incidents in which Marcel's images of others and himself cause 
considerable anguish, rather than resolving themselves and 
harmoniously responding one to the other, as terms of the 
symbolist salvation of involuntary memory. Beckett tellingly 
dubs the first of these—the incident when Marcel, leaning to 
unbutton his boots, both remembers his dead grandmother, 
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and suffers excruciatingly from her absence—as "perhaps the 
greatest passage that Proust ever wrote" (p. 39). Diagnosing 
this as a "poisoned" variant of involuntary memory, Beckett 
comments: "This contradiction between presence and absence 
is intolerable" (p. 42), and in identical terms analyzes the way in 
which Marcel's hopelessly infatuated and hopelessly jealous 
responses to Albertine constitute "a multiplicity in depth, a 
turmoil of objective and immanent contradictions over which 
the subject has no control" (p. 47). 
Few phrases could better describe the perceptual chaos af­
flicting Beckett's subsequent heroes. And with but a shuffling of 
negatives, few phrases could better describe the Beckettian 
hero's antidote to such profound perceptual torment: the anti­
dote of "a multiplicity without depth, a turmoil of objective and 
immanent contradictions over which the subject has control"—in 
Molloy's terms, "dutiful confusions."27 Beckett's analysis of 
Marcel's agonizingly undutiful confusions focuses upon its key 
crisis: the occasion when, having associated Albertine both 
with the beauty of the sea, and with a disquieting vision of 
lesbian love glimpsed at Montjouvain, Marcel not only can no 
longer differentiate between these conflicting versions of 
Albertine, but also can no longer enjoy the sea as an object of 
beauty in its own right, since it has become permanently as­
sociated both with Albertine and with her disturbing lesbian 
proclivities. A victim of his own associations, Marcel has—to 
use Burroughs's terms—inadvertently "cut up" a "sex" image 
and a maritime image, finding that "the sea is a veil that cannot 
hide the horror of Montjouvain, the intolerable vision of sadis­
tic lubricity," and envisioning his subsequent life as "a succes­
sion of joyless dawns, poisoned by the tortures of memory and 
isolation" (pp. 52-53). 
The concept of memory as a source of "intolerable vision" 
and of something "poisoned" duplicates the key adjectives in 
Beckett's analysis of the previous incident, and partially antici­
pates his surprising subsequent suggestion that the perceptual 
miracle of Proust's novel—involuntary memory—is notable as a 
source of "intolerable brightness" (p. 70).28 This passage also 
describes Marcel's revelation more positively, as a source of 
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"felicity." But the suspicion that Beckett would imply that all 
intense introspective perceptions—poisoned or unpoisoned— 
are intolerable is substantially confirmed by Beckett's avowal 
that Proust's wisdom consists of "the ablation of desire" (p. 18), 
and "in obliterating the faculty of suffering" (p. 63). At the 
beginning of Proust, Beckett quite properly distinguishes be­
tween the Proustian notions of the habitual and the inhabitual, 
or in Beckett's morose formulas: the "boredom of living," and 
the "suffering of being"—a state in which man experiences the 
"free play of every faculty" (pp. 19, 20). To achieve the sup­
posedly Proustian ideal of obliterating the faculty of suffering, 
man must therefore obliterate "being," halt the free play of 
every faculty, and limit existence to the very "boredom of liv­
ing" constituted by the "nullity of extracircumferential phe­
nomena." This is certainly not the wisdom of Proust's heroes, 
who employ their every faculty during the triumphant existen­
tial struggles that Elstir defines as "un combat et une victoire" 
(1:864)—a combat and a victory. The ablation of desire, and 
self-immersion in the extracircumferential is, however, the 
negative wisdom of such nihilistic Proustian characters as 
Marcel's tante Leonie, who cherishes "l'inertie absolue [absolute 
inertia]" (1:50); and it would also appear to be the wisdom of 
such Beckettian archetypes as Estragon and Vladimir, who find 
the habitual "a great deadener."29 
Despite the fact that Marcel suffers from the intolerable and 
poisoned memories and confusions that Beckett analyzes so 
impressively in his Proust, his experience does not culminate in 
the Beckettian wisdom of the ablation of desire. Rather, in the 
face of considerable evidence to the contrary, Marcel finally 
concludes that man's desires are worthy of realization. A key 
phase in the evolution of his conclusion occurs when Marcel 
meditates upon some pear trees and cherry trees, finding them 
to symbolize: 
Custodians of memories from the golden age, witnesses to the 
promise that reality is not what we suppose it to be, and that the 
splendour of poetry and the marvellous radiance of innocence may 
shine within it, and may be the reward that we should make every 
effort to merit. (2:161-62)30 
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As Beckett himself implied, when admiring the "dualism in 
multiplicity" of the "Proustian equation" (p. 11), Proust's 
vision is perhaps most impressive of all in terms of the ways in 
which it elaborates the "dual," or positive and negative, poten­
tial of every experience. Although perceptual salvation in 
Proust's novel results from the symbolist aesthetic of sensations 
that both correspond and respond to one another, Proust's 
exemplification of "poisoned" memories and associations also 
probes the reverse of such perceptual felicity. If few critics apart 
from Beckett have elucidated this neglected dimension of 
Proust's novel, few authors apart from Beckett have created a 
life's work based primarily upon such "poisoned" perceptions. 
The disadvantage of this elaboration on the "poisoned" is, of 
course, that Beckett cannot (and indeed does not) make any 
claim to emulate the extraordinary multiplicity of Proust's dual­
istic vision. Few trees blossom in Beckett's fiction, and even 
those that do cause disgust or confusion. Perched under a 
hawthorn (Marcel's favorite flora), Molloy grimly comments: 
"The white hawthorn stooped towards me, unfortunately I 
don't like hawthorn."31 Waiting next to their solitary tree, 
Estragon and Vladimir bicker over its identity, finding it both "a 
bush" and "a shrub."32 
It may be argued that Beckett's vision is nevertheless dual­
istic, since works like Waiting for Godot abound in binary oppo­
sitions of words and characters. This is undeniable, yet at the 
same time the content of the binary oppositions in Proust's fic­
tion and those in Beckett's fiction is immensely different. 
Proust's binary oppositions operate on three distinct levels— 
between the habitual and the unpoisoned inhabitual; between 
the habitual and the poisoned inhabitual; and between the poi­
soned and the unpoisoned inhabitual. Beckett's binaries in­
habit a world without unpoisoned inhabitual experience. His 
characters fluctuate between the boredom of the deadeningly 
habitual and the intolerable anguish of almost invariably poi­
soned inhabitual perceptions. At best they occasionally lose 
consciousness altogether before inevitably boomeranging back 
into boredom or intolerable anguish. 
Caught between the ever increasing perceptual disadvan­
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tages of the perceptual frying pan of habit and the perceptual 
fire of the inhabitual, it is scarcely surprising that Beckett's 
characters attempt to avoid introspection by absorbing them­
selves in the ritualistic pastimes of gestures, dialogues, and 
endlessly invented fictions. At most, their recognition of iden­
tity occurs in carefully censored fragmentary monologues, such 
as those of Not I, Company, and A Piece of Monologue, in which 
every effort is made either to avoid the expression of autobio­
graphical data or at least to minimize the anguish accompany­
ing its expression by repetitive and circumambulatory narra­
tion. Considered collectively, these recent variations on auto­
biographical fragments occasionally add to the reader's knowl­
edge of Beckett's own biography. For example, Company alludes 
to a childhood game of jumping from the top of pine trees: an 
odd passtime only mentioned previously by secondary sources 
in Deirdre Bair's biography of Beckett.33 One might surmise 
that, almost despite himself, Beckett is gradually revealing, and 
perhaps thereby nullifying, painful autobiograpical details, a 
tendency akin to that which Allen Ginsberg has attributed to 
William Burroughs's cut-ups. Ginsberg comments: 
In fact, the cut-ups were originally designed to rehearse and repeat 
his obsession with sexual images over and over again, like a movie 
repeating over and over and over again, and then re-combined and 
cut up and mixed in; so that finally the obsessive attachment, com­
pulsion, and preoccupation empty out and drain from the 
image. . . . Finally, the hypnotic attachment, the image, becomes 
demystified. . . . He can finally look at it at the end of the spool; he can 
look at his most tender, personal, romantic images objectively, and 
no longer be attached to them.34 
Although the specific content of Burroughs's and Beckett's 
"most tender, personal . . . images" are very different, it is 
perhaps not too wild a suggestion to propose that such Beckett­
ian heroes as Krapp might be deemed to be repeating, cutting 
up, and demystifying certain highly tender and personal 
images so as to defuse their painfully explosive content. In 
other words, Krapp's repeated reference to his taped account of 
his haunting moments with a girl in a punt might be interpreted 
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as his attempt to come to terms with his poisoned memory of 
love that he ironically rejected for a career he now no longer 
cares for. In Ginsberg's terms, Krapp is trying to reach the point 
when he can relatively painlessly "look at it at the end of the 
spool." 
Ginsberg's statement not only provides a helpful model for 
an understanding of the introspective strategies of such 
Beckettian heroes as Krapp but also places Burroughs's writings 
in a wider context. Despite Burroughs's suggestion that he is 
primarily interested in "outside" reality, it seems clear that to 
some extent at least his cut-ups reiterate "inward" imagery, be 
this to demystify and placate sexual obsessions, as Ginsberg 
suggests, or to provoke sexual stimulation (a possibility that, as 
Harold Beaver remarks, Burroughs himself implies in his 
maxim "Any writer who has not masturbated with his own 
characters will not be able to make them live on paper").35 
Whether Burroughs's texts serve or served Burroughs person­
ally as a pornographic intoxicant or disintoxicant is perhaps 
beside the point, or at least very secondary to their decisive 
difference from pulp pornography in terms of their exploration 
of the cut-up both as a literary device and as a subversive 
weapon for the verbal-visual urban guerilla. To acknowledge 
this function of Burroughs's writing is neither to deny its por­
nographic content nor to blindly accept the frequently eccentric 
formulations and exemplifications of its variously convincing 
theories. It is, however, to suggest the shortsightedness of such 
evaluations of Burroughs's ideas as George Steiner's reference 
to their "childish conceit of a loose-leaf book—to be put to­
gether at random or at the reader's will,"36 and to argue for 
Burroughs's validity as a theorist who has fascinatingly ex­
plored the subversive potential of contrapuntal intersections of 
words and images, and whose work additionally evokes the 
perfect concept for the confusion of Beckett's heroes: the con­
cept of image warfare. 
Located in the perceptual context of rioting words and 
images, the Beckettian hero's retreat from painful-centripetal 
confusion to relatively painless centrifugal confusion is much 
easier to understand. For too long, critics have misleadingly 
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attempted to interpret Beckett by comparing instead of contrast­
ing Proust and Beckett. Beckett is not Proust (and is not Bur-
roughs), nor was meant to be. But when considered halfway, as 
it were, between Proust and Burroughs, as a writer whose con­
cerns are partially Proustian, insofar as they examine poisoned 
(but not unpoisoned) involuntary memories, and as a writer 
who is partially Burroughsian, insofar as he examines inward 
(but not outward) manifestations of image warfare, Beckett can 
at least be approached within the general parameters of his own 
priorities. This contextualization plainly takes no account of the 
different qualities of Beckett's, Proust's, and Burroughs's writ­
ing, but it does perhaps avoid the prevailing myth that 
Beckett's and Proust's responses to the autobiographical 
image—or the image of the self—are somehow susceptible to 
the same "law."37 This is patently not the case; indeed, it is 
arguable that writers such as Beckett, Proust, and Burroughs 
are most fascinating and most satisfying precisely in terms of 
the ways in which they elaborate and explore diverging—and at 
times incompatible—approaches to the image of the self. 
Proust, for example, provides an exemplary instance of the 
predominantly optimistic literary experiments of the modernist 
writer, both in terms of his confident, all-inclusive, telescopic 
sentences, and in terms of his belief in the perceptual salvation 
of involuntary memory. By contrast, the respectively "inward" 
and "outward" texts of Beckett and Burroughs both bear the 
two hallmarks of the postmodern writer: a pessimistic obses­
sion with incoherent, confused, fragmentary observations, and 
a more optimistic approach to the creative potential of the new 
technology of the recording studio, television, and cinema.38 
The originality of Proust, Beckett, and Burroughs lies not so 
much in any apparent overlap between their ideas in such texts 
as Beckett's Proust, as in the differences between their pre-
technological and part-technological verbalizations and drama­
tizations of complex "intersections" between different images 
of the self. To reduce their originality to any single "law" is to 
lose sight of their contrasting achievements, and yet to juxta­
pose their ideas is a useful means of revealing their individu­
ality. As Beckett warned the reader some fifty years ago, "The 
danger is in the neatness of identifications."39 
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Transcription of the 
Ohio Impromptu Holograph 
EDITORS' NOTE. Bracketed words and phrases indicate dele­
tions by S.B.; a blank space enclosed in parentheses within 
brackets indicates an indecipherable deletion. 
[VERSO OF LEAF l  ] 
I am out on leave. Thrown out on leave. 
Back to time, they said, for 24 hours. 
Oh my God, I said, not that. 
Slip [into] on this shroud, they said, lest you catch your death 
of cold again. 
Certainly not, I said. 
This cap, they said, for your [death's-head] skull. 
Definitely not, I said. 
The New World outlet, they said, in the State of Ohio. We 
cannot be more precise. Pause. 
Proceed straight to [Lima] the nearest campus, they said, and 
address them. 
[Address] whom? I said. 
The students, they said, and professors. 
Oh my God, I said, not that. 
Do not overstay your leave, they said, if you do not wish it to 
be extended. 
Pause. 
What am I to say? I said. 
Be yourself, they said, [you're ( )] stay yourself. 
Myself? I said. What are you insinuating? 




[Not during? I said.] 
[LEAVES 1-3] 
Little remains to be told. 
In a final effort to— 
Knock. 
Little remains to be told. 
Pause & knock 
In a [final] last effort to obtain relief he moved from (the 
house) where they had [lived] been so long [together alone] 
alone together to a small furnished room on the [right] other 
bank. From its single window he could just see the downstream 
extremity of the Island of Swans [where as a young man he had 
sauntered dreaming] wandered [dreaming of things to come.] 
[Pause. Sip] 
[Little remains to be told.] 
[In its extreme emptiness and ] Relief he— 
[Knock] 
[Little remains to be told.] 
[Pause. Knock.] 
[In its extreme unfamiliarity (strangeness) the room held 
some hope of help. The narrow bed. Small table. Two? chairs. 
No books. No pictures. Nothing ever shared.] 
Relief he had hoped wd. flow from [the strange] unfamili­
arity. Unfamiliar room. Unfamiliar scene, [neighborhood] To go 
out to where nothing ever shared. To come back to where noth­
ing ever shared. From this he had once half hoped some small 
measure of relief might [would] flow. 
Pause. Sip. 
192 
[Those days were rare] 
Rare were the days when he was not to be seen slowly pacing 
the island. In his long black coat no matter what the tempera­
ture & [a sort of] old world Latin Quarter hat. At the tip he 
would pause to observe the receding [waters flood] stream. 
How [its two arms parted by the slit of land in ( )] in 
joyous [( )] eddies its two arms conflowed and flowed 
united on. Then turn & his slow steps retrace. 
In his dreams— 
Knock 
Turn turn & his slow steps retrace. 
Pause. Knock 
In his dreams (many a time) he had been warned against this 
change. Seen the dear face and heard the unspoken words, 
Stay where you are, [Aloysius] Mortimer, [( )] my ghost 
will comfort you. 
Blows nose. 
Could he not now turn back? Acknowledge his error & return 
to where they had [been] lived so long [together] alone to­
gether. [Shared so much] alone together so much shared. No. 
The answer was no. What he had done alone [there was no 
undoing] could not be undone. Nothing he had ever done 
could ever be undone. By him. 
[Sip] Refills glass. 
It was in this extremity that his old terror of night laid hold 
[of] on him again. After so long a lapse that as if never been. 
{Pause. Looks closer.) Yes, after so long a lapse that as if never 
been. Hm. Now with redoubled force the [same] fearful symp­
toms [as] described [on page ( )] at length [on] page forty 
[( )] paragraph four. (Starts to turn back the pages. Gesture 
stops him. [Returns to] Resumes present page.) White nights again 
his lot. As when his heart was young. No sleep no [facing] 
braving sleep till [morning light] dawn of day. 
Drinks 
Little remains to be told. [Just one last] One night— 
Knock 
Little remains to be told. 
Pause. Knock. 
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[[Just one last event, incredible as that may seem, and its 
[consequences] outcome. It happened thus. One moonlit night 
as [( )] in his [vain] [search of] [for] vain quest of calm he 
[walked] roamed the streets, in his long black coat and old 
world Latin Quarter hat, he heard himself hailed by name. He 
who since his flight [( )] had gone his ways unknown. He 
turned to face the intruder. A small old man. Long white hair. 
Ravaged face. Wretchedly attired. [( )] In the long look 
exchanged slowly a name: White. See appendix 4. (Turns pages 
forward to ap. 4) White:]] 
One night as he sat trembling head in hands from head to 
foot a man appeared to him and said, I have been sent by—and 
here he named the dear name—to read to you. Drawing then a 
vol. from [his long black] the pocket of his long black coat he sat 
and read till [morning light] dawn. Then [went] disappeared 
without a word. 
Some time later he reappeared [again] with the same volume 
as before this time without preamble sat and read [the] it 
through the long night through. Then [went] disappeared 
without a word. 
So from time to time unheralded he would appear to read the 
old tale through & night away, then disappear without a word. 
Till the night came when having [ended] closed the book and 
[daylight] dawn at hand [( )] he did not disappear with­
out a word but sat on a little while [in silence] without a word. 
Finally he said, I have had word from—and here he named the 
dear name—[not to come again] that I am not to come again. I 
saw the dear face & heard the unspoken words, No need to go 




I saw the dear face & heard the unspoken words, No need to 
go to him again, even were it in your power. 
Pause. Knock 
Nothing remains to be told. 
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Pause. Pause 
Look Closes book. 
Curtain Pause 
Simultaneously they [( ) 
right] lower their right hands to

table, raise their heads and look











As alike in appearance as possible,

Light on table mid-stage. Rest of stage in darkness.

Plain white deal table say 8' x 4'. Two plain armless white

deal chairs. 
L seated facing [audience] front towards [with audience 
right] end [end (his left)] of long side audience right. Bowed 
head [resting] propped on right hand, face invisible, [Long 
black coat. ( )] Left hand on table. Long black coat. Long 
grey hair. 
R seated in profile short side audience right, bowed head 
[resting] propped on right hand, left hand on table, book on 
table before him open at last pages. Long black coat. Long grey 
hair. 








[So a last time the sad tale unwound]

So the sad tale a last time told They sat on as though turned

to stone. Through the single window dawn gave no light. From 
the streets no sound of toil renewed. Or was it that buried in 
who knows what thoughts they gave no heed? To light of 
dawn. Sound of renewing toil [renewed]. Who knows what 
thoughts. [Thoughts?] No, not thoughts. [No.] Profounds of 
mind. Buried in who knows what profounds of mind. Of mind­
lessness. Whither no light can reach. No sound. So sat on. As 
though turned to stone. The sad tale a last time told. 
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Pause 
Nothing remains to tell. 
Pause. 
R [closes book] makes to close book. 
Knock, Book half closed. 
Nothing remains to tell. 












As alike in appearance as possible.

Liffot on table midstape. Rest of stare in darkness.

Plain white deal table say 8' i 4 ' .

Two plain armless white *»»i« deal chairs .

L seated facinr front towards end of long* side audience r i^h t . Bowed head propped 
or r irv t hand. Face invis ible . Left hand on table. Lon bit' ck coat. Lon£ prey ha i r . 
R seated In profile centre of short side audience r i^h t . Bowed hair propped on 
r i . t i t hand. Left hard on table , i took on table before him open flx.last parey. 
Lon^ black cont. Lonf: f^ rey hair . 
Fade up on table.

Pause. 
H turns parre. 
Pause. 
(reading). Li t t le remains to tXKittW. In a l as t - (L knocks^on table.) L i t t l e 
remains to htSfcki. ^Pause. Knock.) In a I E S J attempt to o€ia,in re l ie f he moved 
SK5
 a ninnTT TiiiSbi iw*—\ room onfrom where they had # f so lonr alone togetl er to
the ot^er bank. From i t s single window he could just see the downstream extremity 
of the 41 Isle of Swans. (Pause.) Relief he had hoped would flow from unfamiliarity. 
Unfamiliar room. Unfamiliar scene. To go ouf. to where nothing ever shared. To 
come back to where nothing ever shared. From this he had once h£lf hoped some 
«a«_L-l measure of re l ief miftit flow. 
Pause. 
'•'*nt rv/", hf  " T to he seen slowly pacing t v e i s land^In his lor.f- Mack coat 
j,M / n o  u U  t t e  r w -^at the temperature ar>d old world Latin Quarter hat . At the t ip 
/ he woCT? jf"" /-T ?*iiic^yr>"'" r r " r i i r - stresm. How in joyous eddies i t s two 
arAs conflowed and flowed united on. Then turn and his slow steps re t race . 
Pause. 
In his dreams ­
Knock. 
Then turn and his slov.' steps re t race . 
Pause. Knock. 
In his dreams he had been warned against this chanfe. Seen the dearXace and 
heard the unspoken <& words, 1 t i ?  v * ^ ^ ^ * ^ ^ t ^ ^ ^^*% 
comfort you. ( 
Couldhenot now turn back? Acknowledge his error and return to where thay. 
b j ^ S p R i s p l m  E alone together. Alore together so muchshared. ho. What 
he '? nd dore^could not be undone, l.othinr he had ever donecould ever be undone. 




/ i t was tin this extremity his old terror of r.i, r t laid hold en him afain. 
After so lor..- a jiapse th»t as if never beer.. 'Pause. Looks closer.) Yen, 
after BO lor.- 8 It'.pse that as if never Veer. Low with redoubled force t\ e 
fearful symptoms described at length pa^e forty pararraph £our. (Ctartr: to 
turr rack tbe pares, 'tjjffcel Y JVCi'"'*' '"»" lj- HesCT^Tte^SrW pare.) 
«hite ni ' i i ts ar;ain hin'Tot. .-.s when his heart was TOUTL . !.o sleep no hravir.f 
rleep till/dawn o ' dsv. *' ' ~" 
Pause. 
Little remains to . One r.i. ht ­
Knock. 
Li t t le remains to "be—boM. 
Pause. Knock. 
Or.e ni ht as he sat trembling head in hards from head to foot a man appeared

to him ard said, I have beer, ser t by - and here he named the dear r.ane - to

read to you. ?her. drawing a volume from the pocket of his long black coat he

sat and read t i l l dawn. Then disappeared without a word.

—" th is time without preamble sat and 
Gome time la ter he reappeared at the same hour with the same volume and/read 
i t throu{r.Ttne lone n i^ i t through. Then disappeared without a word. 
Pause. 
.!o frora time to time unheralded he would appear to read the sad tale through 
.and/hif-htAiway, "Jher. disappear without a word. 
Pause. 
W i l T i e ni;-ht «««e^wher. havinf closed the book and dawn at hand he'did not 
disappear buysatJonjawhile without a word. Finally he said, I b*ve had word 
from - ar.^  here We nruaod the dear name - that I shall not coire a oin. I saw 
the dear face and heard the unspoken words, !*o need to go to hjja a^ain, even 
were i t in your power-
Pause. 
irxzkx Ki ock. 
Gaw the dear free and heard the unspoken words, ?.o r.eed to ro to him a{'aTn, even 
were i t in your power. 
Pause. Knock. 
I.o'hir. • remairs to 
H CI>6.R" kaaK boy-:. 
Simul tM'.esouly V cy lower their- ri
 i ;h t hnrds to it VIef raire t'reir heads arid look 
at ep.'-Y o^y pr, /!. xp reunion I ^ss . 
rrde out. 
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As alike in appearance as possible.

Lifiht on table midstare. Rest of stage in darkness. 
Plain white deal table say 8' x 4 ' .

Two plain armless white deal chairs .

L seated at table facing front towards end of long side audience 
r igh t . Bowed head propped on right hand. Face hidden. Left hand 
or. table . Long Hack coat. LonK gray ha i r .
 vvki'ft> 
centre / R seated at table in profile mdm/of short side audience r igh t . 
Bowed head propped on rifftt hand. Left hand on table . Book on 
table before him open at tlwgd las t paeeTLonr black coat. Long 
hai r . 
Fade up an t a t t c . 
'fen seconds. 
R turns pape. 
(read in,?). L i t t l e remains to t e l l . In a las t - (L knocks with lef t 
hCTid on table . ) L i t t l e tM&&£ to t e l l . (Pause. Knock.) In a las t 
attempt to obtain re l ie f he moved from where they had been so long 
alone together to a single room on the far bsnk. Froo i t s single 
window he could just see the downstream extremity of the Is le of 
Swans. {Pause.) Relief he had hoped would flow from unfamiliarity. 
Unfamiliar room. Unfamiliar scene. Out to where nothing ever shared. 
Back to where nothing ever shared. From this he had once half hoped 
some measure of re l ie f migfrt flow. 
Pause. 
Daily he could be seen slowly pacing the isleu Hour after hour. In

his lon^ black coat aa no matter what the weather and old world Latin

Quarter hat. At the tip he would always pause to dwell on the receding

stream. How in joyous eddies its two arms conflowed and flowed united

on. Then turn and his slow steps retrace.









In his dreams he had been warned against this change. Seen the dear 
face and heard the unspoken words. Stay where we were so lon£ alone 








Seen the dear face and heard the unspoken words, Stay where we were





Could he not now turn back? Acknowledge his error and return to where 
they were once so long alone together. Alone together so Auch shared. 
No. Vfliat he had done alone could not be undone. Kothing he had ever 
done alone could ever be undone. 3y hia alone. 
In this extremity his old terror of night laid hold on him again. After

so long a lapse that as if never been. (Pause. Looks closer.) Yes, after

so long a lapse that as if never been. Now with redoubled force the fearful

symptoms described at length page forty paragraph four, (starts to turn

back the pages. Checked by L's left hand. Resumes relinquished pageTT

White nights now again his portion. As when his heart was young. Ivo sleep





Li t t l e remains to t e l l . One night ­
Knock. , 




One ni^ht as he sat trembling head in hands from head to foot a man 
appeared to him and said, I have been sent by - and here he named the dear 
r;ame - to read to you. Then drawing a worn volume from the pocket of 
his long black coat he sat and read t i l  l dawn. Then disappeared without 
a word. 
Pause. 
Some time lajer he reappeared at the same hour with the same volume 
and this time without preamble sat and read i t through a,r-ain the long 
night through. Then disappeared without a word. 
Pause. 
So from time to time unheralded he would appear to read the sad tale





With never a word exchanged they grew to be as one/soull

Til l the night came at las t when having closed the book and dawr. at 
hand he did not disappear but sat on «aM£» without a word. Finally 
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he said, I have had word from - and here he named the dear name - that 
I shall not come a^ain. I saw the dear face and heard the unspoken words, 
I»o need to go to hijn again, even were i  t in your power. 
Pause.





Saw the dear face again and heard the unspoken words, Ko need to go to





So the sad tale a last time told they sat on as thou;~h turned to 3tone.

Through the single window dawn shed no l i # i t . iTom the s treet no sound 
,Vi" "• ''' * ' * °f renWinc^toTt". Or was i t that buried in 1*10 knows what thou<hts they 
• gave / g««/no~heed? To l i ( * t of day. Sound of renewing1 'ioil. l«/hat thoughts who 
, J/--<»"*-< .. ' knows.Mo, not thou;iits. Profounds of mind. Buried in who knows what 
I' r profounds of mind. Of mindlessness. Whither no l ight can reach. No sound. 
So sat on as though turned to stone. The sad tale a las t time told. 
Pause. 
M 11 j  -
l.othing ^eaialfls to t e l l  . 
Pause. / Knuct/R makes to close book.

Knock. Book half closed.

Nothin^Ba&fctfHs to t e l l  .







qfely they lower their right hands to table, raise their heads 
















As alike in appearance as possible.

Light on table midstage. Rest of stage in darkness.

Flain wiite deal table say 8' x 4'.

Two plain armless white deal chaira.

L seated at table facing front towards end of long aide audience

right. Bowed head propped on right hand. Face hidden. Left hand on

table. Lon^ black coat. Long white hair.

R seated at table in profile centre of short side audience right.

Bowed head propped on right hand. Left hand on table. Book on table

before him or>en at last pages. Long black coat. Long white hair.





R (reading). Little is left to tell. In a last ­

L knocks with left hand on table.





In a last attempt to obtain relief he moved from where they had been

so long together to a single room on the far bank. From its pin,;le

vindow he could see the downstream extremity of the Isle of Swans.

Relief he had hoped would flow from unfamiliarity. Unfamiliar room.

Unfamiliar scene. Out to where nothing ever shared. Back to where

nothing ever shared. From this he had once half hoped some measure





Day after day he could be seen slowly pacing the islet. Hour after

hour. In his Ion" black coat no matter what the weather and old world

Latin Quarter hat. At the tip he would always pause to dwell on the

receding stream. How in joyous eddies its two arms conflowed and flowed















In hip dreams he had teen warned against this chance. Seen the dear

face ar.d heard the unspoken words. Stay where we were so long alone









Seen the dear face and heard the unspoken words, Stay where we were so





Could he not now turn back? Acknowledge his error and return to where

they were once so Ion?- alone together. Alone together so much shared.

No. What he had done alone could not be undone. Nothing- he had ever done





hold / In this extremity his old terror of nifht laid/tai»i on him again.

After ST long a lapse that as if never been. (Pause. Looks closer.)

Yea, after so Ion?: a lanse that as if never been. Now with redoubled

force the fearful symptoms described at length page forty oaragraDh four,

(starts to turn back the pages. Checked by L's left hand. Resumes re­

linquished page.) '.'toite ni-hts now again his portion. As when his heart













One ni<?ht as he sat trembling head in hands from head to foot a man

aopeared to him and said, I have been sent by - and here he named the

dear name - to comfort you. Then drawing a worn volume from the nocket







Some time later he appeared again at the same hour with the same volume

and this time without preamble sat and read it through arain the long

ni?ht through. Then disappeared without a word.

So from time to time unheralded he would apoear to read the sad tale







With never a word exchange! they ,"rew to be as one.

Till the nieht came at last when having closed the book and dawn at

hand he did not disappear but sat on without a word.

Finally he said, I have had word from - and here he named the dear u n i i

name - that I shall not come again. I saw the dear face and heard the

unspoken words, :!o need to go to him again, even were it in your power.





Saw the dear face  a m and heard the unspoken words. No need to go to





So the sad tale a last time told they sat on as though turned to stone.

Through the single window dawn shed no light. From the street no sound

of reawakening. Or was it that buried in who knows what thoughts they

paid no need? To lip+it of day. To sound of reawakening. What thoughts

who knows. Thoughts, no, not thoughts. Profounds of mind. Buried in who

knows what profounds of mind. Of mindlessness. Whither no lirtit can reach.







nothing is left to tell.

Pause. R makes to close book.

Knock. Book half closed.

nothing is left to tell.







Simultaneen»ly they lower their right hands to table, raise their heads 
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